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This dissertation is motivated by an observation of a global steep increasing trend in 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting regulation since year 2000. By 2015, world 
top 63 economies have instituted 345 CSR reporting regulation policies. Among them, 
64.2% are mandatory (Carrots&Sticks, 2016). Most previous studies on CSR were 
conducted when it was practiced voluntarily without regulation. By far, a complete history 
and full scope quantitative study of recent CSR reporting regulation has not been done yet. 
Particularly, rare attention has been given to the financial incentives for firms to full CSR 
under the regulation. 
In chapter 1, I analyze the drivers of CSR reporting regulation using long differences by 
looking back at the entire history of CSR regulation and including most countries which 
have instituted CSR reporting instruments. I find that the most significant and robust 
driver of global CSR reporting regulation is the size of an economy measured by GDP level 
of a country. Besides, the deterioration of PM2.5 air pollution level might be a driver to the 
development of voluntary CSR policies. Both the international trade spillover effect and the 
international organization promotion effort might be drivers to the development of general 
sustainability CSR policies. However, during the past 15 years, the regional differences in 
the development of CSR regulation policies among bordering countries has increased. 
Additional likely associations with the development of CSR reporting regulation are the 
extent that a country removes financial bubbles in its stock market and the democratic 
institution as well as political environment of a country.  
In chapter 2, I explore financial incentives for firms to fulfill CSR under CSR reporting 
regulations. The two key questions I addressed are: Is there a link between firms’ CSR 
performance and financial performance? (Q1) Particularly, can publishing CSR reports 
motivate firms to fulfill their CSR obligation? (Q2) I answer these two questions by 
empirically analyzing a large panel data set from China after CSR reporting regulation. 
The data set includes 120 top firms from China spanning from year 2007 to 2013. The total 
revenue of sampled firms constitutes around half of China’s non-agriculture GDP. 





study, which has not been considered by most studies of CSR since these studies were done 
when CSR reporting was practiced voluntarily (Orlitzky, Schmidt, Rynes, 2003; Margolis, 
Elfenbein, and Walsh, 2007). The results show that the short-run links and long-run links 
between firms' CSR performance and financial performance are different. In the short run, 
publishing CSR reports generates higher net profit compared with not publishing CSR 
reports. However, the marginal impact of lagged CSR performance on net profit is negative. 
In the long run, the marginal impact of lagged CSR performance on net profit is positive. 
However, better CSR performance also results in higher total operating cost. Leaders and 
Followers receive positive marginal impact of lagged CSR performance on net profit in the 
long run, while the positive marginal impact on Leaders is greater than the marginal 
impact on Followers. Leaders and Followers' CSR performance need to exceed a certain 
level to receive a positive net profit from CSR performance. The Uncommitted firms receive 
negative marginal impact of lagged CSR performance on net profit. Among four CSR 
performance sub-indices, social CSR performance has the most consistent positive impacts 
on profitability. Lagged market CSR performance and CSR management performance also 
have positive effects on profitability. The link between environmental CSR performance 
and financial performance is very limited and in general negative. 
In chapter 3, I evaluate the impacts of global CSR reporting regulation on sustainable 
development since 73% of global CSR reporting policies are related with firms' 
environmental CSR performance and 38% of global CSR reporting policies are related with 
general sustainability (Carrots&Sticks, 2016). I select three indicators for sustainable 
development: energy intensity, CO2 emissions and PM2.5 pollution level.  
For energy intensity, I followed Fisher-Vanden, Jefferson, Liu and Tao (2004) and used a 
reduced form model to investigate whether CSR regulation may urge firms to use energy 
more efficiently or prudently and further reduce a nation’s energy intensity. Since I use 
macro level time series data, panel unit root test and panel cointegration analysis are used 
to explore the relations.  
For CO2 emissions, I started from Kaya identity (Yamaji, Matsuhashi, Nagata & Kaya, 
1991), which gives an exact decomposition of CO2 emissions into four factors, and then 
focused on examining the impact of CSR regulation on the key factor of carbon intensity of 
energy by using panel cointegration analysis.  
For PM2.5 pollution level, I used a dynamic panel model and adopted a recently developed 





procedure proposed by Han, Phillips, and Sul (2014) which has strong asymptotic and finite 
sample performance characteristics that dominate other procedures such as bias corrected 
least squares (LSDVC), generalized method of moments (GMM), and system GMM 
methods. 
Overall, I find that there is a positive long-run Granger causality from 3-year lag of 
environmental CSR policies to energy intensity. This might be due to the reason that all 
CSR reporting policies on pollution control are classified into environmental CSR policies. 
And more CSR policies on pollution control may increase the cost to producers to meet the 
environmental requirements in the short run. No significant result is found for CSR policies 
on CO2 emissions. However, both current year general sustainability CSR policies and 3-
year lag of environmental CSR policies have significant negative impacts on PM2.5. And 3-
year lag of environmental CSR policies also has a significant negative impact on PM2.5. 
Besides, I also identify some other important factors related with energy efficiency, CO2 
emissions and PM2.5 pollution. 
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Chapter 1  
Drivers of Global Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
Reporting Regulation  
 
1.1 Introduction 
It was around the year 2000 that a remarkable shift of the global consensus in the scope of 
corporate sustainability reporting emerged. In June 2000, the Global Reporting Initiative 
(GRI) launched the first global framework for comprehensive sustainability reporting 
Sustainability Reporting Guidelines on Economic, Environmental, and Social Performance, 
which enlarged the coverage scope of sustainability reporting from environmental issues to 
a triple-bottom-line of economic, environmental and social performance. (GRI’s History, 
GRI website; Sustainability Reporting Guidelines, GRI, June 2000). Soon after, this triple-
bottom-line has been accepted as modern standards of corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
(What is CSR?, UNIDO, website), which is defined as “the responsibility of enterprises for 
their impacts on society” (European Commission, 2011). 
Since then, the number of the reporting regulation instruments that require firms to 
fulfill their CSR and report their CSR performance information has grown fast. By 2015, 
98.4% of the world top 64 economies have instituted 345 reporting regulation instruments 
in total. Moreover, 64.2% of these instruments are mandatory (www.carrotsandsticks.net). 
It is worth to ask why does CSR reporting regulation grow so fast globally? What are 
drivers behind this growth? What role does each driver play? 
Most previous studies on CSR were conducted when CSR was practiced voluntarily 
(Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes, 2003; Margolis, Elfenbein, and Walsh, 2007; Kitzmueller & 
Shimshack, 2012). However, a complete history and full scope study of CSR reporting 
regulation has not been done yet. It would be valuable to review the development of global 
CSR reporting regulation to better understand the role of each driver in the fast growth and 
globalization of CSR reporting regulations. Such a study would also help us to better 





In this chapter, I analyze the drivers of CSR reporting regulation using long differences 
by looking back at the entire history of CSR regulation and including most countries which 
have instituted CSR reporting instruments. 
I find that the most significant and robust driver of global CSR reporting regulation is 
the size of an economy measured by GDP level of a country. Besides, the deterioration of 
PM2.5 air pollution level might be a driver to the development of voluntary CSR policies. 
Both the international trade spillover effect and the international organization promotion 
effort might be drivers to the development of general sustainability CSR policies. However, 
during the past 15 years, the regional differences in the development of CSR regulation 
policies among bordering countries has increased. Additional likely associations with the 
development of CSR reporting regulation are the extent that a country removes financial 
bubbles in its stock market and the democratic institution as well as political environment 
of a country.   
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 1.2, I take a short review on 
the history of global CSR reporting regulation and identify five drivers of global CSR 
reporting regulation. In section 1.3, I first select proxy variables for drivers and then 
empirically test the impacts of drivers in shaping the development of global CSR reporting 
regulation. In section 1.4, limitations and future studies are discussed. 
1.2 A Short History of Global CSR Reporting Regulation 
In April 2016, the most comprehensive database of world corporate social responsibility 
reporting instruments was established, covering the period since 2000. The website of the 
database named www.carrotsandsticks.net (Carrots&Sticks) contains information on 
various forms of sustainability reporting instruments. An overwhelming majority of all 
instruments are issued by governments or industry regulators on CSR reporting regulation, 
in the forms of legislation, regulation, guidance, guidelines, frameworks and standards. 
Only a very small portion of instruments are issued by private standards initiatives or 
voluntary initiative, or on sustainable reporting regulation on organizations in public 
sectors. This database is based on a report and associated research conducted jointly by 
KPMG International, GRI, United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and The 
Centre for Corporate Governance in Africa at the University of Stellenbosch Business 





reporting regulation policies from world top 64 economies have been documented in this 
database. 
According to Carrots&Sticks, every reporting instrument is classified as either 
mandatory or voluntary. Usually, mandatory policies are more specific and have clear 
requirements on what information firms are required to report. For example, U.S.A. EPA 
issued the Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases Rule (74 FR 56260) in year 2009 
which requires reporting of greenhouse gas (GHG) data and other relevant information 
from large sources and suppliers in the United States. For another example, in year 2015, 
India the board of the Securities and Exchange Board (SEBI) mandated listed companies, 
especially top 500 companies, to submit Business Responsibility Reports, describing 
measures taken along the key principles enunciated in the ‘National Voluntary Guidelines 
on Social, Environmental and Economic Responsibilities of Business’ framed by the 
Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA). On the other side, voluntary policies are more general 
and mainly provide some guidelines or suggest some standards on firms’ CSR behaviors or 
governance. For example, in year 2012, the China Banking Regulatory Commission 
updated the Green Credit Guidelines that regulate the environmental performance of 
Chinese banks. In clause 3 and 4, it first clarifies environmental and social (E&S) 
responsibilities of banks by requiring Chinese banks to promote green credit and effectively 
identify, assess, monitor, control or mitigate environmental & social (E&S) risks in business 
operations, develop E&S risk management systems, strengthen credit policies and 
processes that are related. Correspondingly, in clause 24, it further clarifies banks’ E&S 
disclosure responsibility by requiring Chinese banks to disclose green credit strategy and 
policies, and green credit implementation status. 
Also, each CSR reporting regulation instrument is classified into one or more categories 
based on its regulation scope. There are four categories: general sustainability, governance, 
environmental and social. It is common to have multiple instruments under the same 
category for one country. This is because there are multiple types of instruments issuers, 
including national/federal government, local government, industry regulators, financial 
regulators, stock exchange, etc. Also, each instrument may only focus on one or several 
specific issues under a category. Carrots&Sticks doesn’t provide the detailed information on 
the content included in each category. Sometimes, an instrument belongs to multiple 





category. We just followed the classification results done by Carrots&Sticks. The statistics 
are presented in Figure 1.1 to Figure 1.4. 
Figure 1.1 
 
(Source: data is collected from www.carrotsandsticks.net, statistics is done by author) 
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The Number of World Top 64 Economies' Total CSR 
Reporting Policies and Mandatory CSR Reporting 








(Source: data is collected from www.carrotsandsticks.net, statistics is done by author) 
Figure 1.3 
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(Source: data is collected from www.carrotsandsticks.net, statistics is done by author 
Table 1.1 The List of 64 Economies which are Included in the Carrots & Sticks Database 
Austria Czech Republic Indonesia Maldives Romania Turkey 
Argentina Denmark Ireland Mexico Russia Ukraine 
Bangladesh Ecuador Israel Netherlands Singapore 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Belgium Finland Italy Nigeria Slovakia 
United 
Kingdom 
Bolivia France Ivory Coast Norway South Africa U.S.A. 
Brazil Germany Japan Pakistan South Korea Venezuela 
Canada Greece Kazakhstan Peru Spain Vietnam 
Chile Hong Kong Kenya Philippines Sweden Zimbabwe 
Colombia Hungary Kuwait Poland Switzerland Australia 
China Iceland Lithuania Portugal Taiwan  
Cyprus India Malaysia Qatar Thailand  
 
In Figure 1.1 to Figure 1.4, we move the starting time of our statistics back to 1980 to 
better reflect an accelerating trend of the development of CSR reporting instruments after 








The Number of World Top 64 Economies' Four Categories 
of CSR Reporting Policies from 1980 to 2015





early environmental reporting legislation or labor protection reporting requirement. The 
slightly increasing trend between 1980 and 2000 reflected a transition period when 
sustainable development was put on the global agenda. From Figure 1.1 to Figure 1.4, we 
can see that environmental performance is currently the top target of CSR reporting 
regulation, which reflects the most urgent concern by the public and might also be due to 
the relatively earlier starting time that this issue aroused the public’s attention through 
pollution and global climate change. In the following sections 1.2.1 to 1.2.3, we take a short 
review of three development stages of global CSR reporting instruments. Much of this is 
provided from information in the Carrots&Sticks website. In section 1.2.4, we further take 
an overview of the development of CSR reporting instruments in U.S.A. as an example.  
1.2.1 Early Forms: 1960s to 1970s 
The early CSR reporting regulation dates back to 1960s to 1970s. It appeared in the form 
of environmental reporting legislation or labor protection reporting requirement in France, 
USA, Japan and Malaysia. In France, the law, which was voted through on July 7, 1977 as 
Code du Travail, Article L2323-71, mandated all companies with more than 300 employees 
to publish a social review that included more than 100 performance indicators (Carrots and 
Sticks-Promoting Transparency and Sustainability, pg. 79, 2010).  
In the United States, the Clean Air Act, Securities and Exchange Commission 
Regulation legislation, and the Equal Employment Opportunity Act were passed in early 
1970s. The Clean Air Act (CAA), enacted in 1970, requires the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) to establish national ambient air quality standards for certain common and 
widespread pollutants based on the latest science. The EPA has set air quality standards 
for six common “criteria pollutants”: particulate matter (also known as particle pollution), 
ozone, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, carbon monoxide, and lead. The EPA 
issues mandatory reporting requirements for emissions from companies / facilities based on 
the CAA.  
The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has required public companies to 
disclose the material effects that compliance with environmental laws may have on 
earnings, capital expense, or competitive positions through SEC Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. 
§ 229.101 since 1970s. Item 101 has generally led to the disclosure of environmental 





The US Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 made an amendment to Section 
709(c), Title VII, US Civil Rights Act of 1967. It mandates annual filing regarding 
of employment records, including the racial and gender profiles of employees , to determine 
whether unlawful employment practices have been or are being committed.  
In Japan, The Waste Management and Public Cleansing Law (Waste Management Law) 
was established in 1970 along with other pollution-related laws by the Diet. It regulates the 
party that generates, stores or transports waste. It also requires the generator that emits a 
large quantity of waste to report the status of executing a waste management plan to the 
prefectural governors as specified by Ordinance of the Ministry of the Environment. The 
Law has undergone major revisions in 1976, 1991, 1997, 2000 and 2006 in response to 
societal changes. Also, the energy conservation law was introduced in 1979 following the oil 
crises in the 1970s. Under this law, companies that consume a certain amount of energy 
have the obligation to report publicly the amount of energy consumed (Carrots and Sticks-
Promoting Transparency and Sustainability, pg. 52, 2010). 
In Malaysia, the Factories and Machinery Act (FMA) enacted in 1964 proposed reporting 
requirement for manufacturing, mining, quarrying and construction industries. It 
includes provisions on safety, health and welfare of employees handling and working 
around machinery. It sets requirements for the public notification of accidents and 
occurrence of dangerous diseases.  
1.2.2 Transition Period: 1980s to 1990s 
In 1980s, with increasing concern about the accelerating deterioration of the 
environment and natural resources and the consequences of that deterioration for economic 
and social development sustainability development, sustainable development was put on 
the global agenda.  
In 1987, the global consensus on the implication of “sustainable development” was 
proposed in the report of forty-second session of general assembly of the World Commission 
on Environment and Development. The “sustainable development” was interpreted as 
“meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their own needs” (United Nations, 1987). It called on a new approach to economic 
growth, not only to eradicate the poverty but also to enhance the resource base on which 





Under this calling, the main development of CSR reporting regulation during this period 
is that more legislation on environmental protection was enacted. During 1980s and 1990s, 
12 countries enacted law, act, decree or article to require firms to fulfill their 
responsibilities in energy usage saving and pollutant release reduction and report their 
environmental related information. The list of countries and their regulation instruments is 
presented in Table 1.2. 
 








1 Australia 1998 National Pollutant Inventory Mandatory 
2 Belgium 1995 Article 4.1.8 of VLAREM Mandatory 
3 Canada 1999 Canadian Environmental Protection Act Mandatory 
4 Finland 1997 The Finnish Accounting Act Mandatory 
5 Japan 1998 Law concerning the Rational Use of Energy Mandatory 
6 India 1986 Environment (Protection) Act 1986 Mandatory 
7 Mexico 1997 Clean Industry Certificate Voluntary 
  1998 Official Mexican Standard on Wastewater Quality Mandatory 
8 Norway 1998 The Norwegian Accounting Act Mandatory 
9 South Africa 1998 National Environment Management Act Voluntary 
10 Sweden 1998 
Guidelines on environmental info in the Director’s Report 
section of the Annual Report 
Voluntary 
11 U.S.A. 1988 
Energy Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act 
Section 
Mandatory 
12 Venezuela 1995 Decree 883, 638-N˚ 1.257 (on improving air quality) Mandatory 
  1995 Decree No.883 on water quality Mandatory 
  1998 Decree No.2635 on hazardous materials Mandatory 
(Source: www.carrotsandsticks.net) 
At the meantime, a small number of countries enacted act, guidelines or regulation to 
require firms to report employment related information and promote gender balance, 
diversity in the workplace, and securing the safety, health and welfare of persons at work. 







1.2.3 Fast Growth: 2000 to present 
After entering year 2000, five factors have played important roles in shaping the fast 
development of CSR regulation. These five factors are global climate change and 
environmental pollution, the promotion from international organizations, the increasing 
attention to prevent financial risk and rebuild trust after the global financial crisis of 2008, 
the increasing trend of economic globalization and the increasing expectation from 
stakeholders and civil society on governments to regulate firms’ behaviors.   
The first dominant factor in driving the fast development of CSR regulation since year 
2000 is the accelerating climate change and the environmental pollution. In 1990s, there 
has been a realization of the impact of human activities on climate, particularly the impact 
of increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. In 1993, The World 
Meteorological Organization (WMO) began to publish WMO Statement on the Status of the 
Global Climate annually. In their first statement, although a number of climate anomalies 
and extreme events happened and an increase in global surface average air temperature 
was observed in 1993, it was uncertain to claim these events as climate change (WMO, 
1993). However, in a report on global climate change released in January 2001, a detailed 
study of human influence on climate was made and the report concluded that most of the 
observed warming observed over the last 50 years is attributable to human activities 
(IPCC, 2001). In 2016, global warming continued, setting a new record at about 1.1°C above 
the pre-industrial period. Also, carbon dioxide reached new highs at 400.0 ± 0.1 parts per 
million in the atmosphere (WMO, 2016). Globally, more than 80% of people living in urban 
areas that monitor air pollution are exposed to air quality levels that exceed the WHO 
limits. While all regions of the world are affected, populations in low-income cities are the 
most impacted (WHO, 2016). Correspondingly, the number of CSR regulation instruments 
on firms’ environmental performance constitutes around 70% of total CSR regulation 
instruments from 2000 to 2015.  
The second factor in driving the development of CSR regulation is the promotion from 
international organizations. These international organizations developed decision making 
tools or partnered with governments to help governments to take action towards a more 
sustainable economy. Particularly, two international organizations formed comprehensive 
partnerships with governments. They are Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) and the 





Multinational Enterprises. GRI’s mission is to empower decision makers everywhere, 
through their sustainability standards and multi-stakeholder network, to take action 
towards a more sustainable economy and world. In June 2000, GRI launched the first 
global framework for comprehensive sustainability reporting Sustainability Reporting 
Guidelines on Economic, Environmental, and Social Performance, which promoted the 
formation of global consensus on a triple-bottom-line of economic, environmental and social 
performance in firms’ sustainability reporting (GRI’s History, GRI website; Sustainability 
Reporting Guidelines, GRI, June 2000). The contribution of GRI reporting guideline is that 
it enlarged the scope of CSR from environmental issues to a broader scope including 
corporate governance, economic imperative, environmental imperative and social 
imperative. Soon after, this triple-bottom-line has been accepted as modern standard 
definition of corporate social responsibility (CSR) (What is CSR?, UNIDO). Before year 
2000, the percentages of instruments on general sustainability, corporate governance, and 
social imperative among the number of total CSR regulation instruments are relatively 
stable at around 9%, 12%, and 39%. However, by 2015, influenced by the new global 
consensus, the percentage of instruments on general sustainability, corporate governance, 
and social imperative increased to 38%, 55%, and 55%. Up to 2016, 40 countries and 
regions’ governments have mentioned, recommended, or required GRI guidelines in their 
total 70 CSR reporting regulation instruments (GRI referred in policy & regulation, GRI). 
As for OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 44 adhering governments – 
representing both OECD and non-OECD member countries from all regions of the world – 
encourage their enterprises to observe the Guidelines wherever they operate (Brief 
Description of OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, Carrots & Sticks). 
The third factor which shaped the development of CSR regulation after year 2008 is the 
increasing attention in to prevent financial risk and rebuild trust after the global financial 
crisis of 2008. A trust barometer survey by Edelman across 20 countries with 4475 
respondents between Nov. 5th and Dec. 14th 2008 showed that trust in business dropped in 9 
countries, especially in countries which suffered severely from financial crisis like U.S., 
Italy, Mexico, Spain, India and Ireland (Edelman, 2009). In CSR regulation history, we 
observed accelerated growth trend in the number of CSR regulation instruments on firms’ 
governance after 2008. Between 2000 and 2008, 46 new CSR regulation instruments on 





new CSR regulation instruments on firms’ governance were issued. By April 2016, around 
one third of all sustainability reporting instruments are issued by stock exchanges and 
financial market regulators (Carrots&Sticks, 2016). And around 40% of all sector specific 
reporting instruments target financial services sector (Carrots&Sticks, 2016). This may 
reflect an increasing attention in regulating firms’ governance to prevent financial risk and 
rebuild trust in business by issuing new CSR regulation instruments on firms’ governance. 
In Table 1.3, we summarized some examples of this type of CSR regulation instrument 
after 2008. 









Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(Section 1502, 1504) 
Mandatory 
Italy 2009 Directors’ report on financial statements Voluntary 
 2009 Legislative Decree no. 150/2009 Mandatory 
Mexico 2012 Federal Law on Anti-corruption Practices in Public Contracts Mandatory 
Spain 2011 Spanish Sustainable Economy Law Voluntary 
 2012 Guide for management report by listed companies Voluntary 
 2013 Ministerial Order on Corporate Governance Mandatory 
India 2009 
Ministry of Corporate Affair, Corporate Social Responsibility 
Voluntary Guidelines 
Voluntary 
 2011 Guidance Note on Non-Financial Disclosures Voluntary 
 2011 
National Voluntary Guidelines on Social, Environmental & 
Economic Responsibilities of Business, 2011 (1st edition 2009). 
Voluntary 
UK 2010 UK Stewardship Code Voluntary 
 2012 UK Corporate Governance Code Mandatory 
France 2010 Corporate Governance Code of Listed Corporations Mandatory 
 2010 Art 224, Grenelle Act II Mandatory 
 2010 Art 225, Grenelle Act II Mandatory 
(Source: www.carrotsandsticks.net) 
The fourth factor which stimulates the growth of CSR regulation is the increasing trend 
of economic globalization. The economic connections among countries becomes more and 
more closer with increasing world exported and imported value of 1.029 trillion US dollars 
(measured in 2010 US dollars) in year 2000 to 3.608 trillion US dollars (measured in 2010 





Centre). A new phenomenon in international trade is that governments or private bodies of 
developed countries began to propose environmental and health requests or import limits 
on imports from developing countries. Two studies: Environmental Requirements and 
Market Access 2005 by OECD and Trade and Environment Review 2006 by the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) have taken comprehensive 
studies on the trade effects of such requirements on developing countries. Environmental 
and health requirements were widely found in trade products of manufactured goods like 
textile, aromatic amines in textiles, leather goods, plastic and PVC, gasoline, products of 
agriculture, forestry and fishing, products of organic agriculture, and etc (OECD, 2005). 
Although these requirements and their effects on developing countries have been brought to 
the attention of WTO’s Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE), the answer from CTE 
to this issue is not to weaken environmental standards, but to enable exporters to meet 
them (CTE, website). In fact, this is what has happened in developing countries in reality.  
In Figure 1.5, we depicted the counts of the number of economies which had adopted 
CSR regulation instruments in each year. We classified economies into four groups 
according to historical classification based on GNI per capita by the World Bank: high-
income economy (H), upper-middle-income economy (UM), lower-middle-income economy 
(LM), and low-income economy (L). In Figure 1.6, we depicted the counts of the number of 
environmental CSR regulation instruments in each type of economy by income. We can 
observe that number of CSR regulation instrument adoption economies among middle-
income economies (both UM and LM economies) and the number of environmental CSR 
regulation instruments among middle-income economies keeps increasing over the years. It 
is worth to mention that in the past 15 years from 2000 to 2015, most world economies’ GNI 
per capita have increased. The number of high-income economies among our 64 economies 
increased from 28 to 35 and the number of low-income economies decreased from 10 to 1, 
while the number of middle-income economies increased slightly from 26 to 28. Considering 
this dynamic change of classification of economy, the real impacts of environmental and 
health requirements on a developing country may be larger than what is shown in these 





Figure 1.5 CSR Regulation Instruments Adoption Counts 
     
(Source: Trade Map, International Trade Centre) 
Figure 1.6 Environmental CSR Regulation Instruments Counts 
(Source: Trade Map, International Trade Centre 
The fifth factor which stimulates the growth of CSR regulation is the increasing 
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behaviors. The main stakeholders of firms include consumers, shareholders, community, 
employee, business partners, governments, and general public especially for big firms 
which have significant environmental and social impacts. With the development of economy 
and society, stakeholders and civil society’s impacts become more and more important and 
they gain more and more channels to express their complaints and request, which finally 
urge governments to take actions by introducing CSR regulation policies. Since late 1990s, 
civil society has evolved significantly. The number of international non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) was reported to have increased from 6,000 in 1990 to more than 
69,000 in 2016 (WEF, 2013; UIA, 2016). The world stock market capitalization increases 
from 25.1 trillion dollars in year 2000 (measured in 2010 U.S. dollars) to 67.1 trillion 
dollars in year 2015 (measured in 2010 U.S. dollars) (World Bank Open Data). 
Although it is hard to summarize all the impacts of stakeholders and the civil society on 
governments globally from 2000 to present, we can acquire some understanding of advances 
in some areas and in some countries. For example, according to Edelman Trust Barometer 
2002 on 850 opinion leaders from U.S., UK, France and Germany, around 50% respondents 
agree or strongly agree with the statement that the government needs to be more involved 
in oversight and regulation of private enterprise in their country (Edelman, 2002, pg.38). 
However, in Edelman Trust Barometer 2009 on 4475 people from 20 countries who were 
college-educated, in top 25%of household income in each age group and self-reported 
significant media consumption and engagement in public policy, 75% respondents say that 
government should intervene to regulate industry or nationalize companies to restore 
public trust (Edelman, 2009, pg.2).  
For another example related with consumer protection, we found some evidence from 
China. From 1985 to 2000, the number of consumer complaint in China kept in increasing 
each year which aroused the attention of the Chinese government. Since then, the Chinese 
government began to make consumer protection laws and enforced consumer protection 
regulation. From 2004, we observed a gradually decreasing trend in the number of 
consumer complaints and the quality related complaints rate (%). Particularly, the 
decreasing trend in the quality related complaints rate (%) accelerates after 2008 when 
Chinese government began to issue CSR regulation policies. However, the resolution rate 
(%) also decreases gradually, which is probably due to the increasing complexity and new 
areas of consumer complaints with the development of the market that recalls governments 





Globally, the State of Consumer Protection Survey 2015 by Consumer International which 
has 200 member organizations in more than 100 countries found that 40% of members felt 
that one of the top three advances in consumer protection they had witnessed since 2012 is 
new legislation (Consumer International, 2015). 
Figure 1.7 
 
(Data Source: China Consumer Association, www.cca.org.cn) 
  As for impacts from community members on governments to regulate firms, we also found 
an impressive example from India. In 2003, India’s Centre for Science and Environment 
published a report saying that because of drilling underground water to produce beverage, 
Coca-Cola caused water crisis in several villages. Also, Coca-Cola discarded chemical 
wastes without being disposed thus caused pollution to the farmland the reduction to the 
harvest. Besides, Coca-Cola needs to use 4 liters water to produce 1 liter beverage, 
discharging 3 liters polluted wastewater which further polluted clean water and land. On 
seeing this report, local village residents protested against Coca-Cola factory and forced 
local government to stop grant Coca-Cola factory production license (International Finance 
News, August 22nd, 2006). 
Finally, on examples of the change of the general public’s expectation towards 
governments, we would like to cite some evidence from China again. In 2008, a public 
survey showed that 37.7% respondents listed environmental pollution as one of top issues 
they concerned with (www.gov.cn, 2009). However, in 2015, a survey by China Youth Daily 





pollution abatement as their top expectation towards the Chinese government 
(www.xinhuanet.com, 2015).  
1.2.4 Country Examples: CSR Reporting Regulation in U.S.A. and China  
To get a complete impression on how CSR reporting regulation policies are developed in 
one country, we further take an overview of CSR reporting instruments in U.S.A and in 
China. Detailed information about each instrument is listed in Table 1.4 and Table 1.5.  
From the timeline of the development of sustainable reporting instruments in U.S.A., we 
can see that the earliest form of instrument originates from legislation on environmental 
issues in 1970’s, particularly on environmental pollution of air and water. Later on, the 
regulation scope on environmental issues is extended to greenhouse gas emissions by 
issuing new Acts or policies. A careful examination on the initiated date and content of each 
instrument reveals that some reporting instruments are clearly sparked by firms’ 
governance crisis or financial crisis in U.S.A., like The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) sparked 
by Enron scandal and the Arthur Andersen incident in year 2002, and Dodd–Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Section 1502, Section 1504) (2010) sparked by 
global financial crisis of 2008.  
A striking feature of the CSR reporting instruments in U.S.A. is that most instruments 
are in the form of legislation, particularly on some extremely important environmental 
issues and hot social issues. This feature is different from the early definition of CSR 
represented by European Commission (2002), which defines CSR as “a concept whereby 
companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and in 
their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis”. However, changing from 
long term voluntary basis to regulation basis as in U.S.A. is consistent with a global trend 
of CSR regulation practice, especially targeting large companies. To acknowledge this new 
trend in CSR regulation practice, European Commission (2011) updates its definition of 
CSR as “the responsibility of enterprises for their impacts on society”. Although the scope of 
firms’ social responsibility is still quite broad, vague on some aspects, and depend on the 
size of a company, it is a global trend that the whole society is pushing firms to integrate at 
least some of firms’ social impacts into their business operation. And this trend is still 
growing. 





CSR reporting regulation is triggered by more and more salient environmental pollution 
and social problems brought by firms’ business activities accompanied with fast economic 
growth of China. It is also taken as a strategy to promote the transformation of China’s 
economic growth mode and economic structure adjustment. The target companies are state-
owned companies and listed companies in Shenzhen Stock Exchange and Shanghai Stock 
Exchange. A feature of China’s CSR reporting regulation policies is that it emphasizes on 
promoting CSR through regulating financial sectors’ behaviors, particularly on banks’ 
crediting process, green bond, and green credit policies. Relatively speaking, the regulation 
scope focuses more on environmental aspect and sustainable development.  
Although more and more policies are enacted in China require firms to fulfil CSR and 
disclose CSR information, especially environmental performance information, the CSR 
reporting requirement is quite general and standards on what CSR information to be 
disclosed are not very clearly defined. Compared with U.S.A., there is lack of law 
enforcement of CSR reporting regulation in China.  
It is worth mentioning that only policies released by central government and big cities 
like Shanghai or sector regulators in China are included in the database of Carrots&Sticks. 
In fact, to respond to central government’s guidelines, local governments have also issued 
guidelines on CSR separately. Besides, several industry associations also issued guidelines 





































The EPA issues mandatory reporting requirements for 
emissions from companies / facilities based on the CAA, 
including six common “criteria pollutants”: particulate 
matter (also known as particle pollution), ozone, sulfur 
dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, carbon monoxide, and lead. 
1971 
Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) Regulation S-






All listed companies are required to disclose the material 
effects that compliance with environmental laws may 
have on earnings, capital expense, or competitive 
positions. 






Large companies are required to report results for the 
analytes listed in their discharge permits. 
1972 













The US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
mandates annual filing regarding the accessibility of 
employment records to determine whether unlawful 
employment practices have been or are being committed, 
including the racial and gender profiles of employees. 
1988 
Emergency Planning and 
Community Right-to-Know Act 







Companies with more than 10 full-time employees to 
submit data on emissions of specified toxic chemicals to 
the US EPA, filling a toxic chemical release inventory 
form (Form R) annually. 





Legislation M Governance 
It contains 11 different “titles” and imposed new reporting 
requirements for US-listed companies to increase 
corporate transparency (mainly corporate governance).  
2009 
Mandatory Reporting of 








It requires reporting of greenhouse gas (GHG) data and 
other relevant information from large sources and 
suppliers in the United States. 
2010 
Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act 






Section 1502, requiring [some] annual report issuers to 
disclose their connections with conflict minerals. 
Section 1504 requires annual report issuers that 
commercially develop oil, natural gas, or minerals to 
disclose certain payments made to the US or a foreign 
government. 
 
                                                          
1 It requires the EPA to establish national ambient air quality standards for certain common and widespread pollutants based on the latest science. 
2 The CWA’s National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Program regulates point sources that discharge pollutants into waters of the United States. 
Compliance monitoring under the NPDES Program encompasses a range of techniques, including Discharge Monitoring Report reviews which requires major and 





Table 1.4 (cont.) 









It sets forth disclosure requirements for all SEC filings 
(i.e. financial statements). The 2010 SEC guidance on 
disclosure of environmental risks and compliance with 
environmental law helps to explain how disclosure 
requirements within Reg S-K are related to climate change 
concerns. 
2010 California Transparency in 
Supply Chains Act 
Local 
Government 
Legislation M Social 
Large retailers and manufacturers (above $100,000,000 in 
annual world-wide revenues) are required to provide 
consumers with information regarding their efforts to 
eradicate slavery and human trafficking from their supply 
chains and to educate consumers on how to purchase goods 
produced by companies that responsibly manage their 
supply chains. 
2010 
SEC Guidance Regarding 













It provides guidance to listed companies regarding the 
Commission’s existing disclosure requirements as they 
apply to climate change matters. 







It requires manufacturers (including importers) to provide 
the EPA information on the chemicals they manufacture 
domestically or import into the United States. 







“Benefit Corporations” are required to make available to 
the public an annual benefit report that assesses their 
overall social and environmental performance against a 
third party standard. 
2014 
NYSE Section 303A Corporate 







Listed companies are required to “adopt and disclose a 
code of business conduct and ethics.” 
(Source: www.carrotsandsticks.com) 
 
Note:   
1. “M/V” means Mandatory or Voluntary.  








                                                          



















Shenzhen Stock Exchange Social 









According to the guidelines, the exchange encourages 
listed companies to establish a social responsibility 
mechanism and prepare social responsibility reports on a 
regular basis. The guidelines list the key points which 
should be included and disclosed in social responsibility 
reports. The disclosure was initially voluntary but 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange changed the policy in 2008 and 
required mandatory disclosure for all companies in SZSE 
100 index (100 companies). Since the exchange released 
the guidelines on social responsibility for listed companies, 
it has been actively training the 488 companies listed on 
the exchange on how to apply them. 
May 
2008 
Notice of Improving Listed 












Listed companies should establish a CSR strategy from at 
least four aspects and the CSR report should include 
details of the work performed by the company in promoting 
sustainability development. For example, this may include 
protection of employee health and safety via quality 
control of the company products or promoting a 




Guidelines on Environmental 
Information Disclosure by 
Companies Listed on the 










These guidelines encourage listed companies to disclose 
the following environmental information, either as part of 
their CSR report or in a separate report: company 
environmental protection policy, annual environmental 
protection objective and effect; annual total energy 
consumption; environmental protection investment and 
environmental technology development status; 
emission/pollutant types, quantity, concentration and 
destination; construction of environmental protection 
equipment and operational status; production waste 
treatment, disposal and recycling status; the 
environmental improvement agreement (signed 
voluntarily by the company) that the company has entered 
into with the Ministry of Environmental Protection; 
awards the company has received from the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection; other information disclosed at 









Table 1.5 (cont.) 
 
2008 














It requires companies listed on the stock exchange to disclose 
more information about their environmental record.  
2008 
Shanghai Municipal Local 








Standard M Voluntary 
The standards emphasize the following four major legal and 
moral responsibilities: (1). Equity Responsibility: Labor & 
employee management; (2). Environmental Responsibility: 
Resource treatment and environment protection; (3). Integrity 
Responsibility: Ethical business behavior for stakeholders; (4). 
Harmonious Responsibility: Government/Public sector 
relationships and contributions. The local government 
encourages the enterprises to self-assess their CSR performance 
annually or periodically, and release the results to the 
community and employees. 
2008 
Guidelines to the State-
owned Enterprises Directly 
under the Central 




















They were proposed by the 17th CPC National Congress and 
gave the impetus to Central State-owned Enterprises (CSOEs) to 
fulfill corporate social responsibilities, so as to realize the 
comprehensive and sustainable development of social and 
environmental aspects of enterprises. According to the 
guidelines, the main contents of fulfilling CSR by CSOEs 
include: insisting on a legal and honest way of business 
operation, constantly improving their ability to make sustainable 
profits, improving product quality and service, strengthening 
resource conservation and environmental protection, promoting 
independent innovation and technological advancement, 
ensuring production safety, protecting legal rights of employees, 
and participating in social public welfare programs. The 
guidelines also set out the main measures for CSOEs to fulfill 
CSR, such as establishing CSR fulfillment mechanisms and CSR 
information reporting systems. 










The Clause 4 in this Act states that corporations should disclose 
environmental information based on a combination of voluntary 
and mandatory principle. The Clause 19 states that corporations 
are encouraged to voluntarily disclose the following: 
environmental protection guidelines, annual targets and results, 
annual resource utilization, environmental investment and 
description of environmental technologies, pollution levels, 
density, types, and disposal method, environmental protection 
construction and operating status, waste generation, voluntary 
environmental agreements with the agencies, and 





Table 1.5 (cont.) 
 
2008 
















According to the guidelines, all industrial companies and industrial 
federations of China are encouraged to establish a CSR system in 
four sectors: management, regulations, information and 
supervision, in order to run business in a methodical and regulated 
way. The guidelines state that the content of a CSR report should 
cover eight aspects: public statement, scientific development, 
environmental protection, energy conservation, production safety, 
interests of employees, interests of stakeholders and social 
commonwealth. The guidelines recommend more than 80 key 
indicators related to economic performance, employment of 
employees, labor contract, production safety, social insurance, 
energy consumption and emission, environmental protection, 
company credit, etc. These indicators are encouraged to be 


















The guidelines are applicable to all banking financial institutions 
with a corporate status in China. The guidelines elaborate on CSR 
from three perspectives: economic responsibility, social 
responsibility and environmental responsibility, and also make 
recommendations for management control mechanisms and 
systems in relation to implementing CSR in financial institutions. 
It encourages all banks to submit an annual CSR report to CBA by 
the end of June of next year. 












The guidelines state the requirements of green credits to banks 
from 6 aspects: general principles, organization structure 
adjustment, management system, environmental and social risk 
management in the crediting process, information disclosure, and 



















The guidelines call on state-owned companies to address 
environmental protection, community relations and other 
considerations in investments overseas. Clause 18 encourages 
companies to publish companies’ environmental performance 
information periodically. 
2014 



















The Guidelines lay out of a series of principles for companies 
conducting activities relating to mining internationally. These 
principles largely span corporate social responsibility. It states that 
companies should report on their material impacts and disclose 
their ethical, social, and environmental performance to their 
stakeholders in ways that are appropriate and meaningful to their 
needs. 
2015 
PBOC launches green 
financial bonds on the 
interbank bond 
market–Announcement 












Clause 12 in this announcement encourages green bond issuers to 
publish annual audited evaluation reports on the progress and 
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2015 













It requires insurance companies to fulfill their CSR. The 
point 15 under Clause 5 requires insurance companies to 
compile annual CSR report in accordance with relevant 
guidance and publish by April 30 of next year.   
2016 
China Green Bond Endorsed 














It provides the first detailed catalogue of China green bond 
endorsed projects, which provide official reference to future 
green bond approval and registry, green bond audit, green 
bond evaluation and related information disclosure.  
 
(Source: www.carrotsandsticks.net, revised by the author)
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1.3 Empirical Estimates 
1.3.1 Proxy Variables of Drivers 
Based on our above review of the key drivers in shaping the fast development of CSR 
regulation, we developed eleven proxy variables for these drivers. First, for global climate 
change, a proper measurement would be the change in the global annual temperature in a 
recent year from the average global annual temperature in the pre-industrial period, i.e. 
before 1750. However, the problem with using this measurement as a proxy variable is that 
there would be no variability in the independent variable across countries. An alternative 
choice of the proxy variable is to use country level annual temperature change in a recent 
year from a country’s annual temperature in pre-industrial period before 1750. However, 
data limitations preclude our use of this variable. Since climate change is strongly related 
greenhouse gas emissions, we could think about using total greenhouse gas emissions per 
year at country level as alternative proxy variables. 
Second, for environmental pollution, the most urgent concern by the public is air 
pollution. And the air quality index which is mostly related with health is PM2.5 pollution. 
Therefore, we selected PM2.5 pollution as the proxy variable for environmental pollution. 
Third, for the promotion from international organizations, it is actually hard to measure 
it directly. An alternative way is to measure the existing number of policies which have 
mentioned, recommended, adopted or required the guidelines or tools provided by the 
international organizations in each country. We focus on measuring the promotion efforts 
by two main international organizations, GRI and OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises, which have formed comprehensive partnerships with governments. To 
measure GRI’s promotion effort, we referred to GRI’s self-report GRI referred in policy & 
regulation. We use the ratio of CSR policies among all CSR policies in which GRI 
sustainability reporting guidelines have been mentioned, recommended, adopted or 
required in a country till a certain year as the accumulative promotion effort by GRI in a 
country till a certain year. To measure OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’ 
promotion effort, since there is no self-report statistics on how many policies have 
mentioned, recommended, adopted or required OECD Guidelines, we referred to the list of 
OECD national contact points in 2001 and 2015 (OECD, 2001, 2005). The Governments 
adhering to the OECD Guidelines are required to set up a National Contact Point (NCP) 





promotional activities, handling enquiries, and contributing to the resolution of issues that 
may arise from the alleged non-observance of the guidelines in specific instances. We 
created a dummy variable of OECD guidelines promotion. For countries which have set up 
an OECD guidelines national contact point, the value of dummy variable is 1, otherwise it 
is zero. Then, we standardized two promotion effort variables to have the same standard 
deviation of 1 and then summed up two variables together as the proxy variable for 
international organizations’ promotion effort.  
Fourth, for the increasing attention in regulating firms’ governance after the global 
financial crisis of 2008, it is impossible to measure the attention level of a country directly. 
However, the attention level may be related with multiple factors and we may use major 
factors as proxy variables. The major factors may include the economic development level of 
a country and the size of its stock market of a country. Therefore, we will use GDP and 
stock market capitalization (%GDP) as proxy variables for economic development level and 
the size of stock market. 
Fifth, we constructed an international trade CSR policies spillover variable and a 
geopolitical CSR policies spillover variable as the proxies for economic globalization. The 
international trade spillover variable is defined as the weighted sum of the number of 
export destination countries’ CSR reporting regulation instruments. The weight is the sum 
of exports to a destination country within a certain period. Also, we constructed a 
geopolitical spillover variable by using a country’s border neighbors’ weighted existing 
number of CSR reporting regulation instruments. The weight is the average population of a 
border neighbor country within a certain period. 
Sixth, for the increasing expectation from stakeholders and civil society on governments, 
since it is closely related with the level of economic and social development, we selected four 
variables as proxy variables: country total GDP, GNI per capita, stock market 
capitalization (%GDP) and Democracy Index. The Democracy Index we used is from The 
Economist Intelligence Unit. This Democracy Index is a “thick” concept (Coppedge et al., 
2011). It is based on five categories: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the 








The CSR regulation instrument data is collected from the Carrots & Sticks Database 
(www.carrotsandsticks.net). The website collected a dataset of CSR reporting regulation 
instruments of 64 economies, for the 2016 edition of the Carrots & Sticks report. It 
classified CSR reporting regulation instruments by countries and also includes the initial 
year of an instrument, its type, whether it is mandatory or voluntary, and other 
characteristics. It allows searching CSR reporting instruments either by countries and 
regions or by the scope of regulation, but it does not provide the function of downloading the 
dataset. We manually collected the time series data of the existing number of total CSR 
reporting regulation instruments in a country until a certain year from this website.  
The macroeconomic and environmental data, including GDP, GNI per capita, population, 
GDP deflator, stock market capitalization (%GDP), total greenhouse gas emissions, and 
PM2.5 air pollution (mean annual exposure by micrograms per cubic meter), is collected 
from the World Bank. The democracy data is collected from the democracy index compiled 
by The Economist Intelligence Unit since 2006. The international exports data is collected 
from the International Trade Centre (http://www.trademap.org/Index.aspx). The bordering 
countries data is read from the world map.  
After matching CSR policies data with macroeconomic, environmental, international 
trade and international organizations’ promotion effort data, we got 55 countries in the 
sample. The 55 countries are listed in Table 1.6. The summary statistics of data is provided 
in Table 1.7.  
 
Table 1.6 The List of 55 Countries 
Austria Cyprus India Malaysia Romania Turkey 
Argentina Czech Republic Indonesia Mexico Russia Ukraine 
Bangladesh Denmark Ireland Netherlands Singapore United Kingdom 
Belgium Ecuador Israel Nigeria Slovakia U.S.A. 
Bolivia Finland Italy Norway South Africa Australia 
Brazil France Ivory Coast Pakistan South Korea 
Canada Germany Japan Peru Spain  
Chile Greece Kazakhstan Philippines Sweden  
Colombia Hungary Kenya Poland Switzerland 






Table 1.7 Summary Statistics of Variables 
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max 
Total Policies Diff 5.29 4.01 0 16 
Mandatory Policies Diff 3.56 2.75 0 11 
Voluntary Policies Diff 1.96 2.09 0 10 
GS Policies Diff 2.11 2.09 0 9 
Governance Policies Diff 3.11 2.29 0 10 
Environmental Policies Diff 4.00 3.46 0 14 
Social Policies Diff 3.15 2.60 0 11 
Democracy Index in year 2006 7.15 1.81 2.97 9.88 
GNI per capita in year 2000 13204.18 12746.72 270 43490.00 
GDP in year 2000 5.67e+11 1.52e+12 8.40e+09 1.03e+13 
Stock Market Capitalization (%GDP) in year 2000 63.86 61.26 0.78 256.85 
GHG Emissions per capita in year 2000 0.011 0.009 0.001 0.056 
PM2.5 Air Pollution, mean annual exposure (μg/m3) in 
year 2000   
22.42 16.01 5.80 72 
EW Total Policies Diff 8.42 2.03 2.85 13.00 
EW Mandatory Policies Diff 5.48 1.45 0.91 8.21 
EW Voluntary Policies Diff 3.13 0.97 0.77 5.52 
EW General Sustainability (GS) Policies Diff 2.78 1.03 1.18 6.09 
EW Governance Policies Diff 4.16 0.95 2.66 7.26 
EW Environmental Policies Diff 6.03 1.89 2.09 12.24 
EW Social Policies Diff 4.29 1.05 2.09 7.86 
MW Total Policies Diff 7.21 4.23 0.93 16 
MW Mandatory Policies Diff 5.00 3.13 0 14 
MW Voluntary Policies Diff 2.57 2.46 0 10 
MW General Sustainability (GS) Policies Diff 2.70 1.88 0 7 
MW Governance Policies Diff 3.29 2.05 0 7.76 
MW Environmental Policies Diff 5.04 3.35 0.51 11.56 
MW Social Policies Diff 3.41 2.10 0 7.63 
International Organizations Promotion Proxy Diff -7.27e-11 0.67 -0.63 2.33 
Note: The summary statistics are summarized based on the pooling data of base year 2000 (year 2006 for 
Democracy Index) and end year 2015.  
 
1.3.3 Empirical Models 
Since making regulation instruments usually take several years, the potential 
correlations between proxy variables of CSR regulation drivers and the development of CSR 





differences’ models as our empirical specification. Since the change in the number of 
policies may depend on the level of a country’s characteristics, we also include regressors in 
a level form which have not been differenced. The long differences mean changes of a 
variable between year 2000 and 2015. Since there might be two-way relations between long 
differences of GHG emissions and CSR policies as well as long between long differences of 
PM2.5 pollution level and CSR policies, we use long differences between year 1995 to 2005 
for these two variables. The level form means the value of a variable in the base year 2000.  
To check whether some variables have long tails, we draw a C.D.F. graph for each 
variable. The C.D.F. graphs are provided in Appendix A.1. Most variables’ C.D.F. curves 
are close to the fitted normal distribution. However, the C.D.F. curves of GDP in both level 
form and differences, GNI per capita in both level form and differences, 4 categories of 
international trade CSR policies spillover variable in level forms, all categories of 
geographical CSR policies spillover variable in the level forms, total GHG emissions per 
capita in the level form, PM2.5 air pollution in both level form and differences all have long 
tails. Therefore, we take the logarithm form for all variables.  
A complete model specification is as follows: 
 
∆ln⁡(Y + 1) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1∆ln𝑿1 + 𝛽2∆ln⁡(𝑿2 + 1)+𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝑿𝟏 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑛(𝑿2 + 1) + (1) 
 
There are seven different dependent variables that we explain using the above model 
specification. They are: the existing number of total CSR reporting regulation policies, the 
existing number of mandatory CSR reporting regulation policies, the existing number of 
voluntary CSR reporting regulation policies, the existing number of CSR reporting 
regulation policies which are related with firms’ general sustainability, the existing number 
of CSR reporting regulation policies which are related with firms’ CSR governance, the 
existing number of CSR reporting regulation policies which are related with firms’ 
environmental CSR, and the existing number of CSR reporting regulation policies which 
are related with firms’ social CSR. Since all dependent variables are count variables which 
may take a value of 0, we add 1 to the dependent variable before we take the logs. Because 
unobservable variables are likely to impact all dependent variables, we estimate models via 
seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR).  
The partition of independent variable X is as follows: 𝐗1 + 𝐗2 = 𝐗. Particularly, 𝐗2 





in the same category with the dependent variable weighted by trade volume and the sum of 
bordering countries' CSR policies in the same category with the dependent variable 
weighted by population. 𝐗1 includes 8 variables: democracy index, GNI per capita, GDP, 
stock market capitalization (%GDP), and international organizations' accumulative 
promotion effort, PM2.5 air pollution (mean annual exposure by μg/m3) and total 
greenhouse gas emissions per capita. In all, there are 10 independent variables in the 
model specification (1). 
The construction of the long differences of the weighted sum of top 5 exports destination 
countries' CSR policies is proceeded by summing up the long differences of CSR policies 
from top 5 export destination countries in a specific category, weighted by total exports 
volume to a destination country between year 2000 and 2015. The ranking of top 5 exports 
destination countries is based on the total exports volume between year 2000 and 2015 to a 
destination country. In the case that CSR policies data is not available for a top 5 export 
destination country, we move down along the ranking to use the next export destination 
country. The long differences of the weighted sum of bordering countries' CSR policies is 
constructed by summing up the long differences of CSR policies in a specific category, 
weighted by the average population between year 2000 and 2015. In the case that a 
bordering countries’ CSR policies data is not available, we just exclude it from our 
calculation. In the case that no bordering country’s CSR policies data is available, we use 
the nearest country whose CSR policies data is available to construct the variable. The level 
form of these two groups of variables are constructed in the same way by using the same 
weights as specified above.  
Since we have in total 16 independent variables in the complete model specification, to 
select a parsimonious set of covariates to form more concise models, we also use Lasso 
estimates based on Least Angle Regression (LARS) model selection algorithm (Efron, 
Hastie, Johnstone, and Tibshirani, 2004) to estimate refined models. The LARS algorithm 
is developed based on the classic Forward Stepwise Regression (Forward Selection) and 
Forward Stagewise Selection. The motivation for the LARS algorithm is to use a simple 
formula which “allows Forward Stagewise to be implemented using fairly large steps, 
though not as large as a classic Forward Selection” and reduces the computational burden. 
(Efron et al., 2004, p.408). The LARS procedure described in Efron et al. (2004) roughly 





correlated with the response, say 𝑥1. Then, it takes the largest step possible the direction of 
this predictor until some other predictor, say 𝑥2, has as much correlation with the current 
residual. Instead of continuing along 𝑥1, LARS proceeds in a direction equiangular between 
the two predictors until a third variable 𝑥3 earns into the "most correlated" set. LARS then 
proceeds equiangularly between 𝑥1, 𝑥2 and 𝑥3, that is, along the "least angle direction," 
until a fourth variable enters, so on. Based on the homotopy method in the papers by 
Osborne, Presnell and Turlach (2000a, b), a minor modification of LARS algorithm can 
provide full set of Lasso solution and it improves the Lasso estimation procedure by 
defining a clearer and more efficient algorithm. A small simulation study comparing the 
LARS, Lasso and Stagewise algorithm carried out by Efron et al. (2004) shows that the 
three algorithms performed almost identically, and rather well.  
Following the suggestion of Efron et al. (2004), we select a refined model for each 
equation which has the smallest Cp-type selection criterion among all LARS-Lasso 
estimators. Assume that given x’s, y is generated according to an homoskedastic model 
 
𝒚⁡~⁡(𝝁, 𝜎2𝐈) (2) 
 






− 𝑛 + 2𝑘 (3) 
As a robustness check, we also estimated models in which potential social economic drivers 
are differenced over a lagged period from year 1995 to 2005. And we estimated refined 
models with lagged social economic drivers by using LARS-Lasso estimates as well. The 
results of the robustness check are relegated to our appendix.  
 
1.3.4 Results 
1.3.4.1 Complete Model Estimates and Refined Model Estimates 
We first use variance inflation factors (VIF) to detect the collinearity problems among 
variables of interests. The VIF’s for all variables of interest are smaller than 10. However, 
we find that VIF’s for differences of GNI per capita, differences of GDP, and GNI per capita 





per capita and differences of GDP are quite similar. We first drop differences of GNI per 
capita since it has the biggest VIF among three variables. Then, we recheck VIF’s for the 
rest variables. This time, only the VIF of GNI per capita in year 2000 is larger than 10. We 
then further drop GNI per capita in year 2000. After dropping differences of GNI per capita 
and GNI per capita in year 2000, the VIF’s of all variables are smaller than 10.  
We then check the correlation matrices of residuals of each group of revised models after 
excluding the collinearity problems. Overall, the correlation coefficients between residuals 
are between 0.074 and 0.870. Based on the strength of the correlation coefficient of 
residuals, the use of SUR model is justified. While the benefit of using SUR model over 
separate OLS model for some equations may not be salient due to weaker correlation 
coefficients of residuals.  
The SUR estimates for complete models are presented in Table 1.9. Throughout this 
dissertation, we keep using same symbols in presenting estimation results. The meaning of 
symbols is specified in Table 1.8. The LARS-Lasso estimates for refined models are 
presented in Table 1.10. The graphs of LARS-Lasso estimates and graphs of the Cp curve 
for each equation are provided in Appendix A.2. Full interpretation of the estimates results 
are provided in Section 1.3.4.2 to Section 1.3.4.7 below.  
 
Table 1.8 The Meaning of Symbols in Presenting Estimation Results 
Symbol     Meaning       
 Not applicable 
Dropped Dropped from regression because of insignificance 
Boldface t value is greater than 1 
*** Significant level at 0.001    
** Significant level at 0.01    
* Significant level at 0.05     












Table 1.9 The SUR Estimates for Complete Long Differences Models 
Policies Change (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 









Long Differences in logs-Long 
Differences in logs & Level in logs               
Intercept -2.225 -1.510 -2.596* -2.345* -1.722 -1.443 -2.501* 
 
(1.110) (1.196) (1.028) (1.051) (0.898) (1.101) (0.995) 
Differences in log Democracy 2006 
and log Democracy 2015 
0.262 -0.885 0.889 0.400 0.621 -0.295 -0.066 
(1.069) (1.215) (0.999) (1.003) (0.849) (1.099) (0.949) 
Differences in log GDP 2000 and log 
GDP 2015 
0.462 0.325 0.075 0.387 0.281 0.317 0.383 
(0.293) (0.332) (0.280) (0.280) (0.238) (0.303) (0.265) 
Differences in log Stock Market 
Capitalization (%GDP) 2000 and log 
Stock Market Capitalization 
(%GDP) 2012 
-0.187 -0.079 0.063 -0.183 -0.026 -0.099 -0.198 
(0.167) (0.181) (0.158) (0.150) (0.131) (0.168) (0.147) 
Differences in log GHG emissions 
per capita 1995 and log GHG 
emissions per capita 2005 
0.104 0.171 0.516 0.109 0.365 0.291 0.196 
(0.548) (0.612) (0.527) (0.521) (0.447) (0.563) (0.502) 
Differences in log PM2.5 air 
pollution 1995 and log PM2.5 air 
pollution 2005 
1.511 -0.029 1.430 0.938 0.675 1.446 0.995 
(0.803) (0.811) (0.789) (0.704) (0.617) (0.806) (0.687) 
Differences in log Weighted Average 
Top 5 Exports Destination 
Countries' CSR Policies 2000 and  
log Weighted Average Top 5 Exports 
Destination Countries' CSR Policies 
2015 
0.107 0.157 -0.337 0.564* -0.200 0.151 0.662* 
(0.384) (0.409) (0.314) (0.255) (0.324) (0.314) (0.299) 
Differences in log Weighted Average 
Bordering Countries' CSR Policies 
2000 and log Weighted Average 
Bordering Countries' CSR Policies 
2015 
-0.148 0.049 -0.160 -0.116 0.036 -0.148 -0.168 
(0.112) (0.140) (0.110) (0.113) (0.097) (0.110) (0.103) 
Differences in log International 
Organizations' Accumulative 
Promotion Effort 2000 and log 
International Organizations' 
Accumulative Promotion Effort2015 
0.037 0.009 0.003 0.048 0.020 0.034 0.034 
(0.027) (0.029) (0.030) (0.025) (0.023) (0.028) (0.024) 
Log Democracy 2006 0.239 0.275 0.762 0.099 0.507 -0.199 -0.0008 
 
(0.497) (0.536) (0.474) (0.481) (0.405) (0.512) (0.454) 
Log GDP 2000 0.269**
* 
0.155 0.244** 0.226** 0.183** 0.220** 0.241** 
 
(0.075) (0.081) (0.072) (0.072) (0.061) (0.079) (0.068) 
Log Stock Market Capitalization 
(%GDP) 2000 
-0.164 0.001 -0.063 -0.035 0.005 -0.137 -0.037 
 
(0.134) (0.144) (0.140) (0.129) (0.111) (0.139) (0.124) 
Log GHG emissions per capita 2000 -0.125 0.057 0.006 -0.011 0.069 -0.101 -0.077 
(0.145) (0.158) (0.135) (0.137) (0.116) (0.154) (0.132) 
Log PM2.5 Air Pollution (mean 
annual exposure by micrograms per 
cubic meter) 2000 
-0.290 -0.067 -0.044 -0.148 -0.063 -0.281 -0.222 
(0.201) (0.219) (0.194) (0.197) (0.167) (0.208) (0.188) 
Log Weighted Average Top 5 
Exports Destination Countries' CSR 
Policies 2000 
-0.339 0.312 -0.444 1.039 1.135* -0.154 0.610 
(0.339) (0.324) (1.103) (0.630) (0.507) (0.308) (0.401) 
Log Weighted Average Bordering 
Countries' CSR Policies 2000 
0.032 -0.261 0.606 -1.685 0.040 -0.111 -0.263 
(0.171) (0.306) (0.703) (1.843) (0.315) (0.312) (0.249) 
Log International Organizations' 
Accumulative Promotion Effort till 
year 2000 
-0.084 -0.031 -0.093 -0.083 -0.113 0.042 -0.034 
(0.149) (0.159) (0.150) (0.145) (0.127) (0.159) (0.139) 






Table 1.10 The LARS-Lasso Refined Long Difference Models Estimates 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 









Long Differences in logs-Long 
Differences in logs & Level in logs               
Intercept 
-0.846 -1.246* -1.976*** -2.366*** -1.386** -2.158* -
1.670** 
 (0.592) (0.560) (0.524) (0.667) (0.487) (0.833) (0.536) 
Differences in log Democracy 2006 
and log Democracy 2015 
   0.634   
   (0.816)   
Differences in log GDP 2000 and log 
GDP 2015 
   0.261  0.330 
   (0.174)  (0.210) 
Differences in log GHG emissions 
per capita 1995 and log GHG 
emissions per capita 2005 
     0.048 0.336 
     (0.476) (0.357) 
Differences in log PM2.5 air 
pollution 1995 and log PM2.5 air 
pollution 2005 
  1.268* 0.926 0.908* 0.655 0.976* 
  (0.485) (0.514) (0.417) (0.549) (0.485) 
Differences in log Weighted Average 
Top 5 Exports Destination 
Countries' CSR Policies 2000 and  
log Weighted Average Top 5 Exports 
Destination Countries' CSR Policies 
2015 
   0.760*  0.637* 0.395 
   (0.304)  (0.274) (0.292) 
      
Differences in log International 
Organizations' Accumulative 
Promotion Effort 2000 and log 
International Organizations' 
Accumulative Promotion Effort2015 
  0.040* 0.041* 0.028 0.028 
  (0.019) (0.020) (0.016) (0.022) 
Log GDP 2000 
0.132* 0.160** 0.211*** 0.204*** 0.169*** 0.184** 0.173**
* 
 (0.053) (0.050) (0.047) (0.054) (0.043) (0.061) (0.046) 
Log GHG emissions per capita 2000 
     -0.069 
     (0.126) 
Log Weighted Average Top 5 
Exports Destination Countries' CSR 
Policies 2000 
   1.573 1.670*  
   (0.988) (0.675)  
Log Weighted Average Bordering 
Countries' CSR Policies 2000 
     -0.349 
     (0.385) 
N 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 
Adjusted R2 0.08872 0.1465 0.3424 0.248 0.2788 0.1858 0.2606 
F-Statistics 
F(1,53)



























1.3.4.2 Total CSR Regulation Policies Development 
For the development of the number of total CSR reporting policies between 2000 and 
2015, we find two significant drivers from the complete model estimates: the GDP in year 
2000 of a country and differences in log PM2.5 air pollution in 1995 and log PM2.5 air 
pollution in 2005. A country with higher GDP in year 2000 tends to develop more CSR 
policies. In another word, larger economy tends to issue more CSR policies, possibly due to 
more regulation needs accompanied with larger economy. And a country with higher 
deterioration of air pollution level between 1995 and 2005 tends to issue more CSR policies. 
However, the refined model only selects one variable: the GDP in year 2000 to be included 





impact of GDP in year 2000 are consistent, although the estimate by the refined model is 
smaller than the estimate by the complete model.  
Besides, we also find that six factors have weakly significant impacts on the 
development of total CSR policies from estimates based on the complete model, for which 
the significant level is below 0.1 but the t-value is greater than 1. We highlighted these 
factors in bold in Table 1.9 and Table 1.10 for easy reference.  
Among these six weakly significant factors, the difference of log GDP, and the difference 
of log international organization’s accumulative promotion efforts both have positive 
impacts on driving the development of total CSR policies. In another word, the economy 
growth and the growing trend in accumulative promotion efforts from international 
organizations both may be positive factors to drive the development of total CSR policies.  
However, the other four factors are found to have weakly significant negative impacts on 
driving the development of CSR policies: difference of log Stock Market Capitalization 
(%GDP), difference of log weighted sum of bordering countries’ CSR total policies, the log 
Stock Market Capitalization (%GDP) in year 2000, and the log PM2.5 air pollution level in 
year 2000. To interpret these weak negative impacts, we take a more careful examination 
on these four factors. Some clues and speculation we formed are provided as follows.  
First, after reviewing the stock market capitalization (%GDP) from year 2000 to 2012 
and countries’ GNI per capita in year 2000, we found that in year 2000, 44% of high income 
level countries’ stock markets are overvalued, which have stock market capitalization 
larger than 100% GDP. From year 2000 to 2012, 76% of high income level countries 
(measured in year 2000) have negative stock market capitalization (%GDP) change. While 
among countries which have positive stock market capitalization (%GDP) change from year 
2000 to 2012, 81.8% are middle income level and low income level countries. Thus, we may 
possibly interpret negative stock market capitalization (%GDP) between year 2000 and 
2012 to be the extent to remove financial bubbles while positive stock market capitalization 
(%GDP) change between year 2000 and 2012 to be the development of undervalued stock 
market or less developed stock market in middle and low income level countries. And high 
Stock Market Capitalization (%GDP) in year 2000 is more likely to be an overvalued 
market and low Stock Market Capitalization (%GDP) in year 2000 is more likely to be an 
undervalued market. Therefore, combining the weakly negative estimates for both the 
difference of log Stock Market Capitalization (%GDP) and log Stock Market Capitalization 





bubbles, the more total CSR policies are issued. Also, the faster that a country with less 
developed stock market to develop its stock market, the more total CSR policies are possibly 
to be issued.  
Second, for the negative impact of the weighted sum of bordering countries’ total CSR 
policies in 2000 is that the regional differences in the development of total CSR regulation 
policies may become larger between 2000 and 2015.  
Third, one possible explanation for the negative impact of the PM2.5 air pollution (mean 
annual exposure by g/m3) in 2000 is that different countries may be at the different stages 
in addressing the air pollution in year 2000. Some country may begin to deal with air 
pollution and enact legislation to improve air quality at an earlier time. For example, U.S. 
enacted Clean Air Act in 1970 to improve air quality. Therefore, by year 2000, the low PM2.5 
pollution level in that country may reflect the great attention paid by that country in 
addressing the environmental and social problems and the high PM2.5 pollution level in a 
country may reflect little attention paid by that country in addressing the environmental 
and social problems. In another world, the PM2.5 pollution level in year 2000 might be 
negatively correlated with the extent of attention paid by a country in addressing the 
environmental problems. One evidence to support our guessing is that we also found that 
PM2.5 pollution level is negatively correlated with the development of environmental and 
social CSR regulation policies but not related with the development of other categories of 
CSR policies. Therefore, the negative impact of PM2.5 pollution level may reflect that a 
country with greater attention in addressing environmental and social issues are more 
likely to issue CSR policies.  
1.3.4.3 Mandatory and Voluntary CSR Regulation Policies Development 
For the development of the number of mandatory CSR reporting regulation policies 
between 2000 and 2015, the only significant driver we find is the GDP in year 2000 of a 
country. The estimates from the complete model and the refined model on the impact of 
GDP in year 2000 are consistent and quite similar.  
For the development of the number of voluntary CSR reporting regulation policies 
between 2000 and 2015, the complete model estimates suggest that there are two 
significant factors. The refined model estimates are consistent with the complete model 





factors are: the difference of log PM2.5 pollution level, the difference of log international 
organization’s promotion efforts, and the log GDP in year 2000. In another word, it seems 
that the deterioration of air pollution level, the economy growth, and the growing trend in 
accumulative promotion efforts from international organizations may all be positive factors 
to drive the development of voluntary CSR policies. 
Besides, we also find three weakly positive factors. Both differences in the log weighted 
average top 5 exports destination countries’ voluntary CSR policies and differences in the 
log weighted average bordering countries’ voluntary CSR policies are weakly negative 
correlated with the development of voluntary CSR policies. The log Democracy Index in 
year 2006 is weakly positive correlated with the development of voluntary CSR polices. It 
may suggest that the difference between the development of voluntary CSR policies among 
trade partner countries and among bordering countries increases over the period 2000 and 
2015 and a more democratic institution and political environment may facilitate the 
development of voluntary CSR polices.  
1.3.4.4 General Sustainability CSR Regulation Policies Development 
Both complete model estimates and the refined model estimates consistently identify 
three significantly correlated factors with the development of general sustainability CSR 
reporting regulation policies. While the refined model identifies one more significantly 
correlated factors. In total, the four significantly correlated factors are: the difference in log 
PM2.5 pollution, the difference in log weighted average top 5 exports destination countries’ 
general sustainability CSR policies, the difference in the log international organizations’ 
accumulative promotion efforts, and the log GDP in year 2000. All of these four factors are 
estimated to be positively related with the development of general sustainability CSR 
policies. In another word, the deterioration of air pollution, the international trade spillover 
effects, the promotion efforts from international organizations, and the size of an economy 
may all be positive factors in driving the development of general sustainability CSR 
policies. 
Besides, we also find four weakly significant factors to the development of general 
sustainability CSR policies based on both the complete model estimates and refined model 
estimates. Particularly, we find that the difference of log GDP and the log average top 5 





weakly positive impacts. In another word, faster GDP growth and international trade 
spillover effect may both be weak positive factors to drive the development of general 
sustainability CSR policies. Similar to the result with total CSR policies estimates, we find 
that the difference of log Stock Market Capitalization (%GDP) has a weak negative impact 
on the development of general sustainability CSR policies. The same speculation as we 
proposed in interpreting the result for total CSR policies may apply here. Also, the 
difference in log weighted average bordering countries’ general sustainability CSR policies 
is estimated to have a weakly negative impact. This results may indicate that the reginal 
difference in the development among bordering countries’ general sustainability CSR 
policies increases over the period 2000 to 2015. 
1.3.4.5 CSR Governance Regulation Policies Development 
For the development of the number of CSR reporting regulation policies which are 
related with CSR governance between 2000 and 2015, both complete model estimates and 
the refined model estimates consistently identify two significantly correlated factors with 
the development of CSR governance regulation policies. While the refined model identifies 
two more significantly correlated factors. In total, the four significantly correlated factors 
are: the difference in log PM2.5 pollution, the difference in the log international 
organizations’ accumulative promotion efforts, the log GDP in year 2000 and the log 
weighted average top 5 exports destination countries’ CSR governance regulation policies in 
year 2000. All of these four factors are estimated to be positively related with the 
development of CSR governance policies. In another word, higher deterioration of air 
pollution between 1995 and 2005, more promotion efforts from international organizations, 
the economy size, and the international trade spillover effect all may have positive impacts 
on the development of CSR governance policies.  
Since the correlations between the residual from CSR governance policies equation and 
the residuals from other three equations: general CSR policies equation, environmental 
CSR policies equation and the social CSR policies equation are relatively high, between 
0.682 and 0.870, SUR estimates for CSR governance policies also suggest some weakly 
significant factors due to improved efficiency in estimation. Particularly, we find two 
weakly positive factors in driving the development of CSR governance policies: the 





economy growth and more democratic institution and political environment may both 
facilitate the development of CSR governance polices.  
1.3.4.6 Environmental CSR Regulation Policies Development 
For the development of the number of CSR reporting regulation policies which are 
related with environmental CSR between 2000 and 2015, we find a consistent significant 
positive factor: log GDP in year 2000 by both complete model estimates and refined model 
estimates. Besides, the complete model estimates suggest that the difference in log PM2.5 air 
pollution between 1995 and 2005 is significantly positive related with the development of 
environmental CSR policies. And the refined model estimates suggest that the difference in 
log weighted average top 5 exports destination countries’ environmental CSR policies is 
another significant positive factor. In short, the size of an economy, the deterioration of air 
pollution and international trade spillover effect may be three main factors in driving the 
development of environmental CSR reporting policies.  
Since the correlations between the residual from environmental CSR policies equation 
and the residuals from other equations except for the voluntary CSR policies equation are 
relatively high, between 0.682 and 0.759, SUR estimates for environmental CSR policies 
also suggest three weakly significant factors due to improved efficiency in estimation. 
Among them, one weakly positive factor is the difference of log GDP. Thus, it is likely that 
the growth rate of GDP may be a weak factor in driving the development of environmental 
CSR policies. On the other hand, we find two weakly negative factors: log PM2.5 pollution 
level in year 2000 and the log weighted average bordering countries’ environmental CSR 
policies in year 2000. The argument we proposed in interpreting the weak negative impact 
of PM2.5 pollution level on the development of total CSR reporting policies in Section 1.3.4.2 
can be applied here. While the weak negative impact of the geopolitical spillover effect may 
suggest that the regional difference in the development of environmental CSR policies may 
become larger between year 2000 and year 2015.  
 
1.3.4.7 Social CSR Regulation Policies Development 
For the development of the number of CSR reporting regulation policies which are 
related with social CSR between 2000 and 2015, we find a consistent significant positive 





estimates. Besides, the complete model estimates suggest that the difference in log 
weighted average top 5 exports destination countries’ environmental CSR policies is 
significantly positive related with the development of environmental CSR policies. And the 
refined model estimates suggest that the difference in log PM2.5 air pollution between 1995 
and 2005 is another significant positive factor. In short, the size of an economy, the 
deterioration of air pollution and international trade spillover effect may be three main 
factors in driving the development of social CSR reporting policies. 
According to the complete model estimates, both log GDP in year 2000 and the difference 
of log weighted average top 5 exports destination countries’ social CSR polices are two 
significant positive factors. Particularly, the estimate for the international trade spillover 
effect is around 3 times of the estimate for the size of economy in year 2000, suggesting that 
the international trade spillover effect might be a stronger driver.  
Besides, we also find that the difference of log GDP, the difference of log international 
organizations’ accumulative promotion efforts, the log weighted average top 5 exports 
destination countries’ social CSR policies in year 2000 all three have weakly significant 
positive impacts on driving the development of social CSR policies by complete model 
estimates. In another word, the economy growth rate, the growing accumulative promotion 
efforts from international organizations, and the international trade spillover effect in year 
2000 all might be weak drivers to the development of social CSR policies. 
On the other side, we find four weakly significant negative factors from the complete 
model estimates, including the difference of the log Stock Market Capitalization (%GDP), 
the difference of log weighted average bordering countries’ social CSR policies, the log PM2.5 
air pollution level in year 2000, and the log weighted average bordering countries’ social 
CSR policies in year 2000. The speculation we proposed to interpret the weakly negative 
impacts from stock market capitalization (%GDP) and the log PM2.5 air pollution level in 
year 2000 for total CSR policies in Section 1.3.4.2 can be applied here. The weakly negative 
impacts from bordering countries may suggest that the regional difference in the 
development of social CSR policies may become larger between year 2000 and year 2015.  
1.4 Robustness Check 
The changes of potential social economic drivers and the development CSR reporting 





follows the CSR reporting policies development. As a robustness check, we also estimated 
models in which GDP and Stock Market Capitalization (%GDP) are differenced over a 
lagged period from year 1995 to 2005. And we estimated refined models with lagged social 
economic drivers by using LARS-Lasso estimates as well. The results of the robustness 
check are relegated to our Appendix A.3 Table A- 1 and Table A- 2.  
The results from complete model estimates and refined model estimates with lagged 
differences of GDP and Stock Market Capitalization in Appendix A Table A- 1 and Table A- 
2 show that the significant factors for all seven equations are consistent with the significant 
factors we’ve identified before using same period differences of GDP and Stock Market 
Capitalization. However, the SUR estimates results suggest that the lagged differences of 
GDP and Stock Market Capitalization are less relevant to the development of CSR policies 
than same period differences of these two variables. The weakly significant factors 
identified by SUR estimates using lagged differences of GDP and Stock Market 
Capitalization are basically consistent with SUR estimates using same period differences of 
these two variables. The LARS-Lasso estimates for total CSR policies and mandatory CSR 
policies are the same with before. For voluntary CSR policies and CSR governance policies, 
the LARS-Lasso refined models using lagged differences of GDP and Stock Market 
Capitalization include more covariates than LARS-Lasso refined models using same period 
differences of these two variables. However, the significant impact factors identified by two 
types of refined models are basically consistent. For general sustainability CSR policies, 
environmental CSR policies, and social CSR policies, the LARS-Lasso refined models using 
lagged differences of GDP and Stock Market Capitalization include less covariates than 
LARS-Lasso refined models using same period differences of these two variables. However, 
the significant impact factors identified by two types of refined models are still basically 
consistent. 
In summary, for all six equations except for the equation for mandatory CSR policies, 
adjusted R2’s of six equations estimated by SUR using same period differences of GDP and 
Stock Market Capitalization are higher than adjusted R2’s of seven equations estimated by 
SUR using lagged differences of these two variables. And for all six equations except for the 
equation for social CSR policies, adjusted R2’s of six equations estimated by SUR using 
same period differences of GDP and Stock Market Capitalization are higher than adjusted 






In this chapter, we use both SUR and LARS-Lasso methods to estimate complete long 
differences models and refined long difference models on potential drivers to the 
development of CSR reporting regulation policies.  
On the basis of these results, it appears that the GDP level of a country is the most 
significant and robust association with the development of all seven categories of CSR 
reporting regulation policies. This is possibly due to the reason that larger economies may 
have more CSR regulation needs. Besides, the deterioration of PM2.5 air pollution level, the 
international trade spillover effect, and the international organization promotion effort are 
estimated to be significant and robust associations with some categories of CSR policies.  
Particularly, the deterioration of PM2.5 air pollution level is a significant and robust 
association related with the development of voluntary CSR policies. And it might also be 
strongly associated with the total CSR policies, general sustainability CSR policies, CSR 
governance policies, environmental CSR policies and social CSR policies. The international 
trade spillover effect is a significant and robust association with the development of general 
sustainability, while it might also be strongly related with the development of 
environmental and social CSR policies. Besides, the international organization promotion 
effort is estimated to be a significant and robust association with the development of 
general sustainability CSR policies, and might be strongly correlated with the development 
of voluntary CSR policies and CSR governance polices.  
We also identify some factors which have weakly significant impacts on the development 
of CSR policies, including the same period economy growth rate and the Democracy Index 
in year 2006. Particularly, the size of the stock market of a country is not a direct driver in 
the development of CSR regulation policies. Rather, the extent that a country removes 
financial bubbles in its stock market may have a positive impact in driving the development 
of CSR regulation policies. Also, a more democratic institution and political environment 
may facilitate the development of voluntary CSR polices and CSR policies related with CSR 
governance. After 15 years’ development, it is likely that the regional differences in the 
development of CSR regulation policies among bordering countries become larger. The total 
greenhouse gas emissions per capita is estimated to be not significantly associated with the 
development of any CSR regulation policies. It is possible that the attention paid by a 





development of environmental and social CSR regulation policies. However, without 
additional data, we could not further verify conjecture.  
The limitation of our study is the measurement of CSR policies development. Right now, 
we are using the count of CSR policies as the proxy variable for the development of CSR 
policies. However, different CSR policies may have different regulation scope and the 
stringency of each CSR policy may also be different. Thus, different CSR policies are not 
necessarily treated equally. Future study may focus on developing a cross-country and 
cross-period comparable evaluation index for the regulation scope and the quality of each 































Chapter 2  
Is There Financial Incentive for Firms to Fulfill CSR under CSR 
Reporting Regulation? Evidence from China 
  
2.1 Introduction 
Driven by regulation, the global CSR reporting rate is growing fast. Based on KPMG 
2015 survey, over the years from 2011 to 2015, 90% to 95% of the 250 largest companies 
(G250) in the world report on their corporate responsibility activities (KPMG, 2015, pg.30). 
Also, among top 100 firms in 45 countries, namely 4500 firms worldwide, the average CSR 
reporting rate across the globe is 73% (KPMG, 2015, pg.33). However, for mandatory CSR 
reporting regulation to achieve its goal, it is crucial to provide financial incentives for firms 
to fulfill their CSR obligation and report their CSR performance.    
Thus, it is important to ask whether there is financial incentive for firms to fulfill their 
CSR obligation and report their CSR performance or not. In another word, is there a link 
between firms’ CSR performance and financial performance? (Q1) Particularly, can 
publishing CSR reports motivate firms to fulfill their CSR obligation? (Q2)  
In this chapter, we answer these two questions by empirically analyzing a large 
panel data set from China after CSR reporting regulation. The data set includes 120 
top firms from China spanning from year 2007 to 2013. The total revenue of 
sampled firms constitutes around half of China’s non-agriculture GDP. Particularly, 
we introduce the factor of firms’ CSR reports and reporting behaviors into our study, which 
has not been considered by most studies of CSR since these studies were done when CSR 
reporting was practiced voluntarily (Orlitzky, Schmidt, Rynes, 2003; Margolis, Elfenbein, 
and Walsh, 2007). 
Intuitively, we conjecture that CSR performance might be related with financial 
performance through two links. First, there might be an operational effect through 
improved stakeholder relationship management, better market CSR performance 
and better employee relationship which may generate higher profit to firms. Second, 
there might be a signaling effect through reported CSR performance. The reported 





an authority-report signal in job market, which may reveal firms’ moral types. We 
define the moral type as how a firm evaluates its externality. High moral type firms 
give the same negative externality more negative evaluation than low moral type 
firms do and give the same positive externality more positive evaluation than low 
moral type firms do. Further, the moral type of a firm is defined to be influenced by 
two clusters of factors. One cluster of factors is a firm’s inner factors, like the 
entrepreneurship and corporate culture. The other cluster of factors is outer factors 
coming from the society, like social morality, industry morality, consumers’ 
pressure, investors’ pressure, media’ pressure, regulation policy, and other 
stakeholders’ pressure. In the short-run, a firm’s moral type is relatively fixed, say 
one-year period, but in the long-run it is changeable, depending on the impacts of 
inner factors and outer factors. A firm’s moral type is relevant to its stakeholders 
from two aspects: first, what hidden actions a firm may take which will influence 
the interest of stakeholders; second, what impacts on the society and the 
environment a firm may bring which stakeholders concern. We interpret a firm’s 
CSR performance level as the level of externality that a firm choose to generate 
within the range of (−∞,+∞). If we assume that firms maximize net return from 
their business operation and externality4, which equals to the sum of business 
return and CSR performance return minus the cost of business activities and CSR 
activities, a firm’s reported CSR performance level may enable stakeholders to 
conjecture a firm’s moral type and form their strategy on how to interact with a firm 
based on their conjecture. In practice, firms’ CSR reports are published annually. 
Correspondingly, stakeholders may update their beliefs on firms’ moral types 
annually and adjust their strategy towards firms. It is worth a mention that CSR 
activities’ cost not only includes the direct cost of fulfilling CSR but also includes the 
indirect loss from unfulfilling CSR, like lawsuit, boycott, strike, regulation, bad 
corporate reputation etc.  
                                                          





To detect the operational effect, we investigate whether a firm’s CSR performance has an 
impact on financial performance and how four dimensions of CSR performance (CSR 
management performance, market CSR performance, social CSR performance and 
environmental CSR performance) are related with financial performance.  
To detect the signaling effect, we include lagged CSR performance, the interaction term 
of lagged CSR performance and a reporting dummy, and the reporting dummy into the 
regressions on financial performance. If significant effects are found for the interaction 
term and the reporting dummy, this would suggest that reported CSR performance has a 
different impact on firms’ financial performance from unreported CSR performance, which 
may provide some evidence for the existence of signaling effect. Since the reputation may 
take time to build up, the reporting records may also matter in the signaling effect. 
Therefore, we classified firms into three types: Leaders who initiated CSR reporting before 
or since 2008 and keep publishing CSR reports every year (the reporting dummy equals 1 
for all periods), Followers who initiated CSR reporting after 2008 and keep publishing CSR 
reports every year (the reporting dummy switches from zero to 1 only once) and The 
Uncommitted who never publish CSR report or only publish CSR reports once or twice 
discontinuously between 2008 and 2013 (the reporting dummy is almost zero) and 
conducted partitioned regressions. 
We find that both current year CSR performance and lagged CSR performance have an 
impact on firms’ financial performance. Better current year CSR performance has an effect 
on increasing profitability (net profit/ROA/total revenue) but it is also associated with 
higher total operating costs. The examination of the link between four aspects of CSR 
performance and firms’ financial performance suggests that the strength and the direction 
of the link may depend on a firm’s CSR reporting records type, how a firm practices CSR, 
and time horizon. Overall, social CSR performance has the most consistent positive effects 
on profitability among full sample and all types. Lagged market CSR performance and CSR 
management performance also have a positive effect on profitability. The link between 
environmental CSR performance and financial performance is very limited and in general 
negative. A possible explanation to this finding is that stakeholders in China may mainly 
use social CSR performance as an indicator of firms’ moral type while the public perception 
of environmental CSR performance as an indicator of firms’ moral type is still low.  
Next, by isolating the signaling effect of CSR reports and reporting records, we find that 





unreported CSR performance.  Lagged unreported CSR performance increases the total 
operating costs and has a negative effect on the profitability. However, lagged reported CSR 
has a conditional signaling effect on firms’ profitability. The conditional signaling effect is 
that when lagged reported CSR performance is beyond a critical level the impact of lagged 
reported CSR performance on profitability is positive, while when lagged reported CSR 
performance is below this critical level the impact of lagged reported CSR performance on 
profitability is negative. The critical level may reflect stakeholders’ beliefs on the CSR 
performance level which may differentiate high moral type firms from low moral type firms.  
From partitioned regressions, we find that current year CSR performance has an effect 
on increasing total revenue and profitability for all three types. It also has an effect of 
increasing total cost for Leaders and Followers but no significant effect on The 
Uncommitted’ total cost. This finding provides good evidence that both Leaders and 
Followers have invested in fulfilling CSR but The Uncommitted haven’t. In the long run, 
there is a positive effect of lagged reported CSR performance on Leaders, a conditional 
effect of lagged reported CSR performance on Followers and negative effect of lagged 
unreported CSR performance for The Uncommitted, which might suggest adverse selection 
effect for The Uncommitted.  
Our results are of value to policy makers, firms and of relevance to the signaling model 
literature. First, it is helpful to policy makers to be assured the existence of the financial 
incentive for firms to fulfill CSR performance and publish CSR reports. Policy makers can 
promote firms to have better CSR performance by enhancing the standard of CSR 
performance level in differentiating high moral type firms from low moral type firms in 
public awareness. By doing so, police makers could also provide incentives to The 
Uncommitted firms to become content in fulfilling their CSR. Second, these results are 
helpful to firms to be certain about the financial benefits to fulfill CSR. Third, since CSR 
reporting can be viewed as self-report signals and the function of CSR reports as valid 
signals lies heavily on the trustworthiness of CSR reports considering its self-publishing 
feature. It would be worth exploring how the quality of self-report signals would influence 
the equilibrium. This theoretical exploration could be an extension to Spence (1972) job 
market signaling model, in which education can truthfully reflect a worker’s ability as an 
authority-report signal. Therefore, our results provide primary empirical foundation for the 
future theoretical work. Particularly, the new theoretical exploration will be presented in 





The following of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 2.2, we will take a brief 
review on CSR and CSR regulation in China. In section 2.3, we will give a descriptive 
summary of our data. In section 2.4, we present our results on empirical analysis of overall 
CSR performance index, CSR reporting and financial performance. In section 2.5, we will 
further to take an empirical analysis of four CSR performance subindices, CSR reporting 
and financial performance. In section 2.6, limitations and future studies are discussed. 
2.2 CSR and CSR Regulations in China 
According to the latest definition of CSR by United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization, “Corporate Social Responsibility is a management concept whereby 
companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and 
interactions with their stakeholders.” 
CSR has attracted attention from businesses and stakeholders since 1960s (De George 
2011) and earned scholarly perception since 1970s (Markus Kitzmueller and Jay 
Shimshack, 2012). For around 40 years before year 2000, CSR was practiced voluntarily 
and most studies on CSR were built on the basis that it is a voluntary behavior by business 
which “exceeds levels set by obligatory regulation or standards enforced by law”. (Markus 
Kitzmueller and Jay Shimshack, 2012) 
However, with the increasing concern “about the accelerating deterioration of the human 
environment and natural resources and the consequences of that deterioration for economic 
and social development” and the emphasis of “the need for a new approach to economic 
growth, as an essential prerequisite for eradication of poverty and for enhancing the 
resource base on which present and future generations depend” (Report of the World 
Commission on Environment and Development, General Assembly Resolution 42/187, 
United Nations, 11 December 1987), and at the pressure from the public: consumers, 
investors, NGO’s and other stakeholders, who is demanding an increased role for 
governments in addressing the growing environmental and social problems with the 
economic development, as well as the need to address trust crisis after the global financial 
crisis in 2008 (Carrots and Sticks-Promoting Transparency and Sustainability, 2010, pg.6), 
governments began to make CSR mandatory through CSR reporting regulation since year 
2000.  
In China, the number of annual CSR reports grows fast from 32 reports in 2006 to 1703 





reporting rate in China is mainly due to China’s governments and China’s two stock 
markets’ regulation requirements since 2006. In year 2006, in the modified China’s 
Corporate’s Law, it added a new clause, article 5 clause 1, saying that “firms must take 
their social responsibility when conducting businesses”. Besides, 3 environmental 
administrative rules and 26 regulation documents were enacted. Also in year 2006, two 
stock exchanges in China (Shenzhen Stock Exchange and Shanghai Stock Exchange) 
suggested listed companies to publish CSR report together with their financial report each 
year. In January 2008, State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of 
the State Council issued a document of A Guidance for Central-Government Owned 
Enterprise to Fulfill CSR. In year 2008, both stock markets further required listed firms to 
publish CSR report each year. The underlying reason for these regulation requirements is 
the trust crisis in China’s market. In China, the 1st issue of consumption concern is the 
product quality. In 2011, China Consumer’s Association has accepted 607,263 consumer 
complaints and 50.2% are about product’s quality. With a lot of news reports by Chinese 
media on the problems of product security and product quality, like toxic infant milk 
powder, toxic drug capsule, high mercury levels in cosmetics, China’s consumers’ confidence 
in firms in providing high quality products and behaving ethically is weaker than ever 
before. It is through the regulation requirement of CSR reporting that China’s government 
is making an effort to rebuild a good market order and prevent socially irresponsible 
behaviors of firms. 
On the other side, Chinese Academy of Social Science Chinese CSR Research Center 
(CASS CSR Research Center), a national academic research institute was established in 
2008. The CASS CSR Research Center began to release Chinese CSR Reports Writing 
Guidance since 2009 (CASS-CSR). This report writing guidance provides a specific guidance 
to each industry. In 2015, 64% Chinese CSR reports referred to some disclosure standards 
to organize their CSR reports and more and more firms turn to refer to CASS-CSR.  
2.3 Data 
2.3.1 Data source 
Our CSR performance evaluation data come from Research Report on Corporate Social 
Responsibility of China (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2103, and 2014) by CASS CSR Research 
Center. Since 2009, it began to publish Research Report on Corporate Social Responsibility 





100 private companies, and top 100 foreign companies in China. In the report, it developed 
an evaluation framework of CSR performance by decomposing CSR performance into four 
parts: CSR management performance, market responsibility performance, social 
responsibility performance, and environmental responsibility performance and evaluating a 
firm’s CSR performance by using a weighted sum formula: 




where 𝑊𝑗𝑘is the weight of 𝑗
𝑡ℎCSR performance component (one of the 4 parts mentioned 
above) in industry 𝑘 (Each industry may have a difference weight for the same CSR 
performance component), 𝐴𝑖𝑗 is the score that firm 𝑖 got in 𝑗
𝑡ℎCSR performance component, 
𝐵𝑖is the adjustment score by considering the rewards a firm got on CSR performance, the 
negative coverage on a firm’s CSR performance, and the creativity in a firm’s CSR practice. 
For each component of CSR performance, they further developed a series of subindices to 
evaluate a firm’s CSR performance. In Research Report on Corporate Social Responsibility 
of China (2014), there were 80 subindices in total to evaluate a firm’s CSR performance. 
The definition of four aspects of CSR performance and details of 80 subindices are listed in 
Table 2.1.  
The CSR performance index is evaluated based on 4 kinds of information sources: (1). 
Firms’ CSR reports;(2). Firms’ accounting annual report; (3). Firms’ website; (4). Coverage 
on news media’s website and government’s websites.  
Firms’ financial performance data was collected manually by author from firms annual 
accounting reports published on Shenzhen Stock Exchange, Shanghai Stock Exchange and 













Table 2.1 China CSR Performance Evaluation Indices (Research Report on CSR of China, 2014) 
CSR 
Components 







(1).CSR vision; (2).CSR issues; (3).CSR annual plan; (4).CSR leading 
organs; (5).CSR organization system; (6).CSR management system; (7). 
Stakeholders Identification; (8).Stakeholders’ expectation and firms’ 
response action; (9).The interactive stakeholders’ participation system; (10). 
CSR report publication (Yes/No); (11).Third party auditing in CSR reports; 
(12).CSR column on firm’s website; (13).CSR reports on special issues; 






(1).Investor relations management; (2).Total revenue; (3). Net profit; (4). 




(1).Supplier management; (2).Supplier list; (3). Supplier qualification 
requirement; (4). Responsible purchasing institution and guidelines; 





(1). Customer relations management; (2).After-sales services system; 
(3).Active response to customers’ complains; (4).Customers’ information 
protection; (5). Customer satisfaction survey; (6). Product quality 
management and certification; (7).Legal advertising 
R&D 
(CSR-2.4) 
(1).R&D support institution and measures; (2).R&D staff number and ratio; 
(3).R&D investment; (4).Newly developed patents number 
Industry 
Special Issues 






(1).Policies of legal operation; (2).Anti-corruption and business bribery 





(1).Fare employing institution; (2).Employment contract signing 
ratio/Collective contract coverage ratio; (3).Social insurance coverage ratio; 
(4).Unionized staff ratio; (5).Prohibition of forced or compulsory labor; (6). 
Protection for employee personal information and privacy; (7).Average 
annual level; (8).Female manager ratio; (9).Disabled employee 
ratio/number; (10).Democratic management and transparent managerial 
affairs; (11).Financial aid to employee who are in difficulties; 
(12).Protection to special groups (e.g. pregnant women, nursing women, 
etc.); (13).employee satisfaction ratio; (14).Employee turnover rate; 
(15).Employee training program; (16).Performance on employee training; 





(1).Community interactive participation institution; (2).Policy on support to 
employee localization; (3).Support to purchasing localization; (4).Support to 
education of community members; (5).Partnership with local government 
and NGO; (6).Charity policy/foundation; (7).Support to employee volunteer 




(1).Production safety management system; (2).Safety emergency 
management institution; (3).Safety education and training; (4).Performance 
on safety training; (5).Investment on production safety; (6).Casualties 
Industry 
Special Issues 







(1).Environmental management system and certification; 
(2).Environmental protection training and education; (3).Total 
environmental protection input; (4).Total amount of energy consumption; 
(5).Total amount of water usage; (6).R&D on environmental protection 
equipment; (7).Green office; (8).Action towards climate change; 
(9).Greenhouse gas discharge amount and emission reduction amount 
Industry 
Special Issues 






2.3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Top 100 state-owned companies and top 100 private companies from Research Report on 
Corporate Social Responsibility of China (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2103, and 2014) by CASS 
CSR Research Center are selected to form our sample. After matching the CSR 
performance index data and firms’ financial performance data, we got an unbalanced panel 
data set of 120 firms. A brief summary of the panel data is as follows in Table 2.2: 
Table 2.2 Panel Data Summary 
Year 
The Number of Firms 
whose CSR 
performance data is 
available 
The Number of Firms whose 
financial data is available 
The Number of Firms whose 
CSR data and financial data 
matches 
2007 0 111 0 
2008 62 116 62 
2009 120 118 118 
2010 120 120 120 
2011 120 120 120 
2012 120 120 120 
2013 119 115 115 
 
The industries distribution in the panel data is summarized in Table 2.3. In the sample, 
the state-owned firms constitute 62.5% and private firms constitute 37.5%. According to 
China’s National Industries Classification (GB/T 4754-2011), our sample includes 35 
industries out of 88 industries in non-agricultural and non-government sectors. The annual 
total revenue of firms in our sample constitutes around 43% to 48% GDP of non-
agricultural sectors. 
We also differentiate firms into three types: Leaders, Followers, and The Uncommitted 
based on their CSR reporting behaviors. The definitions and statistics are summarized in 
Table 2.4. Particularly, for Followers (in total 33 firms), we checked how many firms 
initiate to publish CSR reports each year. The statistics are in Table 2.5. The average CSR 


















Number of Firms in the 
Sample 
1 Ferrous metal smelting and rolling processing 12 
2 Mechanical and equipment manufacturing  3 
3 Automotive 8 
4 Real Estate Exploitation  1 
5 Technochemistry Product Manufacturing 7 
6 Food and Beverage 2 
7 Retailing 6 
9 Electronic product and parts manufacturing 1 
10 Computer and computer-related equipment manufacturing 10 
11 Banking 2 
12 Wholesale Trade 1 
13 Railway Logistics 7 
14 Construction 2 
15 Communication Equipment Manufacturing 1 
17 Mining 2 
18 Fabricated Metal Product 4 
19 Household Appliances Manufacturing 5 
20 Oil and gas mining 2 
21 Electric power manufacturing 4 
22 Pharmaceuticals 1 
23 Insurance 1 
26 Non-mental Mineral Product Industry 1 
27 Coal Mining and washing 3 
29 Communication Service 3 
30 Tourism 1 
33 Electricity Supply Industry 2 
43 Multi-industry companies 18 
45 Water Transportation 3 
46 Air Transportation 5 
47 Other Transportation Manufacturing 2 





Table 2.4 CSR Reporting Behavior Types 
Types Definition 
The Number 
of Firms in the 
Panel 
Leaders 
A firm which begins to publish CSR reports 
before/from 2008 and continuously 
56 
Followers 
A firm which begins to publish CSR reports 
after 2008 and continuously 
33 
The Uncommitted 
A firm which begins to publish CSR reports 
after 2008 but not continuously; 









Table 2.5 Followers CSR Reporting Initiation Statistics 
Year 
The Number of Firms which 








Figure 2.1 Average CSR Index Evolution 
 
 
2.4 Empirical Analysis of CSR Index, CSR Reporting and Financial Performance 
2.4.1 Full Sample Regressions 
To investigate the impacts of current year’s CSR performance and last year’s CSR 
performance on firms’ financial performance, we evaluate models listed as follows5 for four 
different measurements of firms’ financial performance: net profit, the logarithm of total 
revenue, ROA, and the logarithm of total operating cost. Usually, there is a lag in firms’ 
self-releasing CSR reports. The CSR report on current year will usually be released in the 
first quarter of next year. Therefore, we only consider CSR Reporting Dummy's effect and 
its interaction term for last year CSR performance index.  
                                                          
5 We didn’t include random effects within models here because random effects within models require balanced 
panel data. If we trim our unbalanced panel data to be balanced panel data, we will lose a lot of observations. 
Besides, since we only include one firm size control variable, it is more persuasive to believe that there are other 
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(1a). Pooled OLS  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡−1 ∙ 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
(1b). One-way Fixed Effects Within 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡−1 ∙ 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
(1c). Between 
?̅?𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑥𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑖𝑡−1 ∙ 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽5?̅?𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎𝑖 + ?̅?𝑖𝑡 
In equations (1a) to (1c), 𝑦𝑖𝑡 represents four different financial measurements. Since there 
is negative net profit in our sample, we use net profit in the level form measured in Chinese 
currency yuan. In all equations, 𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 is the CSR performance index of firm i in year t. 
𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡−1 is the last year CSR performance index of firm i in year t. 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡−1 is a 
reporting dummy variable. 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡−1 = 1 if firm i published its CSR report in year t-1 
and 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡−1 = 0 if firm i didn’t publish its CSR report in year t-1. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is the firm size 
control variable and 𝑙𝑛𝑋𝑖𝑡is the logarithm of 𝑋𝑖𝑡. In most cases, we select total asset at the 
beginning of the accounting year as the firm size control variable. For net profit equations, 
besides total asset, we also select total revenue as the firm size control variable. For total 
revenue equations, we also select total operating cost as the firm size control variable. Note 
that we only use one firm size control variable for each equation and never use two control 
variables together. In all one-way fixed effects within equations and between equations, 𝑎𝑖 
is the unobservable individual effect. In all equations, 𝑢𝑖𝑡is an error term. In all between 
equations, for each firm i, we average one-way fixed effects within equation over the time. 
It is important to note that due to the unavailability of the production data we are 
missing the total quantity produced data. However, a firm with higher total quantity 
produced may be a leader firm in its industry and a leader firm may confront more 
government supervision and social pressure on CSR performance. As a result, a leader firm 
tends to have better CSR performance than competitor firms in an industry. Thus, total 
production quantity and CSR performance may also be positively related. Hence, there 
might be endogeneity problem of CSR performance index variables and reporting dummy 
variable. To avoid endogeneity problem, we will use IV’s for CSR performance index 
variables, the interaction term of CSR performance index and reporting dummy, and the 






To avoid the potential endogeneity of 𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡, 𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡−1, 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡−1, and the 
interaction term 𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡−1 ∙ 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡−1, we use instrument variables for all these 
terms in all equations. For CSR performance index, we mainly use last year average CSR 
performance index of other firms in similar size in the sample (CSRSizeIV or CSRNSizeIV, 
definitions are in Table 2.14) and last year other firms’ CSR reporting rate in the industry 
(LCSRR, definition is in Table 2.14)6. To construct LCSRR, we referred to multiple sample 
sources to form an enlarged sample size to calculated LCSRR. The details on how we 
constructed LCSRR are presented in Table 2.7. LCSRR is also used as an IV for reporting 
dummy variable. For the interaction term of CSR performance index and CSR reporting 
dummy variable, we use the interaction term of CSRSizeIV or CSRNSizeIV and the 
predicted probability of CSR reporting and the interaction term of LCSRR and the 
predicted probability of CSR reporting as IV’s. Table 2.6 presented how we constructed 
predicted probability of CSR reporting. The reduced form equations for suspicious 
endogenous variables are presented in Table 2.8 to Table 2.13. The variable definitions are 
presented in Table 2.14. The positive links between CSRNSizeIV, LCSRR, and 
ConsumerDummy and CSR reporting Dummy in Table 2.6 indicate that firms are more 
likely to publish CSR reports when other similar size firms’ CSR performance is improved, 
last year’s industry CSR reporting rate increases, and when a firm produces consumer 
good. The negative links between Ownership and CSR reporting Dummy in Table 2.6 
indicates that the order of CSR reporting probability among the ownership types is central 
government-owned enterprise>state-owned financial firm>local government-owned 
firm>private enterprise. In another word, the more government supervision a firm may 





                                                          
6 It would be better to use last year average CSR performance index of other firms in the same industry rather 
than last year average CSR performance index of other firms in similar size. However, the number of firms 
belonging to the same industry in the sample is very limited and may change from year to year so that last year 
average CSR performance index of other firms in the same industry calculated from the sample is not 




































Dependent Variable: CSR Reporting Dummy  
 Full Sample  Pooled OLS 
Variables Estimate t-value 
(Intercept) 0.381142*** 5.757 
 (0.066204)  
CSRNSizeIV 0.007944*** 6.746 
 (0.001178)  
LCSRR 0.373766*** 7.151 
 (0.052265)  
ConsumerDummy 0.122128*** 4.133 
 (0.029551) 
Ownership -0.083784*** -6.484 
  (0.012922)   
N 647  
Adjusted R2 0.3562  










in Panel Data 
(120 Firms) 






1 Fabricated metal products 10 43 (1),(2) 
2 Mechanical and equipment manufacturing 3 26 (1) 
3 Automotive 8 30 (1) 
4 Real estate 1 31 (1) 
5 Technochemistry Product Manufacturing 7 7 (2) 
6 Foods and beverage 2 35 (1) 
7 Retailing 5 32 (1) 
9 
Computer and computer-related equipment 
manufacturing 1 16 
(1) 
10 Banking 10 25 (1) 
12 Railway Logistics 1 2 (2),(4) 
13 Construction 6 7 (2) 
14 Communication Equipment Manufacturing 2 11 (1) 
15 Mining 1 7 (2) 
17 Consumer-electronics 2 22 (2),(5) 
18 Oil and gas mining 4 8 (1) 
19 Electronic power manufacturing 7 11 (1) 
20 Pharmaceuticals 2 21 (1) 
21 Insurance 4 6 (2) 
22 Textiles 1 8 (2) 
23 Apparel&Shoes&Hat 1 8 (2),(6) 
27 Coal Mining and washing 3 9 (2) 
29 Communication Service 3 11 (1) 
30 Tourism 1 4 (2),(4) 
43 Multi-industry 19 Not Applicable  (1),(2),(3),(7),(8) 
45 Water transportation 3 4 (2) 
46 Air-transport 5 6 (2) 
47 Railway transportation equipment manufacturing 2 2 (2),(4) 
Notes:  
1. Sample Sources:  
(1). The CSR Development Index of Key Industries in Research Report on Corporate Social Responsibility of China (2012, 2013, 2014); 
(2). The CSR Development Index of Top 300 Firms in China (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014); 
(3). The list of Typical Wholesale Enterprises from Ministry of Commerce of People’s Republic of China Department of Circulation 
Development; 
(4). Internet Search for China’ national firms; 
(5). 2015 China’s Top 10 Consumer Electronic Firms in main consumer electronics categories; 
(6). China’s Top 10 Apparel Brands in main apparel categories; 
(7).Top 10 Papermaking Firms in China 
(8). Listed Companies in Agriculture and Animal Husbandry Industry which published CSR reports in 2013 monitored by A study on 
China's CSR reports 2012-2013 by Syn Tao ( A CSR consultancy company). 
2. Multi-industry:  
The IV’s for multi-industry companies are calculated by a weighted sum of industry reporting rates of the industries from which the 
revenue to the firm constitutes above 10% in that firm’s annual total avenue. The weights equals to the relative share of the revenue 
from a certain industry compared to other main revenue contributing industries. The revenue data come from firms’ annual 





Table 2.8 Full Sample Net Profit OLS Model Reduced Form Equations 
 Full Sample Net Profit Pooled OLS Model Reduced Form Equations 
  I   II 
CSRIndex Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 (Intercept) 0.530449  (Intercept) 2.9960e+00 
  (2.285560)   (2.3848e+00) 
 CSRNSizeIV 0.717181***  TotalRevenue 1.0158e-11** 
  (0.061489)   (3.1015e-12) 
 LCSRR 22.373960***  CSRNSizeIV 5.9533e-01*** 
  (3.025293)   (6.9929e-02) 
    LCSRR 2.3056e+01*** 
        (3.0212e+00) 
 N 651  N 643 
 Adjusted R
2 0.32528  Adjusted R
2 0.33239 
  F(2,648)=157.272, p-value: < 2.22e-16  F(3,639)=107.044, p-value: < 2.22e-16 
LCSRIndex Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 (Intercept) 1.9389e+00   (Intercept) 3.6081e+00  
  (2.5087e+00)   (2.5561e+00) 
 Asset1 7.2784e-13   TotalRevenue 1.0182e-11** 
  (4.3528e-13)   (3.1532e-12) 
 LCSRNSizeIV 6.8394e-01***  LCSRNSizeIV 5.9694e-01*** 
  (7.1355e-02)   (7.7187e-02) 
 LLCSRR 2.0750e+01***  LLCSRR 2.0953e+01*** 
   (3.2511e+00)    (3.2284e+00) 
 N 532  N 527 
 Adjusted R2 0.31309  Adjusted R2 0.31562 
  F(3,528)=81.1089, p-value: < 2.22e-16  F(3,523)=81.2987, p-value: < 2.22e-16 
LCSR_R Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 (Intercept) 8.575026***  (Intercept) 9.4748e+00*** 
  (1.763577)   (1.7850e+00) 
 LCSRNSizeIV_P_Reporting 0.729333***  TotalRevenue 9.4635e-12** 
  (0.080823)   (3.5038e-12) 
 LLCSRR_P_Reporting 11.616813**  LCSRNSizeIV_P_Reporting 6.0768e-01*** 
  (4.396870)   (9.1535e-02) 
    LLCSRR_P_Reporting 1.3598e+01** 
        (4.4785e+00) 
 N 533  N 527 
 Adjusted R
2 0.34044  Adjusted R
2 0.34071 
  F(2,530)=137.963, p-value: < 2.22e-16  F(3,523)=91.1404, p-value: < 2.22e-16 
LReporting Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 (Intercept)  3.6058e-01***  (Intercept)  3.4427e-01*** 
  (2.9324e-02)   (2.9423e-02) 
 Asset1 2.4692e-14**  TotalRevenue 2.5780e-1*** 
  (8.2513e-15)   (5.4868e-14) 
 LLCSRR 6.8713e-01***  LLCSRR 6.6798e-01*** 
   (5.8597e-02 )    (5.8045e-02) 
 N 572  N 567 
 Adjusted R2 0.23199  Adjusted R2 0.24689 





Table 2.9 Full Sample Net Profit Between Model Reduced Form Equations 
 Full Sample Net Profit Between Model Reduced Form Equations 
  I   II 
CSRIndex Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 (Intercept) -6.12584      (Intercept) -6.12584 
  (4.90223)   (4.90223) 
 CSRNSizeIV 0.83258***  CSRNSizeIV 0.83258*** 
  (0.13213)   (0.13213) 
 LCSRR 26.92572***  LCSRR 26.92572*** 
  (6.87623)   (6.87623) 
 n 119  n 119 
 T 4--6  T 4--6 
 N 651  N 651 
 Adjusted R
2 0.41733  Adjusted R
2 0.41733 
  F(2,116)=43.4206, p-value: 8.3853e-15  F(2,116)=43.4206, p-value: 8.3853e-15 
LCSRIndex Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 (Intercept) -5.16446  (Intercept) -5.16446 
  (4.52571)   (4.52571) 
 LCSRNSizeIV 0.81684***  LCSRNSizeIV 0.81684*** 
  (0.12824)   (0.12824) 
 LLCSRR 26.93079***  LLCSRR 26.93079*** 
  (6.65865)   (6.65865) 
 n 119  n 119 
 T 3--5  T 3--5 
 N 533  N 533 
 Adjusted R2 0.42422  Adjusted R2 0.42422 
  F(2,116)=44.689, p-value: 4.078e-15  F(2,116)=44.689, p-value: 4.078e-15 
LCSR_R Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 (Intercept) 5.57958   (Intercept) 5.57958  
  (3.17110)   (3.17110) 
 LCSRNSizeIV_P_Reporting 0.77083***  LCSRNSizeIV_P_Reporting 0.77083*** 
  (0.15667)   (0.15667) 
 LLCSRR_P_Reporting 16.22618   LLCSRR_P_Reporting 16.22618  
  (9.38317)   (9.38317) 
 n 119  n 119 
 T 3--5  T 3--5 
 N 533  N 533 
 Adjusted R
2 0.43712  Adjusted R
2 0.43712 
  F(2,116)=47.1541, p-value: 1.0302e-15  F(2,116)=47.1541, p-value: 1.0302e-15 
LReporting Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 (Intercept)  0.293087***  (Intercept)  2.8286e-01*** 
  (0.064636)   (6.2893e-02) 
 LLCSRR 0.886324***  TotalRevenue 2.6739e-13* 
  (0.135264)   (1.0830e-13) 
    LLCSRR 8.0766e-01*** 
        (1.3536e-01) 
 n 119  n 119 
 T 3--5  T 3--5 
 N 574  N 567 
 Adjusted R2 0.26394  Adjusted R2 0.30055 





Table 2.10 Full Sample Net Profit One-way Fixed Effects Within Model Reduced Form Equations 
  Full Sample Net Profit One-way Fixed Effects Within Model Reduced Form Equations 
  I   II 
CSRIndex Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 CSRSizeIV 0.331189***  CSRNSizeIV 0.369231*** 
  (0.067993)   (0.079814) 
 LCSRR 14.412806***  LCSRR 13.985549*** 
  (3.367525)   (3.450827) 
          
 n 119  n 119 
 T 4--6  T 4--6 
 N 651  N 651 
 Adjusted R2 0.10026  Adjusted R2 0.097245 
  F(2,530)=37.2161, p-value: 7.5161e-16  F(2,530)=35.947, p-value: 2.2924e-15 
LCSRIndex Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 LCSRSizeIV 0.219977**  LCSRSizeIV 0.219977** 
  (0.084214)   (0.084214) 
 LLCSRR 10.494742**  LLCSRR 10.494742** 
  (3.559067)   (3.559067) 
        
 n 119  n 119 
 T 3--5  T 3--5 
 N 533  N 533 
 Adjusted R2 0.041537  Adjusted R2 0.041537 
  F(2,412)=11.6982, p-value: 1.1444e-05  F(2,412)=11.6982, p-value: 1.1444e-05 
LCSR_R Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 LCSRSizeIV_P_Reporting 0.36723**  LCSRSizeIV_P_Reporting 0.36723** 
  (0.11425)   (0.11425) 
 LLCSRR_P_Reporting 8.32087   LLCSRR_P_Reporting 8.32087  
  (4.53730)   (4.53730) 
          
 n 119  n 119 
 T 3--5  T 3--5 
 N 533  N 533 
 Adjusted R2 0.070679  Adjusted R2 0.070679 
  F(2,412)=20.7315, p-value: 2.6375e-09  F(2,412)=20.7315, p-value: 2.6375e-09 
LReporting Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 LLCSRR 0.481085***  LLCSRR 0.481085*** 
  (0.056473)   (0.056473) 
          
 n 119  n 119 
 T 3--5  T 3--5 
 N 574  N 574 
 Adjusted R
2 0.10901  Adjusted R
2 0.10901 







Table 2.11 Full Sample TR/ROA/TC Pooled OLS Model Reduced Form Equations 
 Full Sample Total Revenue/ROA/ Total Operating Cost Pooled OLS Model Reduced Form Equations 
  I   II 
CSRIndex Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 (Intercept) -127.612731***  (Intercept) -96.50935*** 
  (13.890609)   (26.31793) 
 lnAsset1 5.774984***  lnTotalOperatingCost 4.51810*** 
  (0.618314)   (1.17536) 
 CSRNSizeIV 0.316366***  CSRNSizeIV 0.28142* 
  (0.072088)   (0.11024) 
 LCSRR 13.319884***  LCSRR 21.96546*** 
   (3.011657)    (3.54963) 
 N 647  N 477 
 Adjusted R
2 0.40514   Adjusted R
2 0.2885 
  F(3,643)=147.51, p-value: < 2.22e-16  F(3,473)=64.6946, p-value: < 2.22e-16 
LCSRIndex Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 (Intercept) -138.192351***  (Intercept) -78.61563** 
  (15.079245)   (25.89780) 
 lnAsset1 6.245984***  lnTotalOperatingCost 3.64637** 
  (0.668568)   (1.13910) 
 LCSRNSizeIV 0.258529**  LCSRNSizeIV 0.37673*** 
  (0.080378)   (0.11020) 
 LLCSRR 11.051617***  LLCSRR 20.79577*** 
   (3.196772)    (3.77142) 
 N 532  N 397 
 Adjusted R2 0.40638   Adjusted R2 0.2812 
  F(3,528)=122.031, p-value: < 2.22e-16  F(3,393)=51.9765, p-value: < 2.22e-16 
LCSR_R Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 (Intercept) -148.235805***  (Intercept) -73.59568* 
  (17.143559)   (28.85722) 
 lnAsset1 6.634831***  lnTotalOperatingCost 3.56134** 
  (0.721663)   (1.21752) 
 LCSRNSizeIV_P_Reporting 0.254331**  LCSRNSizeIV_P_Reporting 0.40135** 
  (0.090934)   (0.12233) 
 LLCSRR_P_Reporting 11.271491**  LLCSRR_P_Reporting 15.84435** 
   (4.086215)    (5.17420) 
 N 532  N 397 
 Adjusted R
2 0.43031   Adjusted R
2 0.30815 
  F(3,528)=134.716, p-value: < 2.22e-16  F(3,393)=59.2088, p-value: < 2.22e-16 
LReporting Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 (Intercept)  -2.3512361***  (Intercept)  -2.119169*** 
  (0.2433834)   (0.360075) 
 lnAsset1 0.1119449***  lnTotalOperatingCost 0.104185*** 
  (0.0099832)   (0.014689) 
 LLCSRR 0.3832592***  LLCSRR 0.479790*** 
   (0.0603682)    (0.067501) 
 N 572  N 424 
 Adjusted R2 0.36021  Adjusted R2 0.26002 
  F(2,569)=161.499, p-value: < 2.22e-16   F(2,421)=74.6829, p-value: < 2.22e-16 





Table 2.12 Full Sample TR/ROA/TC Between Model Reduced Form Equations 
  Full Sample TR/ROA/ TC Between Model Reduced Form Equations 
  I   II 
CSRIndex Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 (Intercept) -128.65785***  (Intercept) -186.8453*** 
  (29.11572)   (-4.8533) 
 lnAsset1 5.75561***  lnTotalOperatingCost 8.4725*** 
  (1.34664)   (1.5788) 
 CSRNSizeIV 0.34925*  LCSRR 24.3180** 
  (0.17008)   (7.7113) 
 LCSRR 13.15049     
   (7.01238)      
 n 119  n 95 
 T 3--6  T 2--6 
 N 647  N 477 
 Adjusted R
2 0.47936   Adjusted R
2 0.36331 
  F(3,115)=37.7297, p-value: < 2.22e-16  F(2,92)=27.6191, p-value: 4.03e-10 
LCSRIndex Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 (Intercept) -129.31262***  (Intercept) -5.16446 
  (27.68970)   (4.52571) 
 lnAsset1 5.73652***  LCSRNSizeIV 0.81684*** 
  (1.26284)   (0.12824) 
 LCSRNSizeIV 0.33392*  LLCSRR 26.93079*** 
  (0.15984)   (6.65865) 
 LLCSRR 13.80193*    
   (6.75958)      
 n 119  n 119 
 T 3--5  T 3--5 
 N 532  N 533 
 Adjusted R2 0.49966   Adjusted R2 0.42422 
  F(3,115)=41.0383, p-value: < 2.22e-16  F(2,116)=44.689, p-value: 4.078e-15 
LCSR_R Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 (Intercept) -144.62301***  (Intercept) 5.57958  
  (31.19621)   (3.17110) 
 lnAsset1 6.44271***  LCSRNSizeIV_P_Reporting 0.77083*** 
  (1.32867)   (0.15667) 
 LCSRNSizeIV_P_Reporting 0.44481**  LLCSRR_P_Reporting 16.22618  
  (0.14419)   (9.38317) 
 n 119  n 119 
 T 3--5  T 3--5 
 N 532  N 533 
 Adjusted R
2 0.51552  Adjusted R
2 0.43712 
  F(2,116)=65.103, p-value: < 2.22e-16  F(2,116)=47.1541, p-value: 1.0302e-15 
LReporting Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 (Intercept)  -2.405066***  (Intercept)  -215.3177*** 
  (0.456099)   (41.5519) 
 lnAsset1 0.113893***  lnTotalOperatingCost 9.3652*** 
  (0.019113)   (1.6981) 
 LLCSRR 0.396242**  LLCSRR 27.6589** 
   (0.144017)    (8.3206) 
 n 119  n 95 
 T 3--5  T 1--5 
 N 572  N 397 
 Adjusted R2 0.43504  Adjusted R2 0.38334 
  F(2,116)=46.7485, p-value: 1.289e-15   F(2,92)=30.1394, p-value: 8.5669e-11 






Table 2.13 Full Sample TR/ROA/TC One-way Fixed Effects Within Model Reduced Form Equations 
 
Full Sample TotalRevenue/ROA/TC One-way Fixed Effects Within Model Reduced Form 
Equations 
  I   II 
CSRIndex Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 lnAsset1 4.129717*  CSRSizeIV 0.331189*** 
  (1.804742)   (0.067993) 
 CSRNSizeIV 0.316112***  LCSRR 14.412806*** 
  (0.083812)   (3.367525) 
 LCSRR 10.971805**    
   (3.780693)      
 n 119  n 119 
 T 3--6  T 4--6 
 N 647  N 651 
 Adjusted R2 0.10828  Adjusted R2 0.10026 
  F(3,525)=26.9473, p-value: 3.1845e-16  F(2,530)=37.2161, p-value: 7.5161e-16 
LCSRIndex Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 lnAsset1 8.116852***  LCSRSizeIV 0.219977** 
  (1.990335)   (0.084214) 
 LCSRSizeIV 0.174428*  LLCSRR 10.494742** 
  (0.083535)   (3.559067) 
        
 n 120  n 119 
 T 3--5  T 3--5 
 N 540  N 533 
 Adjusted R2 0.053787  Adjusted R2 0.041537 
  F(2,418)=15.6069, p-value: 2.9051e-07  F(2,412)=11.6982, p-value: 1.1444e-05 
LCSR_R Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 lnAsset1 7.48532**  LCSRSizeIV_P_Reporting 0.36723** 
  (2.31225)   (0.11425) 
 LCSRSizeIV_P_Reporting 0.36583***  LLCSRR_P_Reporting 8.32087  
  (0.09354)   (4.53730) 
          
 n 119  n 119 
 T 3--5  T 3--5 
 N 532  N 533 
 Adjusted R
2 0.08209  Adjusted R
2 0.070679  
  F(2,411)=24.432, p-value: 9.4221e-11  F(2,412)=20.7315, p-value: 2.6375e-09 
LReporting Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 LLCSRR 0.481085***  lnTotalOperatingCost 0.057915** 
  (0.056473)   (0.021520) 
    LLCSRR 0.463990*** 
        (0.076092) 
 n 119  n 95 
 T 3--5  T 1--5 
 N 574  N 424 
 Adjusted R2 0.10901  Adjusted R2 0.11088 
  F(1,454)=72.572, p-value: 2.3906e-16   F(2,327)=27.4535, p-value: 9.5163e-12 






Table 2.14 Variable Definitions 
 Variable Definitions 
1) Net Profit: The annual net profit measured in Chinese Yuan. 
2) Asset1: The total asset at the beginning of the accounting year. 
3) lnAsset1: The log of Asset1. 
4) TotalRevenue: The annual total revenue measured in Chinese Yuan. 
5) lnTotalRevenue: The log of TotalRevenue. 
6) ROA: The ratio of Net Profit over Asset1. 
7) lnTotalOperatingCost: The log of annual total operating cost.  
8) CSRIndex: The current year CSR Index score evaluated by Research Report on Corporate Social Responsibility of 
China.   
9) LCSRIndex: The last year The current year CSR Index score evaluated by Research Report on Corporate Social 
Responsibility of China.    
10) LReporting: The last year Reporting Dummy. The Reporting Dummy is a binary variable which records whether a 
firm published its CSR report or not in a certain year. The Reporting Dummy equals 0 if the firm didn't publish its 
CSR report in a certain year and the Reporting Dummy equals 1 if the firm published its CSR report in a certain 
year. 
11) LCSR_R: The interaction term of LCSRIndex and last year Reporting Dummy.  
12) CSRNSizeIV: The neighborhood CSR Index average of a firm. The neighborhood consists of 20 other firms 
according to firms' annual total revenue. 
13) LCSRNSizeIV: The last year neighborhood CSR Index average of a firm.  
14) CSRSizeIV: The CSR Index average of firms at a similar size scale. There are threee scales: (1). [1011, +∞) Chinese 
Yuan; (2). [1010, 9.99991010] Chinese Yuan; (3). (-∞, 1010)Chinese Yuan. 
15) LCSRSizeIV: The last year CSR Index average of firms at a similar size scale.  
16) LCSRR: The last year other firms' CSR reporting rate in an industry. 
17) LLCSRR: The year befor the last year other firms' CSR reporting rate in an industry. 
18) CSRNSizeIV_P_Reporting: The interaction term of CSRNSizeIV and the Probability of Reporting. 
19) LCSRNSizeIV_P_Reporting: The interaction term of last year CSRNSizeIV and last year's Probability of Reporting. 
20) CSRSizeIV_P_Reporting: The interaction term of CSRSizeIV and the Probability of Reporting. 
21) LCSRSizeIV_P_Reporting: The interaction term of last year CSRSizeIV and last year's Probability of Reporting. 
22) LCSRR_P_Reporting: The interaction term of LCSRR and the Probability of Reporting. 
23) LLCSRR_P_Reporting: The interaction term of last year LCSRR and last year's Probability of Reporting. 
24) ConsumerDummy: A binary variable which equals 1 if a firm's product is a consumer good and equals 0 if not. 
25) Ownership: A category variable which records the ownership type of a firm. The coding is as follows:  
 
Ownership Type Code 
Central Government-owned Enterpriese 1 
State-owned Financial Firm 2 
Local Government-owned Firm 3 











Since Pearson’s product-moment correlation between CSRIndex and LCSRIndex is 
0.8298485, there might be a concern of collinearity problem between CSRIndex and 
LCSRIndex. We also estimate all equations without CSRIndex as a comparison. The 
estimation results are presented in Table 2.15 to Table 2.187. To avoid the bias caused by 
dropping variables, we only refer to the estimations without CSRIndex when Pearson’s 
product-moment correlation between CSRIndex and LCSRIndex from the reduced form 
equations (first stage OLS regression) is greater than 0.98. This case happens in full sample 
net profit between IV estimations (𝜌=0.988), full sample TR/ROA/TC pooled OLS (𝜌=0.986) 
and between IV estimations (𝜌 =0.998), Leaders net profit between IV estimations (𝜌 
=0.981), Leaders TR/ROA/TC between IV estimations (𝜌 =0.9999525), Followers net profit 
between IV estimations (𝜌 =0.981), The Uncommitted net profit between IV estimations 
(𝜌=0.9897) and The Uncommitted TR/ROA/TC between IV estimations (𝜌=0.986). 
It did require some patience to carefully interpret the results. It is noticeable that the 
signs before LCSR_R by full sample net profit pooled OLS IV estimation and one-way 
within IV estimation (Table 2.15 column (1a).I and (1b).I) reverse and the signs before 
LReporting by full sample net profit pooled OLS IV estimation and one-way within IV 
estimation (Table 2.15 column (1a).I and (1b).I) also reverse. At the first glance, one may 
think that we should accept results by one-way within IV estimation (Table 2.15 column 
(1b).I) and reject results by pooled OLS IV estimation (Table 2.15 column (1a).I) because 
one-way fixed effects within IV model controls the unobservable individual effect and all 
time-invariant effects while pooled OLS IV estimations don’t. However, on second thought, 
we may reach different conclusions. 
First, LReporting is time-invariant for Leaders (LReporting=1) and The Uncommitted 
(LReporting=0 for most observations), therefore, the estimate of LReporting by one-way 
within IV estimations only reflect the effect of Followers when they initiate to publish CSR 
reports. Thus, pooled OLS IV estimation may better reflect the effect of LReporting on the 
full sample. 
Second, the Pearson’s product moment correlation of CSRIndex and LCSRIndex is 
relatively high (95% C.I.=[0.8016275, 0.8543792]) on the full sample. This implies that we 
may view variable LCSRIndex as a variable which has somewhat feature of time-invariance 
                                                          
7 Quite some firms don’t report their total operating cost, therefore, the sample size used to estimate TC models 






and the difference result from pooled OLS IV estimation and one-way fixed effects within 
IV estimation may suggest that the impact of time-invariance part inside the LCSRIndex 
dominate the total impact of LCSRIndex. Let’s illustrate this by using a simplified 
assumption and derivation as below.  
Assume that 𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝑥𝑖𝑡−1 + ?̅?𝑖𝑡−1, where 𝑥𝑖𝑡 is time-variant part for firm i and 
?̅?𝑖𝑡−1 is time-invariant part for firm i, which is simply the average of lagged CSRIndex over 
the time of firm i. One-way fixed effects within model canceled out ?̅?𝑖𝑡−1 and only use 𝑥𝑖𝑡−1 
to estimate the partial effect of 𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡−1. This is true if we agree that 
𝛽1𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡−1=𝛽1𝑥𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽1?̅?𝑖𝑡−1 or 𝛽1𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡−1=𝛽1𝑥𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2?̅?𝑖𝑡−1 but 𝛽2 is very small. 
However, if in fact 𝛽2 is so large that it dominates the total effect, we cannot use 𝛽1 
estimated by one-way fixed effects within model to reflect the partial effect of 𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡−1. 
Instead, pooled OLS IV estimations may better reflect the partial effect of 𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡−1. 
Third, we can further find supportive evidences to pooled OLS IV estimations from 
between IV estimations. The estimation results for LCSR_R by between IV estimations 
with or without CSRIndex (Table 2.15 column (1c).I and column (1c).III) are consistent with 
pooled OLS IV estimations.  
Based on these observations, we would conclude that the estimation results by pooled 
OLS IV estimations give a more precise estimation of the partial effect of LCSR_R and 
LReporting than one-way fixed effects within IV estimation. However, one-way fixed effects 
within IV estimations reflect the impact of time-variant change of these two variables.  
Thus, Table 2.15 suggests two different kinds of effects of lagged CSR performance on 
full sample net profit by pooled OLS IV estimations with CSRIndex (Table 2.15 column 
(1a).I). If a firm didn’t publish its CSR report on last year, there is a weakly negative effect 
of LCSRIndex on net profit. However, if a firm published its CSR report on last year, a 
conditional effect on net profit is suggested by LCSRIndex, LCSR_R and LReporting 
together. The conditional effect is that if a firm published its CSR report on last year and 
last year’s CSR performance index is greater than 34.97, the effect of lagged CSR 
performance index on net profit will be positive and increasing and if a firm published its 
CSR report but last year’s CSR performance index is smaller than 34.97, the effect of last 
year’s CSR performance index on net profit will be negative and increasing. The difference 
between the effects of reported lagged CSR performance and unreported lagged CSR 





as for the negative effect of LCSR_R by one-way within IV estimations with CSRIndex 
(Table 2.15 (1b).I), it may imply that in the short run, the effect of reported lagged CSR 
performance on full sample net profit is negative. However, in the long run, we only found a 
significant positive effect of LCSR_R on full sample net profit by between IV estimation 
(Table 2.15 column (1c).III). The difference between the short run effect and long run effect 
may suggest that signaling benefit may take some time to happen in a longer time period, 
not right after a firm sends a signal. 
The positive effect of LReporting on full sample net profit by one-way within IV 
estimations with CSRIndex (Table 2.15 (1b).I) also requires some careful thinking to 
interpret. Note that LReporting =1 for Leaders all the time and LReporting =0 for The 
Uncommitted most of the time. Although these two types have quite different LReporting 
records, one-way within model measures them as the same by taking time-demeaned 
variables. Therefore, there exist some measurement distortion on LReporting and we 
should not rely on the estimate for LReporting on full sample by one-way within IV 
estimation very much.  
In Table 2.16, we also find two different kinds of effects of lagged CSR performance on 
full sample TR by pooled OLS IV estimation without CSRIndex (Table 2.16 column (2a).III). 
If a firm didn’t publish its CSR report on last year, there is a positive effect of LCSRIndex 
on TR. However, if a firm published its CSR report on last year, a conditional effect on TR 
is suggested by LCSRIndex and LReporting together. The conditional effect is that if a firm 
published If a firm published its CSR report last year and last year’s CSR performance 
index is greater than 30.11, the effect of lagged CSR performance index on total revenue 
will be positive and increasing and if a firm published its CSR report but last year’s CSR 
performance index is smaller than 30.11, the effect of last year’s CSR performance index on 
total revenue will be negative and increasing.  
In the short run, a negative effect of LCSRIndex on TR is suggested by one-way within 
IV estimation with CSRIndex (Table 2.16 column (2b).I). A weak positive effect of LCSR_R 
on TR is suggested by one-way within IV estimation with CSRIndex (Table 2.16 column 
(2b).I), which may be ascribed as a signaling effect. While the total effect of reported lagged 
CSR performance on full sample TR is still negative in the short run by considering 
estimates of CSRIndex and LCSR_R together (Table 2.16 column (2b).I). Note that we 





potential distortion mentioned above. In the long run over the time, a positive effect of 
LCSR_R on TR is suggested by between IV estimations without CSRIndex (Table 2.16 
column (2c).III), which is very likely suggesting a positive signaling effect by reported 
lagged CSR performance in the long run. 
Similarly, the results on total operating cost in Table 2.18 suggest two different kinds of 
effects of lagged CSR performance on full sample TC by pooled OLS IV estimation without 
CSRIndex (Table 2.16 column (4a).II). If a firm didn’t publish its CSR report on last year, 
there is a positive effect of LCSRIndex on TC. However, if a firm published its CSR report 
on last year, a conditional effect on TC is suggested by LCSRIndex and LReporting 
together. The conditional effect is that if a firm published its CSR report last year and last 
year’s CSR performance index is greater than 29.03, the effect of lagged CSR performance 
index on TC will be positive and increasing. And if a firm published its CSR report but last 
year’s CSR performance index is lower than 29.03, the effect of last year’s CSR performance 
index on TC will be negative and increasing. In the short run, we didn’t observe significant 
effect from either LCSRIndex or LCSR_R on full sample TC by one-way within IV 
estimation. However, in the long run, we found a positive effect of LCSR_R on full sample 
TC by between IV estimations without CSRIndex (Table 2.18 column (4c).II). These results 
may imply that better unreported CSR performance will result in higher TC but there 
might be two opposite effects by better reported CSR performance, a TC increasing effect 
caused by inputs to improve CSR performance and a TC reducing effect caused by improved 
efficiency in communication with stakeholders. Overall, the TC increasing effect 
overwhelms the TC reducing effect for higher CSR performance index in the long run.  
Finally, we find weak negative effect of LCSRIndex on full sample ROA and weak 
positive effect of LCSR_R on full sample ROA by pooled OLS IV estimation (Table 2.17 
column (3a).II). However, by taking the estimate of LReporting into consideration together, 
both unreported lagged CSR performance and reported lagged CSR performance have weak 
negative effect on full sample ROA by pooled OLS IV estimation (Table 2.17 column (3a).II). 
And we found significant negative effect of LCSRIndex on full sample ROA by both one-way 
within IV estimation and between IV estimation (Table 2.17 column (3b).I and column 
(3c).II). This is probably because that the impacts of last year CSR performance index on 





significant on some group in within models. We will look at this in more details in the next 
section of partitioned regressions.  
As far as for CSRIndex, we observe that there are positive effects of CSRIndex on net 
profit by one-way within IV estimation either taking Asset1 or TotalRevenue as firm size 
control variable (Table 2.15 (1b).I and (1b).II), TR by pooled OLS IV estimation taking 
lnTotalOperatingCost as firm size control variable and by one-way within IV either by 
taking lnAsset1 or lnTotalOperatingCost as firm size control variable ( 
Table 2.16 (2a).II, (2b).I, and (2b).II), and ROA by one-way within IV estimation (Table 
2.17 (3b).I). There might be two explanations for that. First, market CSR performance 
subindex of CSR performance index includes measuring firms’ financial performance, like 
total revenue (CSR-2.1.2 in Table 2.1) and net profit (CSR-2.1.3 in Table 2.1). Thus, it 
might be due to the construction of market CSR performance subindex itself. Second, some 
items in CSR management performance subindex and social CSR performance subindex of 
CSR performance index may induce improved stakeholder relationship or production 
efficiency, like  stakeholders identification (CSR-1.1.7 in Table 2.1), stakeholders’ 
expectation and firms’ response action (CSR-1.1.8 in Table 2.1), the interactive 
stakeholders’ participation system (CSR -1.1.9 in Table 2.1), and employee relations (CSR-
3.2 in Table 2.1). A further exploration on CSR subindex and financial performance shows 
that current year market CSR performance has a positive effect on net profit while negative 
effect on TR on full sample by pooled OLS IV estimation (the results are presented in Table 
2.47 column (1a).I and Table 2.48 column (2a).I in Section 2.5). And we observe weak 
positive effect of current year CSR management performance on net profit by one-way 
within IV estimation and positive effect of current CSR management performance on TR by 
pooled OLS IV estimation, one-way within IV estimation and between IV estimation (the 
results are presented in Table 2.47 column (1b).I and Table 2.48 column (2a).I, (2b).I and 
(2c).I in Section 5). Also, we observe positive effect of current year social CSR performance 
on net profit and TR by pooled OLS IV estimation and one-way within IV estimation 
(results are presented in Table 2.47 column (1a).I & (1b).I  and Table 2.48 column (2a).I  & 
(2b).I in Section 5). Therefore, both two explanations above may apply to explain the results 
on CSRIndex here. Besides, we also observe positive effect of CSRIndex on TC by one-way 
within IV estimation (Table 2.18 (4b).I). This verifies that improving CSR performance will 






Table 2.15 Full Sample Net Profit Estimation Results 
Dependent Variable: 
NetProfit                       
 
Full Sample Net Profit OLS IV Estimations 
(1a) 
Full Sample Net Profit One-way Fixed Effects Within IV 
Estimations 
(1b) 
Full Sample Net Profit Between IV Estimations 
(1c) 
 I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV 
Variables Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate 
(Intercep


























02***  1.62e-02*** 
1.98e-
02***  3.15e-02* 
3.15e-
02* 




x Dropped Dropped   8.50e+07 4.06e+08*   Dropped Dropped  
     (7.92e+07) (1.80e+08)      
LCSRInd
ex -3.76e+08 -1.12e+09* -3.76e+08 -1.12e+09* Dropped -1.39e+09* Dropped 
-
1.10e+09* Dropped 6.27e+09 Dropped 6.27e+09 
 
(2.41e+08





































* Dropped -1.11e+10* Dropped 1.10e+10* 2.10e+10* 1.27e+10** 
2.85e+10*
* Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped 
  
(5.14e+09
)   (5.14e+09)   (4.75e+09) (1.01e+10) (4.49e+09) (9.52e+09)         
n     119 119 119 119 119 119 119 119 
T     3--5 3--5 3--5 3--5 3--5 3--5 3--5 3--5 
N 527 527 527 527 526 526 526 527 527 527 527 527 
Adjusted 
























































Table 2.16 Full Sample Total Revenue Estimation Results 
Dependent Variable:  lnTotalRevenue 
                      
 
Full Sample TR Pooled OLS IV Estimations 
(2a) 
Full Sample TR One-way Fixed Effects Within 
IV Estimations 
(2b) 
Full Sample TR Between IV Estimations 
(2c) 
 I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV 










 (1.535) (1.041) (1.743) (1.018)     (1.095) (2.237) (9.265) (3.96831) 
lnAsset1 -0.257***  -0.335***  0.177  0.615*  0.541***  -0.574 
 (0.070)  (0.080)  (0.281)  (0.280)  (0.043)  (0.412) 
lnTC  0.570***  0.675***  0.406***  0.498***  0.711*** 
0.68135*
** 
  (0.047)  (0.046)  (0.053)  (0.069)  (0.100)  (0.15314) 
CSRIndex 0.155*** 0.065***   0.119*** 0.090***   Dropped Dropped  
 (0.012) (0.011)   (0.011) (0.011)      
LCSRIndex 0.062*** 0.031** 0.207*** 0.059*** -0.103* -0.105** -0.073 -0.065 Dropped 0.023** Dropped -0.18195 
 (0.017) (0.011) (0.014) (0.010) (0.050) (0.037) (0.047) (0.042)  (0.009)  (0.15850) 
LCSR_R Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped 0.031 0.033 0.050* 0.040 Dropped Dropped 0.117** 0.18851 
     (0.028) (0.025) (0.023) (0.027)   
(0.042) (0.14905) 
LReporting -7.398*** -3.650*** -6.234*** -2.051*** -1.896*** Dropped Dropped 0.980 Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped 
  (0.498) (0.587) (0.559) (0.548) (0.566)     (0.757)         
N     119 95 119 95 120 95 119 95 
T     3--5 1--5 3--5 1--5 3--6 1--5 3--6 1--5 
N 526 397 526 397 525 396 526 396 699 397 526 397 

































































Table 2.17 Full Sample ROA Estimation Results 
Dependent Variable: ROA           
 
Full Sample ROA Pooled OLS IV Estimations 
(3a) 
Full Sample ROA One-way Fixed Effects 
Within IV Estimations 
(3b) 
Full Sample ROA Between IV Estimations 
(3c) 
 I II I II I II 
Variables Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate 
(Intercept) -0.11228355 -0.0944321   0.3612306*  
 (0.11889668) (0.1183235)   (0.1438144)  
lnAsset1 0.00866700 0.0079879 0.01043470 0.0155641 -0.0055039** 0.0155641 
 (0.00561204) (0.0055963) (0.01684041) (0.0166342) (0.0019240) (0.0166342) 
CSRIndex 0.00127148  0.00190805*  Dropped  
 (0.00090625)  (0.00081486)    
LCSRIndex -0.00371632 -0.0024961 -0.00646344*** -0.0056614*** Dropped -0.0056614*** 
 (0.00206061) (0.0018698) (0.00167182) (0.0015995)  (0.0015995) 
LCSR_R 0.00145684 0.0014378 Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped 
 (0.00131435) (0.0013155)     
LReporting -0.05310044 -0.0434480 -0.04932359 Dropped Dropped Dropped 
  (0.03725972) (0.0366530) (0.03208250)       
N   119 119 120 119 
T   3--5 3--5 3--6 3--5 
N 527 527 525 527 701 527 
Adjusted 
























Table 2.18 Full Sample TC Estimation Results 
Dependent Variable: 
lnTotalOperatingCost           
 
Full Sample TC Pooled OLS IV Estimations 
(4a) 
Full Sample TC One-way Fixed Effects Within 
IV Estimations 
(4b) 
Full Sample TC Between IV Estimations 
(4c) 
 I II I II I II 
Variables Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate 
(Intercept) 33.879534*** 35.346623***   46.1691*** 46.1691*** 
 (1.965327) (2.126938)   (13.53694) (13.53694) 
lnAsset1 -0.491224*** -0.541964*** -0.159788 -0.076549 -1.00850  -1.00850  
 (0.090228) (0.097812) (0.157750) (0.294536) (0.59876) (0.59876) 
CSRIndex 0.129872***  0.088977***  Dropped 
 (0.015336)  (0.013028)   
LCSRIndex 0.104175*** 0.225676*** Dropped 0.065613* Dropped Dropped 
 (0.020699) (0.016209)  (0.028024)   
LCSR_R Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped 0.15267* 0.15267* 
     (0.06113) (0.06113) 
LReporting -7.430687*** -6.550343*** -1.270496* Dropped Dorpped Dorpped 
  (0.628964) (0.673946) (0.549180)       
N   95 95 95 95 
T   1--5 1--5 1--5 1--5 
N 396 396 395 395 396 396 
Adjusted 
R2 0.61161 0.54408 0.15061 0.066826 0.11281 0.11281 
F-statistic 
F(4,391)=159.104, p-
value: < 2.22e-16 
F(3,392)=159.466, 















2.4.2 Partitioned Regressions 
We also estimate partitioned regressions for three types based on their different CSR 
reporting behaviors. Since the CSR reporting dummy variables for Leaders and The 
Uncommitted are either all 1 or almost 0, we only include CSRIndex and LCSRIndex as 
independent variables for these two types. We estimate models (1a) to (1c) for each group as 
we did for the full sample. The reduced form equations are presented in Table 2.19 to Table 
2.34. The results are presented in Table 2.35 to Table 2.468.  
For Leaders, we found weak TR increasing effect of lagged CSR performance by pooled 
OLS IV estimation while significant TR increasing effect by between IV estimation (Table 
2.36 column (2a).I and column (2c).III). On the other side, we found TC increasing effect of 
lagged CSR performance by pooled OLS IV estimation and between IV estimation (Table 
2.38 column (4a).I and column (4c).II). As far as for the overall profitability, we found net 
profit increasing effect of lagged CSR performance by pooled OLS IV estimation and 
between IV estimation (Table 2.35 column (1a).I and column (1c).III) while net profit 
reducing effect of lagged CSR performance by one-way within IV estimation (Table 2.35 
column (1b).I). We didn’t observe significant results on ROA.  
These results may suggest that better lagged CSR performance may have a positive 
signaling effect for Leaders in the long run while it will also result in higher TC in the long 
run. For the overall profitability, the results may suggest that better lagged CSR 
performance may increase the profitability in the long run while reduce the profitability in 
the short run.  
It is noticeable that the partial effect of LCSRIndex on TC is larger than the partial 
effect of LCSRIndex on TR by both pooled OLS IV estimation (Table 2.36 column (2a).I and 
Table 2.38 column (4a).I) and between IV estimation (Table 2.36 (2c).III and Table 2.38 
(4c).II).  Since we have taken logarithm for both TR and TC, we could interpret results by 
applying elasticity concept. Let’s take between IV estimation results for an example. These 
two results imply that to make 1 point increase in LCSRIndex to have positive effect on net 
profit, we should have (0.067773*%TR)*TR>(0.094352*%TC)*TC, i.e. TC 
/TR<0.7183. Similarly, we could interpret pooled OLS IV estimation in the same way and 
it would imply TC /TR<0.414.  
                                                          
8 Since we could not find valid IV’s for The Uncommitted for one-way fixed effects within model, we were not be 






Also for Leaders, we observe net profit increasing effect of CSRIndex by one-way within 
IV estimation (Table 2.35 column (1b).I and column (1b).II), TR increasing effect of 
CSRIndex by pooled OLS IV estimation and one-way within IV estimation (Table 2.36 
column (2a).I and II, (2b).I and II), ROA increasing effect of CSRIndex  by one-way within 
IV estimation (Table 2.37 column (3b).I),  and TC increasing effect of CSRIndex  by pooled 
OLS IV estimation, one-way within IV estimation (Table 2.38 column (4a).I and II, column 
(4b).II). A further exploration on CSR subindex and financial performance shows that 
current year market CSR performance has a positive effect on net profit and TR on Leaders 
by one-way within IV estimation (the results are presented in Table 2.51 column (1b).I and 
Table 52 column (2b).I in Section 5). Also, we observe significant effect of current year social 
CSR performance on net profit by pooled OLS IV estimation and between IV estimation and 
on TR by pooled OLS IV estimation and one-way within IV estimation (the results are 
presented in Table 2.51 column (1a).I & (1c).I and Table 2.52 column (2a).I & (2b).I in 
Section 2.5). And we didn’t observe significant effect of current year management CSR 
performance on net profit or TR on Leaders (the results are also presented in Table 2.51 
and Table 2.52 in Section 2.5). Therefore, the effects of CSRIndex on Leaders is very likely 
due to both construction of market CSR performance subindex itself which includes 
measuring firms’ financial performance, like total revenue (CSR-2.1.2 in Table 2.1) and net 
profit (CSR-2.1.3 in Table 2.1) and the improved production efficiency induced by improve 
employee relations under social CSR performance subindex (CSR-3.2 in Table 2.1).  
For Followers, we found two different kinds of effects of lagged CSR performance on TR 
by pooled OLS IV estimation (Table 2.40 column (2a).I). If a firm didn’t publish its CSR 
report on last year, there is a positive effect of LCSRIndex on TR. However, if a firm 
published its CSR report on last year, a conditional effect on TR is suggested by 
LCSRIndex, LCSR_R and LReporting together. The conditional effect is that if a firm 
published its CSR report last year and last year’s CSR performance index is greater than 
49.4, the effect of lagged CSR performance index on TR will be positive and increasing. And 
if a firm published its CSR report but last year’s CSR performance index is lower than 49.4, 
the effect of last year’s CSR performance index on TR will be negative and increasing. In 
the short run, we found weak TR decreasing effect of LCSRIndex by one-way within IV 
estimation (Table 2.40 column (2b).I). While in the long run, we found weak TR increasing 





suggest that there is a positive signaling effect by reported lagged CSR performance for 
Followers in the long run as well as we found for full sample and Leaders. 
From Followers’ TC estimation results, we found a conditional effect of reported lagged 
CSR performance on TC by pooled OLS IV estimation (Table 2.42 column (4a).I). The 
conditional effect is that if a firm published its CSR report last year and last year’s CSR 
performance index is greater than 50.19, the effect of lagged CSR performance index on TC 
will be negative and increasing. And if a firm published its CSR report but last year’s CSR 
performance index is lower than 50.19, the effect of last year’s CSR performance index on 
TC will be positive and increasing. In the long run, we found weak TC increasing effect of 
LCSRIndex by between IV estimation (Table 2.42 column (4c).I). 
The estimation of overall profitability of Followers suggest two different kinds of effects 
of lagged CSR performance on net profit by pooled OLS IV estimation (Table 2.39 column 
(1a).I). If a firm didn’t publish its CSR report on last year, there is a negative effect of 
LCSRIndex on net profit. However, if a firm published its CSR report on last year, a 
conditional effect on net profit is suggested by LCSRIndex, LCSR_R and LReporting 
together. The conditional effect is that if a firm published its CSR report last year and last 
year’s CSR performance index is greater than 47.8, the effect of lagged CSR performance 
index on net profit will be positive and increasing. And if a firm published its CSR report 
but last year’s CSR performance index is lower than 47.8, the effect of last year’s CSR 
performance index on net profit will be negative and increasing. In the short run, the 
results suggest a net profit reducing effect of LReporting by one-way within IV estimation 
(Table 2.39 column (1b).I). The negative effect of LReporting may be due to fact that when a 
firm switch from non-reporting to reporting, its CSR performance index score will have a 
big jump but its net profit may not improve as much as the jump of its CSR performance 
index score compared with firms who make steady progress in their CSR performance index 
score by keeping publishing CSR reports. While in the long run, we found a net profit 
increasing effect of LCSRIndex by between IV estimation (Table 2.39 column (1c).III).  
The estimation results of ROA by pooled OLS IV estimation for Followers (Table 2.41 
column (3a).I) show a negative effect of lagged CSR performance on ROA although the 
negative effect may be weaken by reporting lagged CSR performance. This might be 
because that quite some firms identified as Followers are at the growing stage of business 
cycle and their total asset grows as their business grows. We may find some evidence of this 





IV estimation (Table 2.41 (3a).I and (3b).I). All these estimates are positive which implies 
that as total asset increases ROA increases.  
Also for Followers, we observe negative effect of CSRIndex on net profit by pooled OLS 
IV estimation and one-way within IV estimation (Table 2.39 column (1a).II and (1b).II), on 
ROA by one-way within IV estimation (Table 2.41 column (3b).I), while positive effect on 
net profit by between IV estimation (Table 2.39 column (1c).I), on total revenue by pooled 
OLS IV estimation and one-way within IV estimation (Table 2.40 column (2a).I, (2b).I, and 
(2b).II), and on TC by pooled OLS IV estimation and one-way within IV estimation (Table 
2.42 (4a).I and (4b).I). It is likely that in the short run the cost of improving current year 
CSR performance for Followers outweigh the positive effect of current year CSR 
performance on profitability while in the long run the opposite applies. 
For The Uncommitted, we found negative effect of LCSRIndex on net profit by pooled 
OLS IV estimation and between IV estimation (Table 2.43 column (1a).I, (1a).II and 
(1c).III), on TR by pooled OLS IV estimation (Table 2.44 column (2a).I) and on ROA by 
pooled OLS IV estimation (Table 2.45 column (3a).I). And we didn’t find significant effect of 
LCSRIndex on TC.  
These results may suggest that although The Uncommitted almost never publish CSR 
reports and there seems no way for stakeholders to acquire direct information from The 
Uncommitted firms to determine their moral evaluation types, adverse selection by 
stakeholders may happen by judging from firms’ silence in no CSR reporting and third 
party evaluation of The Uncommitted firms’ CSR performance.  
On the other side, we found positive effect of CSRIndex on net profit by pooled OLS IV 
estimation (Table 2.43 column (1a).I and (1a).II), on TR by pooled OLS IV estimation (Table 
2.44 column (2a).I and (2a).II), weakly on ROA by pooled OLS IV estimation (Table 2.45 
column (3a).I) and on TC by pooled OLS IV estimation (Table 2.46 column (4a).I). A further 
exploration on CSR subindex and financial performance shows that current year social CSR 
performance has a positive effect on net profit and TR on The Uncommitted by pooled OLS 
IV estimation (the results are presented in Table 2.59 column (1a).I and Table 2.60 column 
(2a).I in Section 2.5). And we observed negative effect of current year management CSR 
performance on net profit on The Uncommitted by pooled OLS IV estimation and one-way 
within IV estimation (the results are presented in Table 2.59 column (1a).I and (1b).I in 
Section 2.5). Unfortunately, we were unable to identify qualified IV’s for market CSR 





variables in our models. Therefore, one of possible explanations of the effects of CSRIndex 
on The Uncommitted is the improved production efficiency induced by improved employee 
relations under social CSR performance subindex (CSR-3.2 in Table 2.1). The positive effect 
of CSRIndex on TC may reflect the fact that better current year CSRIndex performance 
may result in higher cost overall for The Uncommitted.  
Table 2.19 Leaders Net Profit Pooled OLS Model Reduced Form Equations 
 Leaders Net Profit Pooled OLS Model Reduced Form Equations 
  I   II 
CSRIndex Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 (Intercept) 35.508767***  (Intercept) 3.5903e+01*** 
  (2.670498)   (2.6892e+00) 
 CSRSizeIV_P_Reporting 0.448150***  TotalRevenue 5.6256e-12  
  (0.066717)   (2.9473e-12) 
    CSRSizeIV_P_Reporting 3.9460e-01*** 
     (7.2838e-02) 
 N 317  N 314 
 Adjusted R
2 0.1245  Adjusted R
2 0.13337 
  F(1,315)=45.1205, p-value: 8.665e-11  F(2,311)=24.1975, p-value: 1.7092e-10 
LCSRIndex Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 (Intercept) 34.733500***  (Intercept) 3.5233e+01*** 
  (2.914847)   (2.9248e+00) 
 LCSRSizeIV_P_Reporting 0.446578***  TotalRevenue 5.7627e-12  
  (0.079097)   (3.0424e-12) 
    LCSRSizeIV_P_Reporting 3.8245e-01*** 
     (8.5788e-02) 
 N 262  N 260 
 Adjusted R
2 0.10838  Adjusted R
2 0.11806 
  F(1,260)=31.8771, p-value: 4.2935e-08   F(2,257)=17.429, p-value: 7.9771e-08 
  
Table 2.20 Leaders Net Profit One-way Within Model Reduced Form Equations 
 Leaders Net Profit One-way Within Model Reduced Form Equations 
  I   II 
CSRIndex Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 CSRSizeIV_P_Reporting 0.364635***  CSRSizeIV_P_Reporting 0.364635*** 
  (0.067686)   (0.067686) 
 n 56  n 56 
 T 4--6  T 4--6 
 N 317  N 317 
 Adjusted R
2 0.082358  Adjusted R
2 0.082358 
  F(1,260)=29.0218, p-value: 1.603e-07  F(1,260)=29.0218, p-value: 1.603e-07 
LCSRIndex Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 LCSRSizeIV_P_Reporting 0.226590*  LCSRSizeIV_P_Reporting 0.226590* 
  (0.090879)   (0.090879) 
 n 56  n 56 
 T 4--5  T 4--5 
 N 262  N 262 
 Adjusted R
2 0.023029  Adjusted R
2 0.023029 






Table 2.21 Leaders Net Profit Between Model Reduced Form Equations 
 Leaders Net Profit Between Model Reduced Form Equations 
  I   II 
CSRIndex Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 (Intercept) 32.97701***  (Intercept) 32.97701*** 
  (6.41558)   (6.41558) 
 CSRSizeIV_P_Reporting 0.50873**  CSRSizeIV_P_Reporting 0.50873** 
  (0.16862)   (0.16862) 
 n 56  n 56 
 T 4--6  T 4--6 
 N 317  N 317 
 Adjusted R
2 0.1391  Adjusted R
2 0.1391 
  F(1,54)=9.10234, p-value: 0.0038883  F(2,53)=4.02203, p-value: 0.023646 
LCSRIndex Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 (Intercept) 31.30377***  (Intercept) 31.30377*** 
  (5.98349)   (5.98349) 
 LCSRSizeIV_P_Reporting 0.53988**  LCSRSizeIV_P_Reporting 0.53988** 
  (0.16980)   (0.16980) 
 n 56  n 56 
 T 4--5  T 4--5 
 N 262  N 262 
 Adjusted R
2 0.15205  Adjusted R
2 0.15205 
  F(1,54)=10.1086, p-value: 0.0024441   F(2,53)=4.42573, p-value: 0.016693 
 
 
Table 2.22 Leaders TR/ROA/TC Pooled OLS Model Reduced Form Equations 
 Leaders TR/ROA/TC Pooled OLS Reduced Form Equations 
  I   II 
CSRIndex Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 (Intercept) -31.57829  (Intercept) 35.508767*** 
  (20.74371)   (2.670498) 
 lnAsset1 2.76956**  CSRSizeIV_P_Reporting 0.448150*** 
  (0.84657)   (0.066717) 
 CSRSizeIV_P_Reporting 0.27676**    
  (0.08342)    
          
 N 316  N 317 
 Adjusted R
2 0.14971  Adjusted R
2 0.1245 
  F(2,313)=27.8663, p-value: 7.2832e-12  F(1,261)=23.6216, p-value: 2.0261e-06 
LCSRIndex Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 (Intercept) -52.055007*  (Intercept) 34.733500*** 
  (22.491683)   (2.914847) 
 lnAsset1 3.552195***  LCSRSizeIV_P_Reporting 0.446578*** 
  (0.913208)   (0.079097) 
 LCSRSizeIV_P_Reporting 0.218336*    
  (0.096834)    
          
 N 262  N 262 
 Adjusted R
2 0.15657  Adjusted R
2 0.10838 







Table 2.23 Leaders TR/ROA/TC One-way Within Model Reduced Form Equations 
 Leaders TR/ROA/TC One-way Within Model Reduced Form Equations 
  I   II 
CSRIndex Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 CSRSizeIV_P_Reporting 0.364635***  CSRSizeIV_P_Reporting 0.364635*** 
  (0.067686)   (0.067686) 
 n 56  n 56 
 T 4--6  T 4--6 
 N 317  N 317 
 Adjusted R
2 0.082358  Adjusted R
2 0.082358 
  F(1,260)=29.0218, p-value: 1.603e-07  F(1,260)=29.0218, p-value: 1.603e-07 
LCSRIndex Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 lnAsset1 6.75564*  LCSRSizeIV_P_Reporting 0.226590* 
  (2.78535)   (0.090879) 
 LCSRSizeIV 0.14007    
  (0.11276)    
 n 56  n 56 
 T 4--5  T 4--5 
 N 264  N 262 
 Adjusted R
2 0.040685  Adjusted R
2 0.023029 
  F(2,206)=5.66587, p-value: 0.0040238   F(1,205)=6.21655, p-value: 0.013447 
 
 
Table 2.24 Leaders TR/ROA/TC Between Model Reduced Form Equations 
 Leaders TR/ROA/TC Between Model Reduced Form Equations 
  I   II 
CSRIndex Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 (Intercept) -63.12374   (Intercept) 58.10920*** 
  (37.16077)   (4.02267) 
 lnAsset1 4.57540**  Industryranking2 -1.74578  
  (1.39549)   (0.89275) 
 Industryranking2 -1.79295*    
  (0.82178)    
          
 n 56  n 56 
 T 3--5  T 3--5 
 N 263  N 263 
 Adjusted R
2 0.21163  Adjusted R
2 0.06377 
  F(2,53)=7.63217, p-value: 0.0012223  F(1,54)=3.82401, p-value: 0.055706 
LCSRIndex Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 (Intercept) -74.90829*  (Intercept) 55.3537*** 
  (34.21186)   (3.8072) 
 lnAsset1 4.91668***  LIndustryranking2 -1.8309* 
  (1.28491)   (0.8554) 
 LIndustryranking2 -1.88624*    
  (0.76442)    
          
 n 56  n 56 
 T 3--5  T 3--5 
 N 263  N 263 
 Adjusted R
2 0.26286  Adjusted R
2 0.075414 







Table 2.25 Followers Net Profit Pooled OLS Model Reduced Form Equations 
 Followers Net Profit Pooled OLS Reduced Form Equations 
  I   II 
CSRIndex Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 (Intercept) 3.58109  (Intercept) 3.58109 
  (4.13411)   (4.13411) 
 CSRSizeIV 0.63160***  CSRSizeIV 0.63160*** 
  (0.11066)   (0.11066) 
 LCSRR 22.58266***  LCSRR 22.58266*** 
  (4.78714)   (4.78714) 
          
 N 171  N 171 
 Adjusted R2 0.31073   Adjusted R2 0.31073  
  F(2,168)=38.8571, p-value: 1.3485e-14  F(2,168)=38.8571, p-value: 1.3485e-14 
LCSRIndex Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 (Intercept) 4.96114  (Intercept) 9.4045e+00* 
  (4.35278)   (4.5780e+00) 
 LCSRSizeIV 0.55142***  TotalRevenue 4.4444e-11* 
  (0.12632)   (1.8495e-11) 
 LLCSRR 22.17829***  LCSRSizeIV 2.7210e-01 
  (5.18814)   (1.6586e-01) 
    LLCSRR 1.9278e+01*** 
        (5.1951e+00) 
 N 139  N 138 
 Adjusted R2 0.27595  Adjusted R2 0.28954 
  F(2,136)=26.713, p-value: 1.6397e-10  F(3,134)=18.9778, p-value: 2.567e-10 
LCSR_R Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 (Intercept) 10.12137**  (Intercept) 1.2619e+01*** 
  (3.49785)   (3.1248e+00) 
 LCSRSizeIV_P_Reporting 0.45067**  TotalRevenue 5.1407e-11** 
  (0.15525)   (1.7123e-11) 
 LLCSRR_P_Reporting 17.53267*  LLCSRR_P_Reporting 2.2458e+01*** 
  (6.93210)   (5.7437e+00) 
          
 N 139  N 138 
 Adjusted R
2 0.24131  Adjusted R
2 0.23346 
  F(2,136)=22.2617, p-value: 4.3287e-09  F(2,135)=21.1584, p-value: 1.016e-08 
LReporting Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 (Intercept) 0.298996***  (Intercept) 0.298996*** 
  (0.056477)   (0.056477) 
 LCSRR 0.734490***  LCSRR 0.734490*** 
  (0.098871)   (0.098871) 
          
 N 158  N 158 
 Adjusted R2 0.25801   Adjusted R2 0.25801  










Table 2.26 Followers Net Profit One-way Fixed Effects Within Model Reduced Form Equations 
 Followers Net Profit One-way Fixed Effects Within Model Reduced Form Equations 
  I   II 
CSRIndex Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 CSRSizeIV 0.54408**  TotalRevenue 6.9542e-11* 
  (0.16200)   (3.0254e-11) 
 LCSRR 34.10035***  CSRSizeIV 3.5012e-01  
  (8.21945)   (1.7750e-01) 
    LCSRR 3.1437e+01*** 
        (8.3226e+00) 
 n 32  n 32 
 T 5--6  T 4--6 
 N 171  N 169 
 Adjusted R2 0.23334  Adjusted R2 0.25568 
  F(2,137)=28.1496, p-value: 5.7358e-11  F(2,168)=38.8571, p-value: 1.3485e-14 
LCSRIndex Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 LCSRSizeIV 0.44996*  TotalRevenue 8.8681e-11** 
  (0.20830)   (3.2708e-11) 
 LLCSRR 28.01626**  LCSRSizeIV 4.2686e-01* 
  (9.09073)   (2.0217e-01) 
    LLCSRR 1.8650e+01* 
        (9.3922e+00) 
 n 32  n 32 
 T 4--5  T 3--5 
 N 139  N 138 
 Adjusted R2 0.13856  Adjusted R2 0.17359 
  F(2,105)=11.7929, p-value: 2.3978e-05  F(3,103)=10.4048, p-value: 4.8674e-06 
LCSR_R Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 Asset1 3.1830e-11*  TotalRevenue 1.1480e-10**  
  (1.5423e-11)   (3.7479e-11) 
 LCSRSizeIV_P_Reporting 1.2728e+00***  LCSRSizeIV_P_Reporting 8.1825e-01* 
  (2.3160e-01)   (3.1274e-01) 
    LLCSRR_P_Reporting 1.4808e+01 
        (1.1383e+01) 
 n 32  n 32 
 T 3--5  T 3--5 
 N 138  N 138 
 Adjusted R
2 0.22251  Adjusted R
2 0.25746 
  F(2,104)=21.7854, p-value: 1.2523e-08  F(3,103)=18.0798, p-value: 1.6836e-09 
LReporting Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 LLCSRR 1.28345***  TotalRevenue 1.2641e-12  
  (0.12987)   (6.4293e-13) 
    LLCSRR 1.1617*** 
        (1.4892e-01) 
 n 32  n 32 
 T 4--5  T 4--5 
 N 158  N 156 
 Adjusted R2 0.34702  Adjusted R2 0.35017 









Table 2.27 Followers Net Profit Between Model Reduced Form Equations 
 Followers Net Profit Between Model Reduced Form Equations 
  I   II 
CSRIndex Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 (Intercept) 5.19763  (Intercept) 5.19763 
  (8.40725)   (8.40725) 
 CSRSizeIV 0.65062**  CSRSizeIV 0.65062** 
  (0.22157)   (0.22157) 
 LCSRR 18.75590*  LCSRR 18.75590* 
  (8.81584)   (8.81584) 
          
 n 32  n 32 
 T 5--6  T 5--6 
 N 171  N 171 
 Adjusted R
2 0.32273  Adjusted R
2 0.32273 
  F(2,29)=8.01939, p-value: 0.0016895  F(2,29)=8.01939, p-value: 0.0016895 
LCSRIndex Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 (Intercept) 4.95358  (Intercept) 4.95358 
  (7.37029)   (7.37029) 
 LCSRSizeIV 0.59700**  LCSRSizeIV 0.59700** 
  (0.21361)   (0.21361) 
 LLCSRR 19.86807*  LLCSRR 19.86807* 
  (8.54282)   (8.54282) 
          
 n 32  n 32 
 T 4--5  T 4--5 
 N 139  N 139 
 Adjusted R2 0.34124  Adjusted R2 0.34124 
  F(2,29)=8.75723, p-value: 0.0010586  F(2,29)=8.75723, p-value: 0.0010586 
LCSR_R Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 (Intercept) 15.75330**  (Intercept) 15.75330** 
  (5.15113)   (5.15113) 
 LCSRSizeIV_P_Reporting 0.55901**  LCSRSizeIV_P_Reporting 0.55901** 
  (0.17764)   (0.17764) 
          
 n 32  n 32 
 T 4--5  T 4--5 
 N 139  N 139 
 Adjusted R
2 0.23267  Adjusted R
2 0.23267 
  F(1,30)=9.90344, p-value: 0.0037113  F(1,30)=9.90344, p-value: 0.0037113 
LReporting Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 (Intercept) 0.496028***  (Intercept) 0.496028*** 
  (0.079696)   (0.079696) 
 LLCSRR 0.317955*  LLCSRR 0.317955* 
  (0.150955)   (0.150955) 
          
 n 32  n 32 
 T 4--5  T 4--5 
 N 158  N 158 
 Adjusted R2 0.12078  Adjusted R2 0.12078 








Table 2.28 Followers TR/ROA/TC Pooled OLS Model Reduced Form Equations 
 Followers TR/ROA/TC Pooled OLS Model Reduced Form Equations 
  I   II 
CSRIndex Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 (Intercept) -55.25614  (Intercept) -133.2556** 
  (34.48025)   (41.4640) 
 lnAsset1 2.68544   lnTotalOperatingCost 6.5046*** 
  (1.47933)   (1.7088) 
 CSRSizeIV 0.49892**  LCSRR 17.9663** 
  (0.15041)   (6.1524) 
 LCSRR 17.36517**    
   (0.26913)      
 N 137  N 112 
 Adjusted R2 0.26913  Adjusted R2 0.24836 
  F(3,133)=17.0043, p-value: 2.0874e-09  F(2,109)=18.6738, p-value: 1.0623e-07 
LCSRIndex Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 (Intercept) -96.80168**  (Intercept) -135.0674*** 
  (32.92455)   (38.8991) 
 lnAsset1 4.37025**  lnTotalOperatingCost 6.3354*** 
  (1.39125)   (1.5938) 
 LCSRSizeIV 0.33834*  LLCSRR 19.7709*** 
  (0.13752)   (5.7359) 
 LLCSRR 16.81152**    
   (5.28356)      
 N 137  N 112 
 Adjusted R2 0.30911  Adjusted R2 0.27913 
  F(3,133)=20.7104, p-value: 4.5075e-11  F(2,109)=21.9173, p-value: 9.9922e-09 
LCSR_R Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 (Intercept) -69.14766   (Intercept) -98.7126* 
  (39.75884)   (48.6281) 
 lnAsset1 3.28478*  lnTotalOperatingCost 4.7354* 
  (1.63512)   (1.9935) 
 LCSRSizeIV_P_Reporting 0.28581   LLCSRR_P_Reporting 20.7136** 
  (0.17172)   (6.3641) 
 LLCSRR_P_Reporting 17.88309*    
   (6.85250)      
 N 138  N 112 
 Adjusted R
2 0.2615  Adjusted R
2 0.21071 
  F(3,134)=16.4628, p-value: 3.6437e-09  F(2,109)=15.0607, p-value: 1.6779e-06 
LReporting Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 (Intercept) 0.433927***  (Intercept) 0.3180434*** 
  (0.062483)   (0.0899704) 
 LLCSRR 0.582234***  LLCSRR 0.5244871*** 
  (0.104371)   (0.1072368) 
    LCSRSizeIV 0.0046241 
       (0.0026109) 
 N 138  N 139 
 Adjusted R2 0.1838  Adjusted R2 0.20253 










Table 2.29 Followers TR/ROA/TC One-way Fixed Effects Within Model Reduced Form Equations 
 Followers TR/ROA/TC One-way Fixed Effects Within Model Reduced Form Equations 
  I   II 
CSRIndex Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 lnAsset1 11.17988**  lnTotalOperatingCost 7.04226  
  (3.61292)   (3.64123) 
 CSRSizeIV 0.34871*  CSRSizeIV 0.35260  
  (0.16902)   (0.18425) 
 LCSRR 31.63695***  LCSRR 24.24521* 
   (8.23535)    (9.99560) 
 n 32  n 27 
 T 3--6  T 3--6 
 N 169  N 137 
 Adjusted R2 0.27309  Adjusted R2 0.20832 
  F(3,134)=23.4657, p-value: 2.8617e-12  F(3,107)=12.9734, p-value: 2.7234e-07 
LCSRIndex Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 lnAsset1 19.05039***  lnTotalOperatingCost 9.97322** 
  (5.59108)   (3.53414) 
 LCSRSizeIV 0.37022   LCSRSizeIV 0.46027* 
  (0.20011)   (0.19763) 
 LLCSRR 15.39822    
   (9.56871)      
 n 32  n 28 
 T 4--5  T 2--5 
 N 158  N 117 
 Adjusted R2 0.20146  Adjusted R2 0.1242 
  F(3,103)=12.6936, p-value: 3.9941e-07  F(2,87)=8.72296, p-value: 0.00035262 
LCSR_R Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 lnAsset1 22.6407***  lnTotalOperatingCost 11.12347** 
  (5.8747)   (4.21879) 
 LCSRSizeIV_P_Reporting 1.1084***  LCSRSizeIV_P_Reporting 1.09390*** 
  (0.2261)   (0.25099) 
          
 n 32  n 27 
 T 3--5  T 2--5 
 N 138  N 112 
 Adjusted R
2 0.26985  Adjusted R
2 0.21885 
  F(2,104)=29.0057, p-value: 9.7582e-11  F(2,83)=17.3921, p-value: 4.9162e-07 
LReporting Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 lnAsset1 0.158329   lnTotalOperatingCost 10.8273* 
  (0.087904)   (4.3219) 
 LLCSRR 1.154101***  LLCSRR 48.2958*** 
   (0.145522)    (11.9998) 
 n 32  n 27 
 T 3--5  T 2--5 
 N 156  N 112 
 Adjusted R2 0.34483  Adjusted R2 0.20413 









Table 2.30 Followers TR/ROA/TC Between Model Reduced Form Equations 
  Followers TR/ROA/TC Between Model Reduced Form Equations 
  I   II 
CSRIndex Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 (Intercept) -86.98349  (Intercept) -169.5480* 
  (51.52202)   (70.3419) 
 lnAsset1 4.29352   lnTotalOperatingCost 7.7316* 
  (2.20544)   (2.8082) 
 CSRSizeIV 0.43953  LCSRR 14.3468 
  (0.26686)   (9.8620) 
    Industryranking2 1.4436 
        (1.0521) 
 n 33  n 27 
 T 3--6  T 3--6 
 N 176  N 137 
 Adjusted R
2 0.29683  Adjusted R
2 0.32937 
  F(2,30)=7.27215, p-value: 0.0026603  F(3,23)=4.83292, p-value: 0.0094253 
LCSRIndex Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 (Intercept) -88.57338   (Intercept) -179.65832* 
  (49.73662)   (66.30796) 
 lnAsset1 4.10911   lnTotalOperatingCost 7.92173** 
  (2.15565)   (2.63505) 
 LCSRSizeIV 0.35625  LLCSRR 17.12455  
  (0.24471)   (9.03338) 
 LLCSRR 12.95785  Industryranking2 1.52936 
   (8.78376)    (0.97337) 
 n 32  n 27 
 T 3--5  T 2--5 
 N 138  N 112 
 Adjusted R2 0.38062  Adjusted R2 0.3983 
  F(3,28)=7.18564, p-value: 0.0010061  F(3,23)=6.73282, p-value: 0.0020049 
LCSR_R Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 (Intercept) -92.5825   (Intercept) -92.8234 
  (49.7706)   (67.9539) 
 lnAsset1 4.5440*  lnTotalOperatingCost 4.6509 
  (2.0118)   (2.8110) 
 LLCSRR_P_Reporting 15.3670   LLCSRR_P_Reporting 13.1259 
  (8.7924)   (10.0189) 
          
 n 32  n 27 
 T 3--5  T 2--5 
 N 138  N 112 
 Adjusted R
2 0.28724  Adjusted R
2 0.25658 
  F(2,29)=6.72828, p-value: 0.0039771  F(2,24)=4.8695, p-value: 0.016786 
LReporting Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 (Intercept) 0.496028***  (Intercept) 0.496028*** 
  (0.079696)   (0.079696) 
 LLCSRR 0.317955*  LLCSRR 0.317955* 
  (0.150955)   (0.150955) 
          
 n 32  n 32 
 T 4--5  T 4--5 
 N 158  N 158 
 Adjusted R2 0.12078  Adjusted R2 0.12078 






Table 2.31 The Uncommitted Net Profit Pooled OLS Model Reduced Form Equations 
 The Uncommitted Net Profit Pooled OLS Model Reduced Form Equations 
  I   II 
CSRIndex Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 (Intercept) 8.8167e+00***  (Intercept) 8.604180*** 
  (1.1724e+00)   (1.141884) 
 Asset1 -4.9472e-11  CSRNSizeIV_P_Reporting 0.123375 
  (3.4235e-11)   (0.073847) 
 CSRNSizeIV_P_Reporting 2.2375e-01*    
   (9.6572e-02)     
 N 162  N 163 
 Adjusted R2 0.032104  Adjusted R2 0.016832 
  F(2,159)=2.68839, p-value: 0.071081  F(1,161)=2.7912, p-value: 0.096726 
LCSRIndex Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 (Intercept) 9.0469e+00***  (Intercept) 8.407867*** 
  (1.3036e+00)   (1.254328) 
 Asset1 -5.7770e-11  LCSRNSizeIV_P_Reporting 0.118578 
  (3.4676e-11)   (0.092108) 
 LCSRNSizeIV_P_Reporting 2.4261e-01*    
  (1.1795e-01)    
 N 132  N 132 
 Adjusted R2 0.032627  Adjusted R2 0.012398 




Table 2.32 The Uncommitted Net Profit Between Model Reduced Form Equations 
 The Uncommitted Net Profit Between Model Reduced Form Equations 
  I   II 
CSRIndex Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 (Intercept) 8.5102e+00***  (Intercept) 7.2882e+00** 
  (2.0673e+00)   (2.1708e+00) 
 Asset1 -8.2505e-11  TotalRevenue -7.1255e-11 
  (6.6838e-11)   (6.3430e-11) 
 CSRNSizeIV_P_Reporting 3.4110e-01  CSRNSizeIV_P_Reporting 5.0355e-01 
  (1.9631e-01)   (3.3612e-01) 
 n 31  n 31 
 T 3--6  T 4--6 
 N 162  N 160 
 Adjusted R2 0.087991  Adjusted R2 0.075457 
  F(2,28)=1.51106, p-value: 0.23813  F(2,28)=1.27619, p-value: 0.29484 
LCSRIndex Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 (Intercept) 8.5349e+00***  (Intercept) 7.1532e+00** 
  (2.0063e+00)   (2.0238e+00) 
 Asset1 -7.2773e-11  TotalRevenue -6.1434e-11 
  (5.6477e-11)   (5.6418e-11) 
 LCSRNSizeIV_P_Reporting 3.4975e-01  LCSRNSizeIV_P_Reporting 5.2520e-01 
  (2.0121e-01)   (3.5052e-01) 
 n 31  n 31 
 T 3--5  T 3--5 
 N 132  N 129 
 Adjusted R2 0.089211  Adjusted R2 0.076512 






Table 2.33 The Uncommitted TR/ROA/TC Pooled OLS Model Reduced Form Equations 
 The Uncommitted TR/ROA/TC Pooled OLS Reduced Form Equations 
  I   II 
CSRIndex Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 (Intercept) 8.604180***  (Intercept) 8.604180*** 
  (1.141884)   (1.141884) 
 CSRNSizeIV_P_Reporting 0.123375  CSRNSizeIV_P_Reporting 0.123375 
  (0.073847)   (0.073847) 
 N 163  N 163 
 Adjusted R2 0.016832  Adjusted R2 0.016832 
  F(1,161)=2.7912, p-value: 0.096726 
 
F(1,161)=2.7912, p-value: 0.096726 
LCSRIndex Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 (Intercept) 8.407867***  (Intercept) 8.407867*** 
  (1.254328)   (1.254328) 
 LCSRNSizeIV_P_Reporting 0.118578  LCSRNSizeIV_P_Reporting 0.118578 
  (0.092108)   (0.092108) 
 N 132  N 132 
 Adjusted R2 0.012398  Adjusted R2 0.012398 
  F(1,130)=1.65735, p-value: 0.20025 F(1,130)=1.65735, p-value: 0.20025 
 
 
Table 2.34 The Uncommitted TR/ROA/TC Between Model Reduced Form Equations 
 The Uncommitted TR/ROA/TC Between Model Reduced Form Equations 
  I   II 
CSRIndex Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 (Intercept) 8.29522***  (Intercept) 8.29522*** 
  (2.04407)   (2.04407) 
 CSRNSizeIV_P_Reporting 0.15904  CSRNSizeIV_P_Reporting 0.15904 
  (0.14429)   (0.14429) 
 n 31  n 31 
 T 4--6  T 4--6 
 N 163  N 163 
 Adjusted R2 0.037614  Adjusted R2 0.037614 
  F(1,29)=1.21488, p-value: 0.27943  F(1,29)=1.21488, p-value: 0.27943 
LCSRIndex Variables Estimate  Variables Estimate 
 (Intercept) 7.84499***  (Intercept) 7.84499*** 
  (1.95547)   (1.95547) 
 LCSRNSizeIV_P_Reporting 0.18225  LCSRNSizeIV_P_Reporting 0.18225 
  (0.15532)   (0.15532) 
          
 n 31  n 31 
 T 3--5  T 3--5 
 N 132  N 132 
 Adjusted R2 0.042402  Adjusted R2 0.042402 





Table 2.35 Leaders Net Profit Estimation Results 
Dependent Variable: 
NetProfit                       
 
Leaders Net Profit Pooled OLS IV Estimations 
(1a) 
Leaders Net Profit One-way Fixed Effects Within IV 
Estimations 
(1b) 
Leaders Net Profit Between IV Estimations 
(1c) 
 I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV 



















Asset1 1.30e-02***  1.30e-02***  1.62e-02***  1.68e-02***  1.25e-02*** 
1.25e-
02*** 




ne  2.24e-02**  2.37e-02**  1.119e-02  2.07e-02*** 
2.279e-
02  2.28e-02 
  (7.81e-03)  (7.772e-03)  (6.09e-03)  (6.01e-03) 
(2.320e-
02)  (2.32e-2) 
CSRIndex Dropped 1.09e+09   3.912+08* 
1.30e+09**
*   8.68e+08 Dropped  
  (7.34e+08)   (1.33e+08) (2.83e+08)   (5.06e+08)   
LCSRInde









 (2.20e+08) (8.11e+08) (2.20e+08) (4.68e+08) (2.50e+08) (5.17e+08) (2.09e+08) (4.48e+08)  (1.28e+9) (5.01e+08) (1.28e+9) 
LCSR_R            
            
LReportin
g            
             
n     56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 
T     3--5 3--5 3--5 3--5 4--6 4--5 4--5 4--5 
N 261 259 261 260 260 260 260 259 315 260 261 260 
Adjusted 


























































Table 2.36 Leaders TR Estimation Results 
Dependent Variable: 
lnTotalRevenue                       
 
Leaders TR Pooled OLS IV Estimations 
(2a) 
Leaders TR One-way Fixed Effects Within IV 
Estimations 
(2b) 
Leaders TR Between IV Estimations 
(2c) 
 I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV 
Variables 
Estimat




e Estimate Estimate 
(Intercept) 
27.566*





 (1.617) (0.779) (1.742) (0.945)     (4.029) (1.135) (4.310) (1.135) 
lnAsset1 
-
0.425***  -0.493***  -0.340**  -0.227  0.083  0.063 
 (0.091)  (0.099)  (0.128)  (0.334)  (0.204)  (0.215) 
lnTC  0.575***  0.621***  0.318***  0.473*** 
0.915**
*  0.915*** 
  (0.038)  (0.044)  (0.054)  (0.058)  (0.045)  (0.045) 
CSRIndex 0.146*** 0.058***   0.111*** 0.088**   0.069  
Droppe
d  
 (0.020) (0.007)   (0.010) (0.012)   (0.036)   
LCSRIndex 0.036 Dropped 0.185*** 0.044*** Dropped -0.026 0.096* 0.058** Dropped 
Droppe
d 0.068  Dropped 
 (0.027)  (0.020) (0.008)  (0.022) (0.038) (0.021)   (0.037)  
LCSR_R            
            
LReporting            
             
n     56 43 56 45 56 46 56 46 
T     3--5 1--5 3--5 1--5 4--6 1--7 4--6 1--7 
N 259 238 260 199 261 190 261 199 315 276 262 276 
Adjusted R2 0.56411 0.78837 0.47833 0.70618 0.33517 0.40784 0.085892 0.28544 
0.09953


































































Table 2.37 Leaders ROA Estimation Results 
Dependent Variable: ROA           
 
Leaders ROA Pooled OLS IV 
Estimations 
(3a) 
Leaders ROA One-way Fixed Effects 
Within IV Estimations 
(3b) 
Leaders ROA Between IV Estimations 
(3c) 
 I II I II I II 
Variables Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate 
(Intercept) 0.2522743*** 0.2522743***   0.3612306* 0.3612306* 
 (0.0375886) (0.0375886)   (0.1438144) (0.1438144) 
lnAsset1 -0.0081185*** -0.0081185*** -0.04201417*** -0.0366020*** -0.0157811* -0.0157811* 
 (0.0014194) (0.0014194) (0.01109073) (0.0042973) (0.0071885) (0.0071885) 
CSRIndex Dropped  0.00205345***  Dropped  
   (0.00042129)    
LCSRIndex Dropped Dropped (0.00129954) Dropped 0.0019459 0.0019459 
     (0.0012357) (0.0012357) 
LCSR_R      
      
LReporting      
       
n   56 56 56 56 
T   3--5 3--5 4--5 4--5 
N 333 333 262 262 263 263 




























Table 2.38 Leaders TC Estimation Results 
Dependent Variable: 
lnTotalOperatingCost           
 
Leaders TC Pooled OLS IV Estimations 
(4a) 
Leaders TC One-way Fixed Effects 
Within IV Estimations 
(4b) 
Leaders TC Between IV Estimations 
(4c) 
 I II I II I II 
Variables Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate 
(Intercept) 33.915798*** 35.283483***   26.564554*** 28.018988*** 
 (2.216026) (2.334260)   (6.137689) (6.597408) 
lnAsset1 -0.753548*** -0.778391*** 0.176924 0.263254 -0.211321 -0.261562 
 (0.125630) (0.133258) (0.211519) (0.483123) (0.304831) (0.323727) 
CSRIndex 0.141049***  0.072629***  0.091859  
 (0.027051)  (0.016976)  (0.049056) 
LCSRIndex 0.086626* 0.221540*** Dropped 0.055376 Dropped 0.094352  
 (0.036105) (0.026726)  (0.055136)  (0.050870) 
LCSR_R      
      
LReporting      
       
n   45 45 45 45 
T   1--5 1--5 2--6 1--5 
N 198 199 199 199 238 200 




























Table 2.39 Followers Net Profit Estimation Results 
Dependent Variable: 
Net Profit                       
 
Followers Net Profit Pooled OLS IV Estimations 
(1a) 
Followers Net Profit One-way Fixed Effects Within IV 
Estimations 
(1b) 
Followers Net Profit Between IV Estimations 
(1c) 
 I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV 
Variables Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate 
(Intercep
t) 4.39e+09** 4.20e+09* 4.39e+09** 3.28e+09       -4.04e+09 -2.91e+08 -4.46e+09 -2.91e+08 
 (1.52e+09) (1.68e+09) (1.52e+09) (1.77e+09)    
(3.264e+0





02***  4.64e-03   4.64e-03   1.18e-2***  1.15e-2*** 









02***  4.58e-2*** 
4.58e-
2*** 




2.09e+8**   Dropped -1.27e+08*   1.66e+08  Dropped  






3.45e+08** -3.24e+08  Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped 2.12e+08  NS 
 (1.25e+08)  (1.25e+08) (1.73e+08)       (1.08e+08)  
LCSR_R 6.13e+8*** -3.90e+8   6.13e+8*** -3.09e+08 Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped 








* 1.70e+10* -2.87e+09* -2.59e+09 -2.87e+09* 
-
4.28e+09** Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped 
  (3.09e+09) (7.15e+09) (3.09e+09) (7.91e+09) (1.32e+09) (1.57e+09) (1.32e+09) (1.38e+09)         
n     32 32 32 32 32 33 32 33 
T     3--5 3--5 3--5 3--5 3--6 4--7 3--5 4--7 
N 137 138 137 138 137 138 137 138 168 223 137 223 
Adjusted 





























































Table 2.40 Followers TR Estimation Results 
Dependent Variable: 
lnTotalRevenue                       
 
Followers TR Pooled OLS IV Estimations 
(2a) 
Followers TR One-way Fixed Effects Within IV 
Estimations 
(2b) 
Followers TR Between IV Estimations 
(2c) 
 I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV 
Variables Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate 
(Intercept) 35.584*** 3.812 24.196*** 3.812     30.591  4.348 30.591 4.348 
 (4.752) (2.309) (2.484) (2.309)     (15.766) (4.033) (15.766) (4.033) 
lnAsset1 -0.513*  0.016  0.475  0.904***  -0.426  -0.426 
 (0.197)  (0.100)  (0.495)  (0.235)  (0.737)  (0.737) 
lnTC  0.812***  0.812***  1.744***  1.887***  0.733**  0.733** 
  (0.106)  (0.106)  (0.187)  (0.186)  (0.213)  (0.213) 
CSRIndex 0.077*** Dropped   0.050** 0.038**   Dropped Dropped  
 (0.016)    (0.016) (0.012)      
LCSRIndex 0.080  0.058  Dropped 0.058  -0.026 -0.047*** Dropped -0.037** Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped 
 (0.044) (0.035)  (0.035) (0.019) (0.014)  (0.013)     
LCSR_R 0.083** -0.036 0.118*** -0.036 Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped 0.174 Dropped 0.174 Dropped 
 (0.026) (0.031) (0.016) (0.031)     (0.114)  (0.114)  
LReporting -8.053*** NS -4.288*** Dropped Dropped -0.011 Dropped Dropped Dropped 3.497 Dropped 3.497 
  (1.565)   (0.832)     (0.007)       (2.884)   (2.884) 
n     29 26 32 24 32 27 32 27 
T     3--5 2--5 3--5 3--5 3--5 3--5 3--5 3--5 
N 137 112 137 112 126 108 137 104 137 127 137 127 







































































Dependent Variable: ROA           
 
Followers ROA Pooled OLS IV 
Estimations 
(3a) 
Followers ROA One-way Fixed Effects 
Within IV Estimations 
(3b) 
Followers ROA Between IV Estimations 
(3c) 
 I II I II I II 
Variables Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate 
(Intercept) -0.9638738*** -0.9638738***   0.1733904 0.1733904 
 (0.2491809) (0.2491809)   -0.1283645 -0.1283645 
lnAsset1 0.0460945*** 0.0460945*** 0.2763996*** 0.2317630*** -0.0057830 -0.0057830 
 (0.0111909) (0.0111909) (0.0366571) (0.0317880) (0.0050701) (0.0050701) 
CSRIndex Dropped  -0.0023513   Dropped 
   (0.0012940)   
LCSRIndex -0.0092192*** -0.0092192*** -0.0061015*** -0.0067615*** Dropped Dropped 
 (0.0026805) (0.0026805) (0.0014459) (0.0010514)   
LCSR_R 0.0041216* 0.0041216* Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped 
 (0.0020076) (0.0020076)     
LReporting Dropped NS Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped 
         
n   25 32 33 33 
T   2--5 3--5 3--6 3--6 
N 111 111 104 137 191 191 





















Table 2.42 Followers TC Estimation Results 
Dependent Variable: lnTotalOperatingCost         
 
Followers TC Pooled OLS IV 
Estimations 
(4a) 
Followers TC One-way Fixed Effects 
Within IV Estimations 
(4b) 
Followers TC Between IV Estimations 
(4c) 
 I II I II I II 
Variables Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate 
(Intercept) 29.926800*** 28.413571***   31.919919* 31.919919* 
 (2.151931) (2.213674)   (14.024600) (14.024600) 
lnAsset1 -0.244691** -0.141563 0.1619907 0.3734225 -0.448917 -0.448917 
 (0.090959) (0.090314) (0.2467521) (0.2290366) (0.650778) (0.650778) 
CSRIndex 0.047273***  0.0245816**  Dropped  
 (0.013609)  (0.0091313)    
LCSRIndex Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped 0.136516 0.136516 
     (0.087828) (0.087828) 
LCSR_R 0.101189*** 0.135231*** Dropped 0.0100617  Dropped Dropped 
 (0.016906) (0.014471)  (0.0054642)   
LReporting -5.078261*** -5.298670*** Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped 
  (0.751600) (0.786693)       
n   27 27 27 27 
T   2--5 2--5 2--5 2--5 
N 111 111 111 111 111 111 




























Table 2.43 The Uncommitted Net Profit Estimation Results 
Dependent Variable: Net Profit               
 
The Uncommitted Net Profit Pooled OLS IV Estimations 
(1a) 
The Uncommitted Net Profit Between IV Estimations 
(1c) 
 I II III IV I II III IV 
Variables Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate 
(Intercept) 4.0699e+09*** 4.4816e+09 4.3696e+09*** 6.2409e+09* 3.2916e+09 1.0479e+09** 3.2916e+09 1.0479e+09** 
 (9.9011e+08) (2.6135e+09) (9.8360e+08) (2.4246e+09) (2.4091e+09) (3.3362e+08) (2.4091e+09) (3.3362e+08) 
Asset1 1.6223e-02**  0.019379***  3.3807e-02  3.3807e-02 
 (5.6325e-03)  (5.3859e-03)  (1.7310e-02)  (1.7310e-02) 
TR  7.5992e-03  1.3503e-02*  3.8300e-03  3.8300e-03 
  (6.2951e-03)  (5.3226e-03)  (6.0846e-03)  (6.0846e-03) 
CSRIndex 2.5738e+08 5.8540e+08   Dropped Dropped  
 (1.4580e+08) (3.3969e+08)      
LCSRIndex -6.0067e+08*** -9.7391e+08** -3.7520e+08*** -5.6745e+08* -3.0779e+08 Dropped -3.0779e+08 Dropped 
 (1.5858e+08) (3.5755e+08) (9.4779e+07) (2.7082e+08) (2.3171e+08)  (2.3171e+08)  
LCSR_R        
        
LReporting        
         
n     31 31 31 31 
T     3--5 4--7 3--5 4--7 
N 129 129 129 129 129 207 129 207 
Adjusted 































Table 2.44 The Uncommitted TR Estimation Results 
Dependent Variable: lnTotalRevenue               
 
The Uncommitted TR Pooled OLS IV Estimations 
(2a) 
The Uncommitted TR Between IV Estimations 
(2c) 
 I II III IV I II III IV 
Variables Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate 
(Intercept) 7.859363*** 10.37208*** 6.663770*** 8.15858*** 2.70182 2.563864 2.70182 2.563864 
 (1.645488) (1.97750) (1.767434) (1.99735) (6.42439) (2.200243) (6.42439) (2.200243) 
lnAsset1 0.556070***  0.607195***  0.80611**  0.80611** 
 (0.080155)  (0.086320)  (0.26856)  (0.26856) 
lnTotalOperatingCost  0.46538***  0.57546***  0.894565***  0.894565*** 
  (0.10394)  (0.10560)  (0.091292)  (0.091292) 
CSRIndex 0.562115*** 0.52545***   Dropped Dropped  
 (0.115509) (0.14989)      
LCSRIndex -0.289708* -0.29372 0.301519*** 0.21763 0.21953 Dropped 0.21953 Dropped 
 (0.144487) (0.18002) (0.084956) (0.11245) (0.16976)  (0.16976)  
LCSR_R        
        
LReporting        
         
n     31 23 31 23 
T     3--5 2--7 3--5 2--7 
N 129 86 129 86 129 113 129 113 




































Table 2.45 The Uncommitted ROA Estimation Results 
Dependent Variable: ROA       
 
The Uncommitted ROA Pooled OLS IV Estimations 
(3a) 
The Uncommitted ROA Between IV Estimations 
(3c) 
 I II I II 
Variables Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate 
(Intercept) 0.3191498* 0.2862817* 0.0232248 0.0232248 
 (0.1379314) (0.1372202) (0.1889822) (0.1889822) 
lnAsset1 -0.0062977 -0.0048922 0.0012318 0.0012318 
 (0.0067189) (0.0067017) (0.0079832) (0.0079832) 
CSRIndex 0.0154531  Dropped 
 (0.0096824)   
LCSRIndex -0.0284437* -0.0121902 Dropped Dropped 
 (0.0121115) (0.0065958)   
LCSR_R    
    
LReporting    
     
n   31 31 
T   3--6 3--6 
N 129 129 177 177 
Adjusted 




















Table 2.46 The Uncommitted TC Estimation Results 
Dependent Variable: 
lnTotalOperatingCost       
 
The Uncommitted TC Pooled OLS IV Estimations 
(4a) 
The Uncommitted TC Between IV Estimations 
(4c) 
 I II I II 
Variables Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate 
(Intercept) 7.189137*** 6.815064** 2.99430 -5.05684 
 (1.869143) (2.135302) (3.07836) (11.37363) 
lnAsset1 0.542707*** 0.549081*** 0.88146*** 1.11172* 
 (0.091553) (0.105665) (0.12848) (0.41063) 
CSRIndex 0.382718***  Dropped 
 (0.066263)   
LCSRIndex Dropped 0.426922*** Dropped 0.25803 
  (0.093218)  (0.24453) 
LCSR_R    
    
LReporting    
     
n   23 23 
T   2--6 2--5 
N 101 86 106 86 
Adjusted 
R2 0.61197 0.56039 0.63137 0.25568 
F-statistic 
F(2,98)=83.6841, p-













2.5 Empirical Analysis of CSR Subindices, CSR Reporting and Financial 
Performance 
To further investigate the impacts of four CSR subindices performance on firms’ 
financial performance, we also evaluate four sets of models as we did for CSR Index in 
section 2.4 for CSR subindices. To examine the signaling effect of each CSR subindex 
performance, we include the interaction term of each CSR subindex and LReporting 
dummy. Besides the signaling effect from the public, we expect that there might be a 
delayed return from lagged social CSR performance and lagged environmental CSR 
performance because social benevolence like community supporting program or employee 
relations program may receive a delayed return from the benefited groups and energy 
efficiency program may take some time to exhibit its resource saving effect. So we include 
LSocialCSR and LEnvironmentalCSR as well.  
We construct IV’s for each variable of interest in similar ways by using same category 
average CSR subindex score of firms in similar size in the sample, and other IV’s as we 
used before. To save space, the tables of CSR subindex IV’s profiles are not listed here. 
They can be provided at the demand to the author. 
After IV’s for each variable of interest is constructed, we checked the Pearson’s product-
moment correlation among variables of interest from the reduced form equations for all 
three types of models (pooled OLS, one-way fixed effects within and between models). The 
results showed that high Pearson’s product-moment correlation (𝜌 > 0.99) exist among 
current year’s CSR subindex scores and among lagged CSR subindex scores for full sample 
and leaders in pooled OLS and between models.  
Technically speaking, this implied that some variables are redundant so that we need 
to drop the redundant variables. However, dropping variables may be problematic for two 
reasons. First, since for full sample and leaders’ pooled OLS and between models, all 
current year’s CSR subindex scores are pairwise highly linearly correlated and all lagged 
CSR subindex scores are also pairwise highly linearly correlated, we can only keep one 
current year’s CSR subindex scorre and one lagged CSR subindex score by dropping 
“redundant” variables and there is no persuasive evidence to keep a particular CSR 
subindex score while drop others. Second, dropping too many highly correlated variables 





Economically speaking, four CSR subindices are definitely defined differently and the 
high correlations among CSR subindices reflect behavioral consistency of firms’ CSR 
performance in four dimensions.  
After balancing the large standard error caused by high collinearity correlations and 
the bias caused by dropping variables, we choose to keep all current CSR subindex scores 
and lagged CSR subindex scores. And we use backward elimination to derive final selected 
models. The limitations of our model specifications are discussed in section 2.6. Out of a 
parallel comparison purpose with empirical analysis of CSR index and lagged CSR index 
in section 2.5, we also evaluate the model specifications which only include lagged CSR 
subindex scores and their interaction terms. The results are presented in Table 2.47 to 
Table 2.62. 
The estimation results indicate that the links between CSR subindces and financial 
performance are much more complicated than what we expected. The strength and the 
direction of the link may depend on a firm’s CSR reporting records type, how a firm 
practices CSR, and time horizon. For full sample, we found both CSR management 
performance and social CSR performance (both current year and last year’s) have positive 
effects on TR. And current year social CSR performance exhibits the largest positive 
impact on full sample TR among four CSR subindces. While the estimation results on full 
sample net profit and ROA show that market CSR performance and social CSR 
performance have positive effects and lagged market CSR performance has larger impacts 
on full sample net profit. For Leaders, we found positive effects of lagged CSR 
management performance and current year social CSR performance on net profit, TR and 
ROA. And current year social CSR performance exhibits the largest positive impact on 
Leaders’ net profit, TR, and ROA among four CSR subindces. For Followers, we found that 
social CSR performance (both current year and last year’s) and lagged reported 
environmental CSR performance have positive effects on TR. And social CSR performance 
(both current year and last year’s) exhibits the largest positive impact on Followers’ TR 
among four CSR subindces. While the estimation results on Followers net profit and ROA 
show that lagged reported CSR management performance and lagged reported market 
CSR performance have positive effects and market CSR performance has larger impacts 
on Followers’ net profit and ROA. For The Uncommitted, we only found positive effect of 






Overall, social CSR performance has the most consistent positive effects on profitability 
among full sample and all types and also four CSR subindices. While lagged market CSR 
performance has larger impacts on full sample net profit and CSR management 
performance also has a positive effect on full sample TR. Besides, Leaders’ management 
CSR performance has stronger link with financial performance while Followers’ market 
CSR performance has stronger link with financial performance. The link between 
environmental CSR performance and financial performance is very limited and in general 
negative, and we only found positive impact of environmental CSR on Followers’ TR, 
considering that we were not able to find proper IV’s for LEnvironmentalCSR for Leaders 
and no IV’s for EnvironmentalCSR and LEnvironmentalCSR for The Uncommitted. 
2.5.1 CSR Management Subindex and Financial Performance 
2.5.1.1 Current Year CSR Performance and Financial Performance 
There are consistent evidences that better current year CSR management performance 
has an effect to reduce TC on full sample (weakly by pooled OLS IV estimation in Table 
2.50 column (4a).I) and three types (by pooled OLS IV estimation in Table 2.54 column 
(4a).I, Table 2.58 column (4a).I and Table 2.62 column (4a).I). Relating to the subindeices 
under CSR management in Table , this TC reducing effect might be due to improved CSR 
management efficiency (CSR-1.3, CSR-1.4, CSR-1.5, CSR-1.6 and CSR-1.14 in Table 2.1), 
better identification of key CSR issues (CSR-1.2 in Table 2.1) and key stakeholders (CSR-
1.7 in Table 2.1), better response to stakeholders’ expectation (CSR-1.8 and CSR-1.9 in 
Table 2.1).  
Also, better current year CSR management performance increases TR on full sample 
(by pooled OLS IV estimation in Table 2.48 column (2a).I, One-way within IV estimation 
in column (2b).I and between IV estimation in column (2c).I). This TR increasing effect 
might come from the improved stakeholder relationship which is built up by better CSR 
management. However, we found that better current year CSR management performance 
has an effect to reduce the TR of Leaders (by pooled OLS IV estimation in Table 2.52 
column (2a).I). This revenue reducing effect may be because that Leaders reallocate their 
resources to improve CSR management. Some resources which were used for business 
operating are now reallocated to support better CSR management and this effect may 





Unfortunately, we were not able to find consistent net profit or ROA increasing effect 
by current year CSR management. Instead, we found weak net profit reducing effect on 
full sample (by pooled OLS IV estimation in Table 2.47 column (1a).I), ROA reducing 
effect on full sample and Leaders (by pooled OLS IV estimation in Table 2.49 column 
(3a).I and Table 2.53 column (3a).I), but net profit increasing effect on full sample (by 
One-way within IV estimation in Table 2.47 column (1b).I) and ROA increasing effect on 
Followers (by One-way within IV estimation in Table 2.57 column (3b).I). This mixing 
result on net profit and ROA may be due to two reasons. First, there are both revenue 
increasing aspects and revenue reducing aspects in CSR management sub-indices. So the 
total effect of CSR management on net profit/ROA may depend on how the firm practices 
CSR management. Second, some TC data are missing because of unavailability of data. 
Some firms didn’t list out the total operating cost directly in their accounting reports. 
Some firms’ accounting reports’ structures, like firms who publish their accounting reports 
in Hong Kong Stock Exchange, are not comparable with other firms who publish their 
accounting reports in China Foreign Exchange Trade System & National Interbank 
Funding Center and they didn’t list out the total operating cost as well. Some firm groups’ 
accounting reports are not available so that their financial data were read from their CSR 
reports. Therefore, we only have 395 observations for TC pooled OLS models while we 
have 527 observations for net profit, TR and ROA pooled OLS models.  
2.5.1.2 Lagged Reported CSR Management Performance and Financial 
Performance 
We found that there are consistent evidences that lagged reported CSR management 
performance has a revenue increasing effect on full sample (by pooled OLS and one-way 
within IV estimation in Table 2.48 column (2a).I and column (2b).I), Leaders and 
Followers (by pooled OLS IV estimation in Table 2.52 column (2a).I and Table 2.56 column 
(2a).I). However, for The Uncommitted, their poor lagged CSR management performance 
has a revenue reducing effect (by pooled OLS IV and one-way within IV estimation in 
Table 2.60 column (2a).I and (2b).I).  
On the other side, we didn’t find significant effect of lagged reported CSR management 
performance on TC. We only found significant TC increasing effect of lagged reported CSR 






We also found net profit increasing effect weakly on Leaders and significantly on 
Followers (by pooled IV estimation in Table 2.51 column (1a).I and Table 2.55 column 
(1a).I), while net profit reducing effect on The Uncommitted (by one-way within IV 
estimation and between IV estimation in Table 2.59 column (1b).I and (1c).I). Besides, we 
found ROA increasing effect on full sample (by one-way within IV estimation in Table 2.49 
column (3b).I), Leaders (by pooled OLS IV estimation in Table 2.53 column (3a).I), and 
Followers (by one-way within IV estimation in Table 2.57 column (3b).I), while ROA 
reducing effect on The Uncommitted (by one-way within IV estimation in Table 2.61 
column (3b).I).  
In all, these findings above may primarily verify our expectation of the signaling effect 
of lagged reported CSR management performance. Good lagged reported CSR 
management performance may be a signal of CSR responsible behavior to broader 
stakeholders and may bring higher revenue and net profit to the firm, like Leaders and 
Followers. While bad lagged reported CSR management performance may be a signal of 
CSR irresponsible behavior to broader stakeholders and may reduce a firm’s revenue and 
net profit, like The Uncommitted (The Uncommitted’ lagged CSR management 
performance is estimated and published by CSR research institute, not The Uncommitted 
themselves). 
2.5.2 Market CSR Subindex and Financial Performance 
2.5.2.1 Current Year Market CSR Performance and Financial Performance 
The effect of current year market CSR performance on financial performance is even 
more complicated than CSR management performance because there are more items 
included under market CSR subindex, for example, higher TR and net profit (CSR-2.1.2 
and CSR-2.1.3 in Table 2.1), and better customer relationships (all items in CSR-2.1 in 
Table 2.1). Some items may have TR/net profit/ROA increasing effect while some items 
may have TR/net profit/ROA reducing or TC increasing effect, for example, supply chain 
management (all items in CSR-2.2 in Table 2.1) and R&D (all items in CSR-2.4 in Table 
2.1).  
Our empirical analysis suggests that better current year market CSR performance may 
increase the net profit on full sample (by pooled OLS IV estimation in Table 2.47 column 
(1a).I), Leaders (by one-way within IV estimation in Table 2.51 column (1b).I), and weakly 





increase TR on Leaders (by one-way within IV estimation in Table 2.52 column (2b).I). 
And it may weakly increase ROA of Followers (by pooled OLS estimation in Table 2.57 
column (1a).I).  
On the other side, better current year market CSR performance may weakly reduce the 
net profit for full sample (by one-way within IV estimation in Table 2.47 column (1b).I) 
and reduce the net profit for Followers (by one-way within IV estimation in Table 2.55 
column (1b).I). It may also reduce TR on full sample (by pooled OLS IV estimation and 
one-way within IV estimation in Table 2.48 column (2a).I and (2b).I) and Followers (by 
pooled OLS IV estimation and one-way within IV estimation in Table 2.55 column (2a).I 
and (2b.I)). And it may reduce ROA on Leaders (by pooled OLS IV estimation in Table 
2.53 column (3a).I). 
To further interpret these results in an economic sense, these results may imply that 
better current year market CSR performance may increase the net profit for full sample 
and net profit/ROA weakly on Followers in the long run (because one-way within 
estimation focuses on the short run effect and between estimation focuses on the long run 
effect while pooled OLS estimation is a combination of short run and long effect) while 
reduce the net profit for full sample and Followers in the short run. And better current 
year market CSR performance may increase net profit and TR for Leaders in the short 
run but reduce ROA in the long run. It is probably because there is a CSR catching up 
stage for Followers and they may not be able to receive the benefit of better market CSR 
performance until their market CSR performance achieves and exceeds a certain level. 
For Leaders, although their better market CSR performance may quickly earn net 
profit/TR from stakeholders, their market CSR performance has not achieved an efficient 
level.  
The effect of current year market CSR performance on TC is quite mixed. The results 
suggest that better current year market CSR performance may increase TC (but less than 
the increase on TR) for Leaders in the short run (by one-way within IV estimation). For 
Followers, better current year market CSR performance may increase TC in the long run 
(by between IV estimation) but weakly reduce TC in the short run (by one-way within IV 
estimation). Since we have 26 observations of TC missing from 137 total observations for 
Followers, the estimation of current year market CSR performance on TC for Followers 





2.5.2.2 Lagged Reported Market CSR Performance and Financial Performance 
We found that better lagged reported market CSR performance has a TR increasing 
effect on Leaders (by pooled OLS IV estimation and one-way within IV estimation in Table 
2.52 column (2a).I and (2b).I). However, it has a TR reducing effect on full sample and 
Followers (by pooled OLS IV estimation and one-way within IV estimation in Table 2.48 
column (2a).I and (2b).I and Table 2.56 column (2a).I and column (2b).I). This may imply 
that there exists positive signaling effect of lagged reported market CSR performance for 
Leaders while for Followers the signaling effect might be negative. 
However, the results on net profit and ROA show that better lagged reported market 
CSR performance has a net profit and ROA increasing effect for full sample and Followers 
(by pooled OLS IV estimation in Table 2.47 column (1a).I, Table 2.49 column (3a).I, Table 
2.55 column (1a).I and Table 2.57 column (3a).I) but has a weakly net profit reducing 
effect on Leaders (by pooled OLS IV estimation in Table 2.47 column (1a).1). These results 
suggest that there should be a contrary TC effect on full sample and Followers to 
counteract the TR effect of lagged reported market CSR performance on full sample and 
Followers. Unfortunately, we only found the evidence of TC reducing effect on full sample 
(by one-way within IV estimation in Table 2.50 column (4b).I) and TC increasing effect on 
Leaders (by one-way within IV estimation in Table 2.54 column (4b).I) but no evidence 
found for Followers, considering that there are missing TC observations for Followers.  
Economically, the findings above may imply that the improvement of some items under 
market CSR performance subindex may cause a sustaining investment to maintain. For 
example, increasing total assets (CSR-2.1.4 in Table 2.1) may cause an increasing total 
operating cost in the next year, or improved customer relationship management (CSR-2.3 
in Table 2.1) may cause higher operating cost to maintain it. 
2.5.3 Social CSR Subindex and Financial Performance 
2.5.3.1 Current Year Social CSR Performance and Financial Performance 
The empirical results show quite consistent evidences that better current year social 
CSR performance has a TR increasing effect on full sample (by pooled OLS IV estimation 
in Table 2.48 column (2a).I and one-way within IV estimation in column (2b).I), Leaders 
and Followers (by pooled OLS IV estimation and one-way within IV estimation in Table 
2.52 column (2a).I and (2b).I, Table 2.56 column (2a).I and (2b).I), and The Uncommitted 





increasing effect on full sample (by pooled OLS IV estimation and one-way within IV 
estimation in Table 2.47 column (1a).I and (3a).I), Leaders (weakly by pooled OLS IV 
estimation and between IV estimation in Table 2.51 column (1a).I and (3a).I), Followers 
(by one-way within IV estimation in Table 2.55 column (1b).I), and The Uncommitted (by 
pooled OLS IV estimation in Table 2.59 column (1a).I). Besides, we found consistent 
evidences that better current year social CSR performance has a ROA increasing effect on 
full sample (by pooled OLS IV estimation and one-way within IV estimation in Table 2.49 
column (3a).I and (3b).I), Leaders (by pooled OLS IV estimation and one-way within IV 
estimation in Table 2.53 column (3a).I and (3b).I), Followers (weakly by one-way within IV 
estimation in Table 2.57 column (3b).I), and  The Uncommitted (weakly by pooled OLS IV 
estimation in Table 2.61 column (3a).I). 
The positive effect of current year social CSR performance might be related with 
employee relationship items under social CSR performance subindex, like average annual 
leave (CSR-3.2.7 in Table 2.1), employee training program (CSR-3.2.15 in Table 2.1), 
employee career development channels (CSR-3.2.17 in Table 2.1) and incentive 
mechanism for employee (CSR-3.2.18 in Table 2.1). Improved employee relationship may 
induce a higher employee morale, thus may enhance the productivity and further generate 
higher TR or net profit. It may also be related with the company income tax (CSR-3.1.3 in 
Table 2.1) because higher company income tax implies higher profitability.  
On the TC side, we also found consistent evidences that better current year CSR 
performance may increase the TC on full sample (by pooled OLS IV estimation in Table 
2.50 column (4a).I), Leaders (by pooled OLS IV estimation in Table 2.54 column (4a).I), 
Followers (by pooled OLS IV estimation and one-way within IV estimation in Table 2.58 
column (4a).I and (4b).I), and The Uncommitted (by pooled OLS IV estimation in Table 
2.62 column (4a).I).   
The increasing effect on TC may be related with community relationship items under 
social CSR performance subindex, like supporting the education of community members 
(CSR-3.3.4 in Table 2.1) and donations (CSR-3.3.8 in Table 2.1). Employee relationship 
may also require higher investment, like financial aid to employee who have financial 
difficulties (CSR-3.2.11 in Table 2.1), protection to special groups (CSR-3.2.12 in Table 2.1, 
e.g. pregnant women), employee training program (CSR-3.2.15 in Table 2.1) and incentive 
mechanism for employee (CSR-3.2.18 in Table 2.1). Besides, some increased TC may be 





2.5.3.2 Lagged Social CSR Performance and Financial Performance 
We found that better lagged social CSR performance has an effect of increasing TR on 
full sample (weakly by pooled OLS IV estimation in Table 2.48 column (2a).I), Followers 
(by pooled OLS IV estimation and one-way within IV estimation in Table 2.56 column 
(2a).I and (2b).I), and The Uncommitted (by pooled OLS IV estimation in Table 2.60 
column (2a).I). But it has a weakly TR reducing effect on Leaders (by pooled OLS IV 
estimation in Table 2.52 column (2a).I).  
Meantime, we found that better lagged social CSR performance has an effect of 
increasing TC on full sample (weakly by pooled OLS IV estimation in Table 2.50 column 
(4a).I), Followers (by pooled OLS IV estimation and one-way within IV estimation in Table 
2.58 column (4a).I and (4b).I), and on The Uncommitted (by pooled OLS IV estimation in 
Table 2.62 column (4c).I).  
For net profit, the results show that better lagged social CSR performance has an effect 
of increasing the net profit on full sample (by between IV estimation and weakly by pooled 
OLS IV estimation in Table 2.47 column (1c).I and (1a).I) and Leaders (weakly by one-way 
within IV estimation in Table 2.51 column (1b).I). However, it reduces the net profit of 
Followers (by pooled OLS IV estimation in Table 2.55 column (1a).I) and The 
Uncommitted (by pooled OLS IV estimation in Table 2.59 column (1a).I). 
This may verify our expectation that some items in social CSR subindex may take time 
to generate benefit to firms and they may result in sustaining higher cost, especially when 
some program or system is in the establishing stage. Overall, the lagged effect of social 
CSR performance is more significant on full sample, Followers and The Uncommitted, but 
not on Leaders. It is probably because the employee relationship management, the 
community relationship management and production safety management of Leaders are 
established and more developed than other types so the lagged effect of improved social 
CSR performance of Leaders is not very significant.  
For reported lagged social CSR performance, we didn’t find strong evidence of 
significant signaling effect on TR and net profit. And we didn’t find strong evidence of 
effect on TC as well. That may imply that the social CSR performance may only be valued 







2.5.4 Environmental CSR Subindex and Financial Performance 
2.5.4.1 Current Year Environmental CSR Performance and Financial 
Performance 
We found very consistent evidences that better current year environmental CSR 
performance has an effect of reducing the net profit on full sample (by pooled OLS IV 
estimation and one-way within IV estimation in Table 2.47 column (1a).I and (1b).I), 
Leaders (weakly by pooled OLS IV estimation and one-way within IV estimation in Table 
2.51 column (1a).I and (1b).I), and Followers (by pooled OLS IV estimation in Table 2.55 
column (1a).I). Since the The Uncommitted’ environmental CSR performance score tends 
to be very low, we could not identify proper IV’s for The Uncommitted. So we didn’t 
include environmental CSR performance related variables in The Uncommitted’ models.  
Also, we found that better current year environmental CSR performance has an effect 
of reducing TR on full sample (by pooled OLS IV estimation in Table 2.48 column (2a).I) 
and Leaders (by one-way within IV estimation in Table 2.52 column (2b).I). Similarly, 
better current year environmental CSR performance has an effect of reducing ROA on full 
sample (by pooled OLS IV estimation and weakly by one-way within IV estimation in 
Table 2.49 column (3a).I and (3b).I), Leaders (by one-way within IV estimation in Table 
2.53 column (3b).I) and Followers (by one-way within IV estimation in Table 2.57 column 
(3b).I).  
The results on TC show that better current year environmental CSR performance has 
an effect of increasing TC on full sample (by one-way within IV estimation in Table 2.50 
column (4b).I) and Followers (by pooled OLS IV estimation in Table 2.58 column (4a).I).  
The results above are consistent with common expectation that improving 
environmental CSR performance may result in an investment. Therefore, it may reduce 
the profitability in the short run.  
However, it is noticeable to see that better current year environmental CSR 
performance has a weak effect of reducing TC on Leaders (by one-way within IV 
estimation). According to the structure of Income Statement adopted by most Chinese 
firms, TC (total operating cost) only record the cost related to the business operation. For 
the cost related with environmental CSR, some cost related with basic environmental 
management may be have been counted as operating cost by accounting standers, like cost 
related with environmental management system and certification (e.g. ISO 14001). While 





non-operating expenditure. Since most Leaders may have begun to practice environmental 
CSR earlier than the starting time of our data set, they may have already established 
basic environmental management system and their environmental CSR management 
system may have already entered the benefit-generating stage. Therefore, their better 
environmental CSR performance may result in higher non-operating expenditure but a 
lower operating cost. For Followers, their better environmental CSR performance may 
mainly result in a higher cost by improved basic environmental management, so we will 
observe a higher TC on Followers. 
2.5.4.2 Lagged Environmental CSR Performance and Financial Performance 
We found that lagged environmental CSR performance has an effect of increasing TC 
on full sample (weakly by pooled OLS IV estimation in Table 2.50 column (4a).I) and 
Followers (by pooled OLS IV estimation in Table 2.58 column (4a).I). However, we also 
found that lagged environmental CSR performance has an effect of reducing TC on 
Leaders (by one-way within IV estimation in Table 2.54 column (4b).I) and Followers (by 
one-way within IV estimation in Table 2.58 column (4b).I).  
This mixed result may imply that better last year environmental CSR performance 
may have a larger TC reducing effect for Leaders and Followers in the short run. 
However, averaging over the time in a longer period, firms who have better environmental 
CSR performance tend to result in higher TC compared with firms who have poorer 
environmental CSR performance.  
It would be interesting to examine whether higher degree lagged environmental CSR 
performance may result in lower TC by pooled OLS IV estimation, in another sense, to 
examine that whether firms who have better higher degree of lagged environmental CSR 
performance may reduce TC compared with firms who have poorer environmental CSR 
performance over a longer time period. However, due to the limited time periods of our 
data set, this examination is not very practical.  
It is also found that better lagged environmental CSR performance has an effect of 
reducing TR on Leaders (by one-way within IV estimation in Table 2.52 column (2b).I) and 
Followers (by one-way within IV estimation in Table 2.56 column (2b).I). And better 
lagged environmental CSR performance has an effect of reducing ROA on full sample (by 
pooled OLS IV estimation in Table 2.49 column (3a).I) and Followers (by pooled OLS IV 





performance will reduce the net profit on full sample (by pooled OLS IV estimation in 
Table 2.47 column (1a).I) and Leaders (by one-way within IV estimation in Table 2.51 
column (1b).I). These results may be ascribed to reallocating resource to improve 
environmental CSR performance.  
At the same time, we found that better lagged environmental CSR performance has an 
effect of increasing the net profit on full sample (by one-way within IV estimation in Table 
2.47 column (1b).I). This result may imply that better last year environmental CSR 
performance may have an effect of improving the net profit in the short run on full 
sample. However, since we couldn’t identify a proper IV for full sample for TR/TC/ROA 
one-way within model, we could not further verify this effect.  
For lagged reported environmental CSR performance, we found that it has an effect of 
increasing TR on Followers (by pooled OLS IV estimation and one-way within IV 
estimation in Table 2.56 column (2a).I and (2b).I). This probably suggests a positive 
signaling effect of lagged reported environmental CSR performance on Followers in the 
short run.  
On the other side, we found that lagged reported environmental CSR performance has 
an effect of increasing TC on full sample (weakly by one-way within IV estimation and 
between IV estimation in Table 2.50 column (4b).I and (4c).I) and Followers (by pooled 
OLS IV estimation and one-way within IV estimation in Table 2.58 column (4a).I and 
(4b).I). Since firms which report their environmental CSR performance tend to have 
higher environmental CSR performance scores, that implies that firms which report their 
CSR performance may invest more to improve their environmental CSR performance than 
firms which do not report their CSR performance.  
When it turns to net profit/ROA, we found that better reported last year environmental 
CSR performance has effect of reducing ROA on full sample (by one-way within IV 
estimation in Table 2.49 column (3b).I) and Followers (by pooled OLS IV estimation in 
Table 2.57 column (3a).I). For net profit, we found that it has an effect of reducing net 
profit on full sample (by one-way within IV estimation in Table 2.47 column (1b).I) and 
Followers (by pooled OLS IV estimation and between IV estimation in Table 2.55 column 
(1a).I and (1c).I). However, we also found that it has an effect of increasing net profit on 
full sample (by pooled OLS IV estimation in Table 2.47 column (1a).I) and Followers (by 
one-way within IV estimation in Table 2.55 column (1b).I). This may imply that for the 





net profit in the long run. For Followers, it may increase the net profit in the short run. In 
another sense, the signaling effect may take a relatively longer period to happen on the 





Table 2.47 Full Sample Net Profit CSR Subindices Estimation Results 
Dependent Variable: Net Profit           
 
Full Sample Net Profit Pooled OLS IV 
Estimation 
(1a) 
Full Sample Net Profit One-way Within 
IV Estimation 
(1b) 
Full Sample Net Profit Between IV 
Estimation 
(1c) 
 I II I II I II 
Variables Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate 
(Intercept) -1.6448e+10*** 1.3816e+09   -8.6132e+09* -1.3775e+10 
 (4.8985e+09) (2.6394e+09) 
  (4.2341e+09) (9.0160e+09) 
Asset1 1.5642e-02*** 1.3929e-02*** 0.015882*** 0.016052*** 1.2704e-02*** 1.4426e-02*** 
 (8.6243e-04) (4.1245e-04) (4.9972e-04) (4.8436e-04) (7.9298e-04) (1.6432e-03) 
CSRManagment -3.0812e+08  1.2475e+08  Dropped 
 (2.1062e+08) 
 (7.8490e+07)   
 
LCSRManagment_R -5.0437e+08 Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped 1.2829e+09 
 (4.7612e+08) 
  
  (8.6005e+08) 
MarketCSR 8.6973e+08**  -4.4667e+08  Dropped 
 (3.0881e+08) 
 (2.9111e+08)   
 
LMarketCSR_R 1.4742e+09*** 4.8323e+08* -6.9109e+08** -4.8449e+08** Dropped Dropped 
 (3.8483e+08) (1.9432e+08) (2.2675e+08) (1.7011e+08)  
 
SocialCSR 8.3883e+08*  4.7150e+08*  Dropped 
 (3.8633e+08) 
 (2.3253e+08)  
  
LSocialCSR 8.2952e+08 Dropped -1.4329e+09 -1.4383e+09 4.1901e+08** Dropped 
 (6.0812e+08) 
 (8.3096e+08) (8.3011e+08) (1.2567e+08)  
LSocialCSR_R -1.6671e+09* Dropped 2.9903e+09** 2.7246e+09** Dropped Dropped 
 (8.1090e+08) 
 (9.9357e+08) (9.6327e+08)  
 
EnvironmentalCSR -1.3776e+09***  -3.1424e+08    Dropped 
 (3.8043e+08) 
 (2.1727e+08)   
 
LEnvironmentalCSR -1.9011e+09* -6.4743e+08*** 4.3764e+09* 4.1169e+09* Dropped 3.5889e+09 
 (9.4762e+08) (1.9054e+08) (1.9396e+09) (1.8923e+09)  (2.4591e+09) 
LEnvironmentalCSR_R 1.2559e+09 2.7411e+08 -4.1271e+09** -3.9317e+09** Dropped -4.4727e+09 
 (7.2192e+08) (2.0046e+08) (1.4647e+09) (1.4369e+09)  (2.8042e+09) 
LReporting 3.6666e+10 Dropped -4.1016e+10* -3.2006e+10* Dropped Dropped 
  (2.0719e+10)   (1.6524e+10) (1.5132e+10)     
n   119 119 119 119 
T   3--5 3--5 3--5 3--5 
N 525 525 525 525 525 525 
Adjusted R2 0.78685 0.78523 0.5905 0.5936 0.75671 0.59011 
F-statistic 
F(12,512)=178.208, 






















Table 2.48 Full Sample TR CSR Subindices Estimation Results 
Dependent Variable: lnTotalRevenue           
 
Full Sample TR PLS IV Est. 
(2a) 
Full Sample TR One-way Within IV 
Est. 
(2b) 
Full Sample TR Between IV Est. 
(2c) 
 I II I II I II 
Variables Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate 
(Intercept) 13.159244*** 25.665487***   25.451089*** 31.545660*** 
 (2.567377) (1.579666) 
  (5.297049) (7.220067) 
lnAsset1 0.470081*** -0.111839 -0.9379964** 0.38527*** -0.122741 -0.409010 
 (0.123373) (0.074664) (0.3230493) (0.11594) (0.240659) (0.331856) 
CSRManagment 0.027038*  0.0227145***  0.079320** 
 (0.012055) 
 (0.0064596)  (0.026787)  
LCSRManagment_R 0.107922** 0.120867** 0.1813545* Dropped Dropped Dropped 




MarketCSR -0.075992*  -0.0381749  Dropped 
 (0.029399) 
 (0.0358166)   
 
LMarketCSR_R -0.087059** Dropped -0.0433010** Dropped Dropped Dropped 
 (0.030572) 
 (0.0147485)   
 
SocialCSR 0.248604***  0.1209903***  Dropped 
 (0.034095) 
 (0.0246914)    
LSocialCSR 0.032545 0.154808*** Dropped Dropped Dropped 0.117165** 
 (0.020277) (0.024082) 
  
 (0.039188) 
LSocialCSR_R Dropped -0.107235*   Dropped Dropped 
 
 (0.046709)    
 
EnvironmentalCSR -0.132907***  Dropped  Dropped 
 (0.033995) 
   
 
 
LEnvironmentalCSR  Dropped   Dropped Dropped 
 
      
LEnvironmentalCSR_R Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped 
 
    
 
 
LReporting -6.084112*** -4.550050*** -5.3336750*** 0.78891 Dropped Dropped 
  (0.634445) (0.578787) (1.4339373) (0.42544)     
n 119 119 119 119 119 119 
T 3--5 3--5 3--5 3--5 3--5 3--5 
N 525 525 525 525 525 525 


























Table 2.49 Full Sample ROA CSR Subindices Estimation Results 
Dependent Variable: 
ROA             
 
Full Sample ROA PLS IV Est. 
(3a) 
Full Sample ROA One-way Within IV 
Est. 
(3b) 
Full Sample ROA Between IV Est. 
(3c) 
 I II I II I II 
Variables Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate 
(Intercept) -0.753466 -0.6267801   0.1653334** 0.1653334** 
 (0.4744895) (0.4512365)   (0.0519217) (0.0519217) 
lnAsset1 0.0342720 0.0302447 -0.0602277* -0.0395297 -0.0049506* -0.0049506* 
 (0.0209136) (0.0199677) (0.0245025) (0.0227933) (0.0020296) (0.0020296) 
CSRManagment -0.0024845**  Dropped  Dropped 
 (0.0008880)  
    
LCSRManagment_R Dropped 0.0038816 0.0089217 0.0071130 Dropped Dropped 
  (0.0030245) (0.0053655) (0.0053167)   
MarketCSR Dropped  Dropped  Dropped 
   
  
  
LMarketCSR_R 0.0075648** 0.0040546 Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped 
 (0.0025058) (0.0024869) 
  
  
SocialCSR 0.0077112***  0.0033503*  Dropped 
 (0.0019546)  (0.0016982) 
 
  
LSocialCSR Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped 
   
  
  
LSocialCSR_R -0.0069840* -0.0068480* Dropped  Dropped Dropped 
 (0.0027495) (0.0033287) 
  
  
EnvironmentalCSR -0.0052167*  -0.0016793  Dropped 
 (0.0025683)  (0.0014084) 
   
LEnvironmentalCSR -0.0080285 -0.0076284 Dropped  Dropped Dropped
 (0.0047943) (0.0047581) 
    
LEnvironmentalCSR_R Dropped Dropped -0.0042113* -0.0037258* Dropped Dropped 
   (0.0017443) (0.0017233) 
  
LReporting 0.1289983 0.1281667 -0.2097110* -0.1344587 Dropped Dropped 
  (0.0942848) (0.0954733) (0.1066601) (0.1008256)     
n   119 119 119 119 
T   3--5 3--5 3--5 3--5 
N 525 525 525 525 525 525 

























Table 2.50 Full Sample TC CSR Subindices Estimation Results 
Dependent Variable: lnTotalOperatingCost           
 
Full Sample TC PLS IV. Est. 
(4a) 
Full Sample TC One-way Within IV 
Est. 
(4b) 
Full Sample TC Between IV Est. 
(4c) 
 I II I II I II 
Variables Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate 
(Intercept) 43.634863*** 53.223032***   30.070035* 39.018416*** 
 (10.029949) (10.934589)   (15.136297) (8.580499) 
lnAsset1 -0.907964* -1.304701** 0.152376 0.734886 -0.283418 -0.701802 
 (0.435965) (0.475366) (0.248847) (0.450925) (0.669377) (0.381432) 
CSRManagment -0.020180  Dropped  Dropped 
 (0.014684)  
    
LCSRManagment_R Dropped Dropped Dropped -0.136694 Dropped Dropped 
   
 (0.101321)   
MarketCSR Dropped  Dropped  Dropped 
   
    
LMarketCSR_R Dropped Dropped -0.048210 Dropped Dropped 0.119799** 
   (0.028812) 
  (0.038132) 
SocialCSR 0.142837***  Dropped  Dropped 
 (0.023626)  
    
LSocialCSR 0.049120 0.106187** Dropped 0.052078 Dropped Dropped 
 (0.034328) (0.036135) 
 (0.039125)   
LSocialCSR_R Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped 
   
    
EnvironmentalCSR Dropped  0.077439***  Dropped 
   (0.011542) 
   
LEnvironmentalCSR 0.167296 0.277190*  Dropped Dropped Dropped 
 (0.113312) (0.123462) 
    
LEnvironmentalCSR_R Dropped Dropped 0.058451 Dropped 0.080500 Dropped 
   (0.047887) 
 (0.073937)  
LReporting -10.027756*** -9.946542*** -1.049327 2.044227 Dropped Dropped 
  (1.898100) (2.073686) (0.613318) (1.878591)     
n   95 95 95 95 
T   1--5 1--5 1--5 1--5 
N 395 395 395 395 395 395 

























Table 2.51 Leaders Net Profit CSR Subindices Estimation Results 
Dependent Variable: Net Profit         
 
Leaders Net Profit PLS IV Estimation 
(1a) 
Leaders Net Profit One-way Within IV 
Estimation 
(1b) 
Leaders Net Profit Between IV 
Estimation 
(1c) 
 I II I II I II 
Variables Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate 
(Intercept) 1.4791e+09 -5.9663e+09   -2.8375e+10 -2.8421e+10 
 (1.7683e+10) (1.3658e+10)   (3.3257e+10) (3.3493e+10) 
Asset1 1.3269e-02*** 1.3368e-02*** 1.6182e-02*** 1.6469e-02*** 1.2662e-02*** 1.2635e-02*** 
 (5.0174e-04) (5.7069e-04) (5.9980e-04) (5.9504e-04) (1.2525e-03) (1.3052e-03) 
CSRManagment Dropped  Dropped  Dropped 
       
LCSRManagment 1.1966e+09 Dropped   Dropped Dropped 
 (7.7513e+08)      
MarketCSR Dropped  6.4476e+08*  Dropped 
   (2.7223e+08)    
LMarketCSR -6.4884e+08 2.3069e+09*** Dropped -6.0912e+08*** Dropped Dropped 
 (6.3603e+08) (5.9994e+08)  (1.6521e+08)   
SocialCSR 1.3023e+09  Dropped  7.5580e+08 
 (8.7396e+08)    (6.8600e+08)  
LSocialCSR Dropped -1.4787e+09* 3.5124e+08 4.1332e+08* Dropped 8.0786e+08 
  (5.8575e+08) (2.5764e+08) (1.9436e+08)  (7.2516e+08) 
EnvironmentalCSR -1.6590e+09  -5.1059e+08  Dropped 
 (1.0551e+09)  (3.5380e+08)    
LEnvironmentalCSR Dropped -6.0190e+08 -7.8689e+08** Dropped Dropped Dropped 
  (3.2159e+08) (2.3551e+08)    
LReporting      
              
n   54 54 56 56 
T   3--5 3--5 4--6 3--5 
N 260 259 252 251 317 261 









p-value: < 2.22e-16 
F(3,194)=293.357, 












Table 2.52 Leaders TR CSR Subindices Estimation Results 
Dependent Variable: lnTotalRevenue   
 
Leaders TR PLS IV Est. 
(2a) 
Leaders TR One-way Within IV Est. 
(2b) 
 I II I II 
Variables Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate 
(Intercept) 33.452405*** 33.399872***  
 (2.369864) (2.595230)   
lnAsset1 -0.904281*** -0.737781*** -1.2526802*** 0.435907** 
 (0.141164) (0.140357) (0.1923914) (0.135268) 
CSRManagment -0.070969**  -0.0106684 
 (0.024863)  (0.0083445)  
LCSRManagment 0.147384* 0.162863*  
 (0.073347) (0.080301)   
MarketCSR Dropped  0.2003256*** 
   (0.0313975)  
LMarketCSR 0.099039 -0.080542 0.1339210*** Dropped 
 (0.076853) (0.071007) (0.0281759)  
SocialCSR 0.297508***  0.0527290* 
 (0.049865)  (0.0259279)  
LSocialCSR -0.142767 0.186665  
 (0.097257) (0.101026)   
EnvironmentalCSR Dropped  -0.0924158** 
   (0.0321477)  
LEnvironmentalCSR   -0.1441859*** 0.038570* 
   (0.0379477) (0.017892) 
LReporting    
          
n   56 56 
T   3--5 3--5 
N 199 199 261 261 
Adjusted R2 0.43114 0.33722 0.38265 0.080753 
F-statistic 
F(5,193)=30.8921, p-value: < 
2.22e-16 
F(3,195)=34.1061, p-value: < 
2.22e-16 
F(7,198)=28.788, p-




1.Since we could not identify proper IV’s between models for Leaders when lnAsset1 is used as the firm size control variable, we do not have results of TR/ROA/TC between 
models for Leaders.   
2.We were not able to find IV’s for LEnvironmentalCSR for Leaders for pooled OLS model when lnAsset1 is used as the firm size control variable, therefore, we do not have 
estimation results for LEnvironmentalCSR for TR/ROA/TC pooled OLS models 
3. We were not able to find IV’s for LmanagementCSR and LSocialCSR for Leaders for one-way within models when lnAsset1 is used as the firm size control variable, 







Table 2.53 Leaders ROA CSR Subindices Estimation Results 
Dependent Variable: ROA     
 
Leaders ROA PLS IV Est. 
(3a) 
Leaders ROA One-way Within IV Est. 
(3b) 
 I II I II 
Variables Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate 
(Intercept) 0.2088983 0.1033820  
 (0.1223791) (0.0925930)  
lnAsset1 -0.0028491 0.0004863 -0.0521096*** -0.0387114*** 
 (0.0075516) (0.0055391) (0.0053256) (0.0047174) 
CSRManagment -0.0013154  Dropped 
 (0.0011204)    
LCSRManagment 0.0073904 0.0057819  
 (0.0038084) (0.0036713)   
MarketCSR -0.0074342  Dropped 
 (0.0043431)    
LMarketCSR Dropped Dropped Dropped -0.0014440 
    (0.0010583) 
SocialCSR 0.0091713*  0.0038584*** 
 (0.0046495)  (0.0010190)  
LSocialCSR -0.0088534* -0.0069653  
 (0.0040348) (0.0036720)   
EnvironmentalCSR Dropped  -0.0024852* 
   (0.0012161)  
LEnvironmentalCSR   Dropped 0.0020648 
    (0.0015000) 
LReporting    
          
n   56 56 
T   3--5 3--5 
N 262 261 262 261 















Table 2.54 Leaders TC CSR Subindices Estimation Results 
Dependent Variable: lnTotalOperatingCost 
 
Leaders TC PLS IV Est. 
(4a) 
Leaders TC One-way Within IV Est. 
(4b) 
 I II I II 
Variables Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate 
(Intercept) 41.467208*** 36.74147***  
 (3.158346) (2.71032)   
lnAsset1 -1.211574*** -0.92372*** -0.458984 0.638384*** 
 (0.191213) (0.16362) (0.318986) (0.188633) 
CSRManagment -0.052795  Dropped 
 (0.030696)    
LCSRManagment 0.186970*** 0.17300  
 (0.039951) (0.10675)   
MarketCSR -0.158373  0.155975** 
 (0.117825)  (0.051770)  
LMarketCSR Dropped Dropped 0.158970** 0.023593 
   (0.052767) (0.018427) 
SocialCSR 0.378395**  Dropped 
 (0.127501)    
LSocialCSR Dropped 0.12133  
  (0.10755)   
EnvironmentalCSR Dropped  -0.054778 
   (0.049434)  
LEnvironmentalCSR   -0.201510** Dropped 
   (0.070866)  
LReporting    
          
n   45 45 
T   1--5 1--5 
N 199 199 199 199 
Adjusted R2 0.43114 0.33722 0.17314 0.078753 
F-statistic 
F(5,193)=30.8921, 
p-value: < 2.22e-16 
F(3,195)=34.1061, 










Table 2.55 Followers Net Profit CSR Subindices Estimation Results 
Dependent Variable: Net Profit         
 
Followers Net Profit PLS IV Est. 
(1a) 
Followers Net Profit One-way Within IV 
Est. 
(1b) 
Followers Net Profit Between IV Est. 
(1c) 
 I II I II I II 
Variables Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate 
(Intercept) -5.1065e+09 1.5553e+08   -9.1853e+08 -7.5602e+09 
 (4.3127e+09) (1.4080e+09)   (3.8869e+09) (4.3805e+09) 
Asset1 1.3162e-02*** 1.2942e-02*** -2.2072e-03 -1.0960e-02 1.5676e-02*** 1.0607e-02** 
 (1.3224e-03) (1.3203e-03) (4.0635e-03) (6.9996e-03) (3.6294e-03) (3.2781e-03) 
CSRManagment Dropped  Dropped  Dropped 
       
LCSRManagment_R 9.7965e+08*** 1.0499e+09*** -1.9344e+08* -4.0146e+08* 7.8523e+08* Dropped 
 (2.4904e+08) (2.3709e+08) (8.5396e+07) (1.6056e+08) (3.7020e+08)  
MarketCSR 4.1402e+08  -3.5884e+08*  Dropped 
 (2.7733e+08)  (1.7009e+08)    
LMarketCSR_R 1.1898e+09* 8.4981e+08* Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped 
 (4.6309e+08) (4.2022e+08)     
SocialCSR Dropped  1.7835e+08  Dropped 
   (1.0436e+08)    
LSocialCSR -8.3637e+08** -7.8865e+08** Dropped Dropped Dropped 3.1971e+08* 
 (2.6646e+08) (2.6678e+08)    (1.4332e+08) 
LSocialCSR_R Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped 
       
EnvironmentalCSR -4.6697e+08  Dropped  Dropped 
 (2.6307e+08)      
LEnvironmentalCSR 5.1205e+08 3.7811e+08 Dropped -2.2302e+08 Dropped Dropped 
 (3.5760e+08) (3.5099e+08)  (2.1405e+08)   
LEnvironmentalCSR_R -1.9056e+09** -1.5455e+09** 2.0458e+08* 4.4286e+08* -7.5300e+08 Dropped 
 (5.9875e+08) (5.6786e+08) (9.8834e+07) (1.8420e+08) (4.5697e+08)  
LReporting Dropped Dropped Dropped 6.1903e+09 Dropped Dropped 
        (4.8048e+09)     
n   32 32 32 33 
T   3--5 3--5 3--5 3--5 
N 137 137 137 137 137 143 
Adjusted R2 0.55863 0.5568 0.10325 0.084308 0.41352 0.46649 
F-statistic 
F(8,128)=23.7919, 
p-value: < 2.22e-16 
F(6,130)=30.7674, 
















Table 2.56 Followers TR CSR Subindices Estimation Results 
Dependent Variable: lnTotalRevenue       
 
Followers TR PLS IV Est. 
(2a) 
Followers TR One-way Within IV Est. 
(2b) 
Followers TR Between IV Est. 
(2c) 
 I II I II I II 
Variables Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate 
(Intercept) 19.672060 36.874040***   20.992316** 23.003642* 
 (12.777441) (4.205294)   (6.501775) (9.782792) 
lnAsset1 0.426088 -0.496006** 1.537822 0.83339* 0.038035 -0.059971 
 (0.558588) (0.165249) (1.026376) (0.38135) (0.298126) (0.441467) 
CSRManagment Dropped Dropped Dropped  Dropped 
       
LCSRManagment_R 0.087764 Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped 0.133047 
 (0.055977)     (0.072448) 
MarketCSR -0.254732** Dropped -0.804116***  Dropped 
 (0.080155)  (0.202626)    
LMarketCSR_R -0.261578* 0.103142*** -0.085350 Dropped Dropped Dropped 
 (0.125021) (0.028926) (0.050316)    
SocialCSR 0.202138*** Dropped 0.186172***  Dropped 
 (0.043411)  (0.035235)    
LSocialCSR 0.262454*** 0.138986*** 0.145908* Dropped 0.089307* Dropped 
 (0.069656) (0.034909) (0.059473)  (0.040277)  
LSocialCSR_R Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped 
       
EnvironmentalCSR Dropped Dropped Dropped   
       
LEnvironmentalCSR Dropped Dropped -0.206238 Dropped  
   (0.111963)    
LEnvironmentalCSR_R 0.359870** Dropped 0.077144 Dropped  
 (0.117829)  (0.067347)    
LReporting -18.671658*** -10.055479*** 1.097698 0.73135 Dropped Dropped 
  (4.041760) (1.838460) (0.847514) (0.60415)     
n 32 32 32 32 32 32 
T 3--5 3--5 2--4 2--4 3--5 3--5 
N 137 137 107 107 137 137 
Adjusted R2 0.61499 0.5219 0.24989 0.092317 0.32323 0.21095 
F-statistic 
F(8,128)=30.8151, 
p-value: < 2.22e-16 
F(4,132)=39.0004, 


















Table 2.57 Followers ROA CSR Subindices Estimation Results 
Dependent Variable: ROA         
 
Followers ROA PLS IV Est. 
(3a) 
Followers ROA One-way Within IV 
Est. 
(3b) 
Followers ROA Between IV Est. 
(3c) 
 I II I II I II 
Variables Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate 
(Intercept) -0.5998554** -0.6409869**   0.1732338 0.1732338 
 (0.1960573) (0.1932338)   (0.1283617) (0.1283617) 
lnAsset1 0.0277882** 0.0310443*** 0.2242939** 0.1442122* -0.0057768 -0.0057768 
 (0.0089747) (0.0085543) (0.0674962) (0.0613797) (0.0050700) (0.0050700) 
CSRManagment Dropped  0.0052717  Dropped 
   (0.0031209) 
 
  
LCSRManagment_R Dropped Dropped 0.0072159 0.0070128 Dropped Dropped 
   (0.0044495) (0.0047225)   
MarketCSR 0.0018978  Dropped  Dropped 
 (0.0016053)  
  
  
LMarketCSR_R 0.0044140* 0.0045958* -0.0068767 Dropped Dropped Dropped 
 (0.0018491) (0.0018454) (0.0039414) 
 
  
SocialCSR Dropped  0.0099298  Dropped 
   (0.0062743) 
 
  
LSocialCSR Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped 
   
  
  
LSocialCSR_R Dropped Dropped 0.0087307** Dropped  
   (0.0031545) 
 
  
EnvironmentalCSR Dropped  -0.0196092***   
   (0.0051836) 
 
  
LEnvironmentalCSR -0.0114093*** -0.0101283*** Dropped Dropped  
 (0.0030438) (0.0028487) 
  
  
LEnvironmentalCSR_R Dropped Dropped -0.0095767** -0.0051440***  
   (0.0033256) (0.0014154)   
LReporting Dropped Dropped -0.1951663 -0.2322757 Dropped Dropped 
      (0.1166872) (0.1249209)     
n   32 32 33 33 
T   2--4 2--4 3--6 3--6 
N 137 137 107 107 191 191 

























Table 2.58 Followers TC CSR Subindices Estimation Results 
Dependent Variable: lnTotalOperatingCost     
 
Followers TC PLS IV Est. 
(4a) 
Followers TC One-way Within IV Est. 
(4b) 
Followers TC Between IV Est. 
(4c) 
 I II I II I II 
Variables Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate 
(Intercept) 55.7574788*** 43.326701***   38.20309* 26.591933** 
 (11.8567962) (3.655810)   (16.81300) (9.073433) 
lnAsset1 -1.0818000* -0.744116*** 2.212968 2.237830* -0.80715 -0.193944 
 (0.5012174) (0.143648) (1.546721) (0.987256) (0.80546) (0.413311) 
CSRManagment -0.0957859***  -0.072123  Dropped 
 (0.0270704)  (0.047495)    
LCSRManagment_R Dropped Dropped -0.122906 -0.113697 Dropped Dropped 
   (0.075517) (0.062042)   
MarketCSR -0.2044996**  -0.232354  0.18099 
 (0.0670687)  (0.192012)  (0.10388)  
LMarketCSR_R Dropped 0.124708*** Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped 
  (0.025737)     
SocialCSR 0.2184242***  0.161379  Dropped 
 (0.0489983)  (0.080615)    
LSocialCSR 0.1376438* 0.156253*** 0.205471 0.034887 Dropped 0.101618 
 (0.0547040) (0.030106) (0.122394) (0.033400)  (0.054179) 
LSocialCSR_R Dropped Dropped -0.119701 Dropped  
   (0.070645)    
EnvironmentalCSR 0.0144060  Dropped   
 (0.0077413)      
LEnvironmentalCSR 0.2632187* Dropped -0.334702 -0.059904  
 (0.1121355)  (0.175812) (0.050812)   
LEnvironmentalCSR_R 0.1717029*** Dropped 0.192797 Dropped  
 (0.0346405)  (0.098657)    
LReporting -21.7087505*** -12.035727*** 4.851991* 4.671225* Dropped Dropped 
  (3.5260304) (1.738347) (2.079442) (2.031273)     
n   27 27 28 27 
T   1--4 1--4 3--6 2--5 
N 111 111 85 85 142 111 
Adjusted R2 0.63729 0.57314 0.20275 0.15054 0.19819 0.2409 
F-statistic 
F(9,101)=26.2336, 
p-value: < 2.22e-16 
F(4,106)=39.7788, 


















Table 2.59 The Uncommitted Net Profit CSR Subindices Estimation Results 
Dependent Variable: Net Profit         
 
Indifferentist NP PLS IV Est. 
(1a) 
The Uncommitted NP One-way Within 
IV Est. 
(1b) 
The Uncommitted NP Between 
IV Est. 
(1c) 
 I II I II I II 
Variables Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate 
(Intercept) 1.1741e+09 3.0109e+09***   1.8853e+09 1.8853e+09 
 (1.2047e+09) (7.3169e+08)   (1.1688e+09) (1.1688e+09) 
Asset1 5.4871e-02*** 2.9476e-02*** -2.6683e-02** -2.7720e-02** 4.2805e-02* 4.2805e-02* 
 (1.2967e-02) (5.5405e-03) (8.8769e-03) (8.8628e-03) (1.5619e-02) (1.5619e-02) 
CSRManagment -4.8426e+08*  -8.6992e+07  Dropped 
 (2.2152e+08)  (6.9951e+07)    
LCSRManagment Dropped Dropped -1.9573e+08 -1.4884e+08 -3.7388e+08 -3.7388e+08 
   (1.0011e+08) (9.3002e+07) (2.2274e+08) (2.2274e+08) 
MarketCSR      
       
LMarketCSR      
       
SocialCSR 3.5962e+08     
 (1.8812e+08)      
LSocialCSR -2.6097e+08** -2.8349e+08***    
 (9.1980e+07) (8.0965e+07)     
EnvironmentalCSR      
       
LEnvironmentalCSR      
       
LReporting      
              
n   31 31 31 31 
T   3--5 3--5 3--5 3--5 
N 129 129 129 129 129 129 





















Notes: Since we could not identify proper IV’s for MarketCSR, LMarketCSR, EnvironmentalCSR, and LEnvironmentalCSR for all types of models for The Uncommitted, we do not have estimation  







Table 2.60 The Uncommitted TR CSR Subindices Estimation Results 
Dependent Variable: lnTotalRevenue       
 
The Uncommitted PLS IV Est. 
(2a) 
The Uncommitted One-way Within IV 
Est. 
(2b) 
The Uncommitted Between IV 
Est. 
(2c) 
 I II I II I II 
Variables Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate 
(Intercept) 6.079757** 6.457742***   8.37452 8.37452 
 (1.856025) (1.687314)   (5.67762) (5.67762) 
lnAsset1 0.561821*** 0.668579*** 0.146864 0.146864 0.60458* 0.60458* 
 (0.079868) (0.073397) (0.171097) (0.171097) (0.25484) (0.25484) 
CSRManagment Dropped  Dropped  Dropped 
       
LCSRManagment -0.213849** Dropped -0.088172 -0.088172 0.24937 0.24937 
 (0.079922)  (0.050962) (0.050962) (0.14973) (0.14973) 
MarketCSR      
       
LMarketCSR      
       
SocialCSR 0.363735***     
 (0.072359)      
LSocialCSR 0.207504*** 0.180303***    
 (0.055157) (0.036947)     
EnvironmentalCSR      
       
LEnvironmentalCSR      
       
LReporting      
              
n   31 31 31 31 
T   3--5 3--5 3--5 3--5 
N 129 129 129 129 129 129 



























Table 2.61 The Uncommitted ROA CSR Subindices Estimation Results 
Dependent Variable: ROA         
 
The Uncommitted&Pussyfooters ROA 
PLS IV Est. 
(3a) 
The Uncommitted&Pussyfooters ROA 
One-way Within IV Est. 
(3b) 
The Uncommitted&Pussyfooters 
ROA Between IV Est. 
(3c) 
 I I.2 I I.2 I I.2 
Variables Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate 
(Intercept) 0.2255904 0.3080334*   0.0232554 -0.13242 
 (0.1575480) (0.1370278)   (0.1889811) (0.3191339) 
lnAsset1 -0.0111003 -0.0091833 -0.1112309*** -0.1115029*** 0.0012305 0.009479 
 (0.0068719) (0.0059606) (0.0107521) (0.0107699) (0.0079832) (0.0143241) 
CSRManagment -0.0118074  -0.0028116  Dropped 
 (0.0083220)  (0.0024074)    
LCSRManagment Dropped Dropped -0.0061567 -0.0046579 Dropped -0.0079733 
   (0.0034494) (0.0032079)  (0.0084160) 
MarketCSR      
       
LMarketCSR      
       
SocialCSR 0.0192384     
 (0.0136636)      
LSocialCSR -0.0040690 -0.0040570    
 (0.0034194) (0.0030005)     
EnvironmentalCSR      
       
LEnvironmentalCSR      
       
LReporting      
              
n   31 31 31 31 
T   3--5 3--5 3--6 3--5 
N 129 129 129 129 177 129 
























Table 2.62 The Uncommitted TC CSR Subindices Estimations Results 
Dependent Variable: lnTotalOperatingCost     
 
The Uncommitted TC PLS IV Est. 
(4a) 
The Uncommitted TC One-way Within 
IV Est. 
(4b) 
The Uncommitted TC Between IV 
Est. 
(4c) 
 I I.2 I I.2 I I.2 
Variables Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate 
(Intercept) 5.544305* 5.000500*   5.82577 5.82577 
 (2.198774) (2.042495)   (5.89579) (5.89579) 
lnAsset1 0.520715*** 0.726141*** 0.15641 0.151284 0.71962* 0.71962* 
 (0.098667) (0.087584) (0.23606) (0.236996) (0.25473) (0.25473) 
CSRManagment -0.267740*  Dropped  Dropped 
 (0.110808)      
LCSRManagment Dropped Dropped Dropped -0.060758 0.21793 0.21793 
    (0.080882) (0.14003) (0.14003) 
MarketCSR      
       
LMarketCSR      
       
SocialCSR 0.645733***     
 (0.188658)      
LSocialCSR 0.111947* 0.192496***    
 (0.045660) (0.039816)     
EnvironmentalCSR      
       
LEnvironmentalCSR      
       
LReporting      
              
n   23 23 23 23 
T   2--5 2--5 2--5 2--5 
N 86 86 86 86 86 86 






















2.6 Limitations and Conclusions 
In this paper, we did a first empirical study of CSR performance, CSR reporting and 
financial performance based on panel data of top firms from China right after CSR 
regulation to present (from year 2007 to year 2013).  
We found that both current year CSR performance and lagged CSR performance have 
impacts on firms’ financial performance. And we found that the impacts of lagged 
unreported CSR performance are different from lagged reported CSR performance on net 
profit, total revenue (TR), ROA, and total operating cost (TC). We also found that the 
impacts of lagged reported CSR performance in the short run are different from impacts in 
the long run. In the short run, the impacts of lagged reported CSR performance on 
profitability tend to be negative. However, in the long run, the impacts of lagged reported 
CSR performance on profitability tend to be positive. These findings are very likely 
suggesting a signaling effect of lagged reported CSR performance to firms who report their 
CSR performance and the signaling effect may take time to happen. In another word, it 
requires firms to keep publishing their CSR performance reports for a while to get the 
signaling effect benefit. And in the long run, better lagged CSR performance tends to 
increase TC. 
Particularly, we found a conditional impact pattern of lagged reported CSR performance 
on net profit, TR and TC by pooled OLS IV estimations. The conditional impact pattern is 
that when lagged reported CSR performance is beyond a critical level the impact of lagged 
reported CSR performance on profitability is positive, while when lagged reported CSR 
performance is below this critical level the impact of lagged reported CSR performance on 
profitability is negative. The critical level is around 30 pts based on a 100 pts CSR 
performance index from our empirical analysis. 
We differentiated firms into three types: Leaders, Followers, and The Uncommitted, 
based on their CSR reporting records and conduct partitioned regressions for each group. 
For Leaders, who initiated CSR reporting before or since 2008 and keep publishing CSR 
reports every year, we found a positive signaling effect of lagged CSR performance in the 
long run although better lagged CSR performance will also result in higher TC in the long 
run. Overall, better lagged CSR performance may increase the net profit for Leaders in the 
long run while reduce the net profit in the short run. For Followers, who initiated CSR 
reporting after 2008 and keep publishing CSR reports every year, we found a conditional 





full sample regressions by pooled OLS IV estimations. And the critical level for Followers is 
around 50 pts based on a 100 pts CSR performance index. In the long run, we found a weak 
TR increasing effect, a net profit increasing effect and a weak TC increasing effect of better 
lagged reported CSR performance on Followers. For The Uncommitted who never publish 
CSR report or only publish CSR reports once or twice discontinuously between 2008 and 
2013, we found negative effect of lagged CSR performance on net profit, TR and ROA and 
we didn’t found significant effect of lagged CSR performance on TC. These results may 
suggest that although The Uncommitted almost never publish CSR reports and there seems 
no way for stakeholders to acquire direct information from The Uncommitted firms to 
determine their moral evaluation types, adverse selection by stakeholders may happen by 
judging from firms’ silence in no CSR reporting and third party evaluation of The 
Uncommitted firms’ CSR performance. 
In general, the results suggest that current year CSR performance tends to have a 
positive impact on firms’ profitability. This link may be ascribed to two explanations. First, 
it might be due to the construction of market CSR performance subindex itself which 
includes evaluating a firm’s net profit and total revenue. Second, it may be due to improved 
stakeholder relationship or production efficiency induced by some items in CSR 
management performance subindex and social CSR performance subindex. 
We further investigated the links between four aspects of CSR performance and firms’ 
financial performance. The estimation results suggest that the links between CSR 
subindces and financial performance are much more complicated than what we expected. 
The strength and the direction of the link may depend on a firm’s CSR reporting records 
type, how a firm practices CSR, and time horizon. Overall, social CSR performance has the 
most consistent positive effects on profitability among full sample and all types and also 
four CSR subindices. While lagged market CSR performance has larger impacts on full 
sample net profit and CSR management performance also has a positive effect on full 
sample TR. Besides, Leaders’ management CSR performance has stronger link with 
financial performance while Followers’ market CSR performance has stronger link with 
financial performance. The link between environmental CSR performance and financial 
performance is very limited and in general negative, considering that we were not able to 
include lagged environmental CSR performance variables in partitioned regressions for 
Leaders and The Uncommitted since we could not find proper IV’s for these variables for 





It is also needed to mention that there exist high correlations among CSR sub-indices 
variables (based on both Pearson product-moment correlation and variance inflation factor 
method) even if we’ve used IV for all of the CSR sub-indices variables. The VIF (variance 
inflation factor) rule of thumb is not helpful for us to decide which CSR sub-indices variable 
to drop since there is high Pearson product-moment correlation among all pair-wise CSR 
sub-indices variables. We choose to keep all CSR sub-indices variables since they are 
variables of interest and to avoid the bias caused by dropping variables. However, keeping 
all CSR sub-indices variables may cause a problem of larger variance to the estimates and 
some variables of interest may become insignificant.  
For future studies, there are three directions worth exploring.  
First, it would be interesting to study dynamic models on how the critical value of 
conditional impacts of lagged reported CSR performance evolves over the time, which may 
portray the evolution of signaling effects over the time, conditioning on overall CSR 
performance. The critical value may reflect the social expectation of the CSR performance 
level of a responsible firm. However, to study dynamic models, it requires more time 
periods which are beyond the capability of our current panel data set.  
Second, the function of CSR reports as valid signals lies heavily on the trustworthiness 
of CSR reports considering their self-publishing feature. In job market signaling model 
(Spence, 1972), a critical prerequisite is that education can truthfully reflect a worker’s 
ability as an authority-report. In CSR reports mechanism, a key condition is that CSR 
reports truthfully reflect CSR performance of a firm. Thus, the quality of CSR reports is 
crucial for it becomes trustable self-report signals. It would be worth to explore both 
theoretically and empirically how the quality of self-report signals would influence the 
equilibrium. Currently, limited quantitative measurement of CSR reports has been 
developed. It would be valuable to explore this issue when effective quantitative 
measurements of CSR reports are developed in future.  
Third, it would be helpful to further investigate in detail how firms practice each CSR 
sub-index aspect to help us understand firms’ CSR practice more deeply and make the 






Chapter 3  
An Evaluation of Effects of Global Corporate Social 




The energy security, the accelerating global warming and the continuing rise of world air 
pollution at an alarming rate have gained widely attention in recent years. It is estimated 
that global proved oil reserves in 2016 would only be sufficient to meet 50.6 years of global 
production at 2016 levels (BP, 2017). The year 2016 was the warmest on record in all major 
global surface temperature datasets since 1850, with Carbon dioxide (CO2) reached new 
highs in the atmosphere and global sea levels reached new record highs as well (WMO, 
2016). Globally, it is estimated that 92% of the world’s population reside in areas exceeding 
the World Health Organization’s (WHO) air quality guidelines (an annual mean of 10 
μg/m3) (G. Shaddick et al., 2018) and the global population-weighted annual average PM 
2.5 concentrations were 3-fold higher than WHO guideline (A. van Donkelaar et al, 2016), 
which dramatically increases the risk of heart disease, lung cancer and other chronic and 
acute respiratory diseases. 
Greenhouse gas emissions and air pollution are important both to policy makers and to 
the world sustainable development. However, as a new policy tool to address above 
sustainable development issues, no evaluation of the effectiveness of global CSR regulation 
has been done yet.  
In this chapter, I provide the first systematic evaluation of the impact of global CSR 
regulation on sustainable development, including the impact on energy intensity, CO2 
emissions, and PM2.5 pollution levels. I conducted my investigation by analyzing a global 
panel dataset of 25 countries between 2000 and 2014. To examine the impact of CSR on 
energy intensity, I followed Fisher-Vanden, Jefferson, Liu and Tao (2004) and used a 
reduced form model to investigate whether CSR regulation may urge firms to use energy 
more efficiently or prudently and further reduce a nation’s energy intensity. Since I use 
macro level time series data, panel unit root test and panel cointegration analysis are used 





started from Kaya identity (Yamaji, Matsuhashi, Nagata & Kaya, 1991), which gives an 
exact decomposition of CO2 emissions into four factors, and then focused on examining the 
impact of CSR regulation on the key factor of carbon intensity of energy by using panel 
cointegration analysis. To examine the impact of CSR regulation on PM2.5 pollution level, I 
used a dynamic panel model and adopted a recently developed econometric method, panel 
fully aggregated estimator (PFAE) by using X-differencing procedure proposed by Han, 
Phillips, and Sul (2014) which has strong asymptotic and finite sample performance 
characteristics that dominate other procedures such as bias corrected least squares 
(LSDVC), generalized method of moments (GMM), and system GMM methods.  
For energy intensity, I find that 3-year lag of the inventory of environmental CSR 
(CSR3) reporting policies has a significant positive impact on energy intensity. This might 
be due to the reason that all CSR reporting policies on pollution abatement and pollution 
control are classified into the category of environmental CSR policies. More environmental 
CSR policies on pollution control may have a significant effect on increasing the cost to 
producers to meet the requirements or expected standards in the short run. However, it is 
likely that the cost on pollution control or abatement may be balanced over a longer time 
period and the negative effect on firms’ energy efficiency may disappear in the long run.  
Besides, I also find that the environmental policy stringency index (EPS), R&D, and the 
relative price of aggregate energy price (AEPoP) have significant effects on reducing energy 
intensity. However, both EPS and AEPoP are estimated to first increase the energy 
intensity and then reduce the energy intensity. A detailed discussion on how to 
interpretation this composite impact pattern is provided.  
For impacts on CO2 emissions, the result suggests that there is no evidence that CSR 
policies have any significant impact on reducing CO2 emissions of a country. However, the 
result indicates that the renewable energy consumption rate, 6-year lag of EPS and 4-year 
lag of the number of CO2 emissions abatement technology patents have significant impacts 
on reducing carbon intensity of energy of a country.  
For impacts on PM2.5 pollution level, it is found that both the current period and 3-yer 
lag of inventory of general sustainability CRS reporting regulation policies (CSR1) have 
significant impacts on reducing PM2.5 pollution levels. The 95% C.I.’s of elasticity of annual 
mean PM2.5 exposure with respect to the inventory of current period CSR1 is [0.036%, 
0.166%]. And the 95% C.I.’s of elasticity of annual mean PM2.5 exposure with respect to the 





environmental CSR reporting regulation policies (CSR3) is also estimated to have a 
negative impact on PM2.5 pollution levels. The 95% C.I.’s of elasticity of annual mean PM2.5 
exposure with respect to the inventory of 3-year lag of CSR3 is [0.008%, 0.074%].  
Also, I found that EPS has a significant impact on reducing the PM2.5 pollution level. 
However, total CO2 emissions and the CO2 emissions from solid fuel combustion have 
significant impacts on increasing the PM2.5 pollution level. Particularly, an interesting 
result is obtained for the number of ISO14001 certificates (ISO14001). It is estimated that 
the level form of ISO14001 has a significant positive impact on PM2.5 while the first 
difference of ISO14001 has a significant negative impact on PM2.5. The positive correlation 
might reflect an inverse causality that the increasing number of ISO14001 certificates is 
driven by PM2.5 pollution level. Higher PM2.5 pollution level may cause more public concern 
on air quality which may provide firms more incentives to seek ISO14001 certificates to 
stand out in the market. Since the monitoring system of ISO 14001 certificates is based on 
a five-year review, due to the moral hazard problem, it seems that only firms which newly 
obtain ISO14001 certificates bring a significant impact on reducing PM2.5 pollution level. 
In section 3.2, a brief review on CSR regulation and sustainable development will be 
provided. In section 3.3, section 3.4, section 3.5 and section 3.6, the literature review, 
methodology, the data description, and results for energy intensity, CO2 emissions, and 
PM2.5 pollution level are provided in each section separately. In section 3.7, conclusions and 
policy implication are drawn. 
3.2 CSR Reporting Regulation and Sustainable Development 
The sustainable development is the primary goal of CSR reporting regulation. Up to 
2015, 73.22% of global CSR reporting regulation instruments are related with firms’ 
environmental CSR performance and 38.25% are related with general sustainability 
(Carrots&Sticks, 2016). In G4 Sustainability Reporting Guidelines (GRI, 2015), which has 
been mentioned, recommended, or required by 40 countries and regions’ governments in 
their total 70 CSR reporting regulation instruments (GRI referred in policy &regulation, 
GRI), sustainability is suggested to be the central framework of a firm’s CSR report. The 
impacts on inputs (such as energy) and outputs (such as emissions) are suggested to be 
indicators of a firm’s environmental sustainability performance in G4 Sustainability 





consumption within and outside the organization, energy intensity, reduction on energy 
consumption, reduction on energy requirements of products and services, direct GHG 
emissions, energy indirect GHG emissions9, GHG emissions intensity, reduction of GHG 
emissions, NOX, SOX, and other significant air emissions including particulate matter (PM) 
are included in G4.  
3.3 Energy Intensity  
3.3.1 Literature review on empirical analysis of energy intensity 
The energy intensity is one of the commonly used ways to measure the energy efficiency 
of a nation’s economy. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), “Energy 
efficiency is a way of managing and restraining the growth in energy consumption. 
Something is more energy efficient if it delivers more services for the same energy input, or 
the services for less energy input (IEA, 2011)”. Thus, the energy intensity is calculated as 
units of energy used per unit of GDP.  
The commonly used approach in empirical analysis of energy intensity is the index 
decomposition analysis (IDA), a technique which has been increasing used since the late 
1970s. It was not long after the 1973/1974 world oil crisis that energy researchers began to 
look for ways to quantify the impact of structural shift in industry production on total 
energy demand to have a better understanding of the change in energy usage. They 
developed simple decomposition techniques to separate the impact associated with 
industrial activity composition, i.e. structural effect, and the impact associated with 
changes in sectoral energy intensity, i.e. intensity effect (Ang & Zhang, 2000).  
Specifically, the IDA on aggregate energy intensity is as follows. Assume that the 
aggregate energy consumption is the sum of consumption in m sectors. Define the following 
variables for year t: 
𝐸𝑡 =Total industrial energy consumption 
𝐸𝑖,𝑡 =Energy consumption in industrial sector i  
𝑌𝑡 =Total industrial production 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 =Production of industrial sector i 
𝑆𝑖,𝑡 =Production share of sector i (=𝑌𝑖,𝑡/𝑌𝑡) 
                                                          
9 Energy indirect emissions are emissions from the generation of purchased electricity, heating, 





𝐼𝑡 =Aggregate energy intensity (=𝐸𝑡/𝑌𝑡) 
𝐼𝑖,𝑡 =Energy intensity of sector i (=𝐸𝑖,𝑡/𝑌𝑖,𝑡) 








= 𝐷𝑠𝑡𝑟𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑡   (multiplicative decomposition) 
∆𝐼𝑡𝑜𝑡 = 𝐼𝑇 − 𝐼0 = ∆𝐼𝑠𝑡𝑟 + ∆𝐼𝑖𝑛𝑡 (additive decomposition) 
To proceed, there are two basic decomposition schemes: Laspeyres index method and 
Divisia index method. The Laspeyres index method follows the method of Laspeyres price 
and quantity indices. It isolates the impact of a variable through letting this specific 
variable change while holding other variables at their base year values. The formulae of 







𝐷𝑟𝑠𝑑 = 𝐷𝑡𝑜𝑡/(𝐷𝑠𝑡𝑟𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑡) 
where residual term 𝐷𝑟𝑠𝑑 denotes the part of 𝐷𝑡𝑜𝑡which is left unexplained. Similarly, the 











∆𝐼𝑟𝑠𝑑 = ∆𝐼𝑡𝑜𝑡 − ∆𝐼𝑠𝑡𝑟 − ∆𝐼𝑖𝑛𝑡 
The Divisia index method is an integral-based index introduced by Divisia (Divisia, 1925). 









To acquire the multiplicative decomposition, dividing both sides of the equation above by 𝐼𝑡 






















Let 𝜔𝑖 = 𝐸𝑖,𝑡/𝐸𝑡 , then the multiplicative decomposition can be expressed as (Ang & Zhang, 
2000):  












The additive decomposition of Divisa index method integrates 𝐼𝑖,𝑡
′  and can be expressed as 













where 𝜏𝑖 = 𝐸𝑖,𝑡/𝑌𝑡. In empirical studies, there are different ways to approximate the weight 
function 𝜔𝑖 and 𝜏𝑖 by using discrete data. The arithmetic mean Divisia index method simply 
takes the average of the base year weight and the end year weight to approximate, e.g. 𝜔𝑖 =
(𝜔𝑖,0 +𝜔𝑖,𝑇)/2 (Ang & Zhang, 2000). While adaptive weighting Divisia index method allows 
the weight 𝜔𝑖 and 𝜏𝑖 to change from year to year as output and energy consumption change 
(Greening, Davis, Schipper, & Khurshch, 1997). And there are other weight approximation 
methods as well. In practice, the arithmetic mean Divisia index with a rolling base year has 
been applied to the United States (Department of Energy, 1995).  
Since the late 1970s, the IDA has been extensively used in energy and energy-related 
environmental analysis and different decomposition methods have been developed 
continuously. By 2000, a survey of IDA in energy and environmental studies (Ang & Zhang, 
2000) documented 124 studies which used IDA. By 2015, there are more than 500 archival 
journal articles (in English) on IDA (Ang, 2016). An early work by Greening, Davis, 
Schipper, & Khurshch (1997) compared six different decomposition methods of aggregate 
energy intensity. They found that the adaptive weighting Divisia index method, in either a 
fixed year or a rolling year specification, is most robust, exhibiting the smallest residual 
term with the leas variation. Figure 3.1 summarizes a general framework of IDA.  





Figure 3.1 A General Framework of IDA Methods 
 
 
Although the IDA methods have the merit of decomposing the aggregate energy 
intensity into the structural effect and the intensity effect, it has the limitation to further 
link the factors which might have impacts on energy consumption with energy intensity. 
Recently, some empirical studies began to introduce econometric analysis into the empirical 
energy intensity analysis. Fisher-Vanden, Jefferson, Liu & Tao (2004) used a reduced form 
model from cost minimization and explained successfully why the energy intensity in China 
has fallen almost continuously since the onset of economic reform in the late 1970s. They 
found that rising relative energy prices, R&D expenditures, and the ownership reform in 
the enterprise sector, as well as shifts in China’s industrial structure, are principle drivers 
of China’s declining energy intensity. The merit of their method is that they provide a clear 
theoretical foundation for what efficiency determinants should be included in the empirical 
analysis and their results are consistent with the theoretic prediction. In addition, their 
method is flexible which allows incorporating new factors, such as CSR reporting 
regulation, in examining the associated factors on energy intensity. Metcalf (2008) 
regressed the energy intensity, which was measured by the ratio of total energy 
consumption to personal income10, on a set of economic and weather variables to analyze 
the determinants of the energy intensity of 48 U.S. states between 1970 and 2001. He found 
that rising per capita income and higher energy prices have important roles in lowering 
energy intensity.   
                                                          













The empirical model on energy intensity is derived following Fisher-Vanden, Jefferson, 
Liu & Tao (2004). To examine the impact of CSR reporting regulation on energy intensity, I 
assume that a firm may use the energy more efficiently or prudently due to the CSR 
reporting regulation. This impact is equivalent to “increase” the price of energy input. To 
avoid the endogeneity problem, I’ve also included factors of instruments of environmental 
policy related with energy and environmental policy stringency. The impact of these 
environmental policies can be viewed as explicit or implicit changes to the energy price. 
Thus, I assume a Cobb-Douglas cost function derived from cost minimization as: 
 







where Q is the quantity of output, 𝑃𝐾is the price of capital input, 𝑃𝐿is the price of labor 
input, 𝑃𝐸 is the aggregate energy price, CSR is the number of the inventory of general 
sustainability or environmental CSR reporting regulation instruments, EPS is the 
environmental policy stringency index, 𝑃𝑀is the price of materials input, 𝛼𝑥is the elasticity 
of cost with respect to input price X (X=K, L, E, M) and ∑ 𝛼𝑥 = 1𝑥 , A is the total productivity 
factor (TPF), and 𝜌 is a constant which only contains 𝛼𝑥. The environmental policy index 
(EPS) is a composite policy index developed by OECD. It is by far the first internationally 
comparable measures of the stringency of environmental policies over a relatively long time 
horizon. EPS is defined by explicit or implicit, cost of polluting or environmentally harmful 
behavior (Botta and Koźluk, 2014), which is measured by evaluated stringency scores of 
both market-based policies, including taxes, trading schemes, feed in tariff for wind and 
solar, deposit & refund scheme, and non-market policies, including emissions limit 
standards and R&D subsidies on renewable energy. The structure of EPS indicator is 
shown in Figure. The details of the construction of EPS indicator can be referred to Figure 





Figure 3.2 Structure of economy-wide indicator: environmental policy stringency index (EPS) 
 
Source: Figure 4 in Botta and Koźluk (2014).  
 
In fact, this cost function could be derived from cost minimization with a Cobb-Douglas 
production function Q = A𝐾𝛼𝐾𝐿𝛼𝐿𝐸𝛼𝐸𝑀𝛼𝑀 and a linear cost structure of C = 𝑃𝐾𝐾 + 𝑃𝐿𝐿 +
?̃?𝐸𝐸 + 𝑃𝑀𝑀, where ?̃?𝐸 = 𝐶𝑆𝑅
𝛾1𝐸𝑃𝑆𝛾2𝑃𝐸 is the composite energy price which has taken policy 
factors into consideration. According to a recent comprehensive literature review of 
economy-level determinants of TPF by Isaksson (2007), creation of knowledge proxied by 
R&D is identified as the most important determinant of an economy’s TPF. Albrizio et al. 
(2014) study the effects of environmental policy stringency on productivity growth for 19 
OECD countries over the 1990-2010 period by using EPS as a proxy. They find that one 
year ahead of EPS change has a negative on productivity growth while 2-year lag and 3-
year lag of EPS changes have a positive effect on productivity growth. Therefore, for the 
baseline model, A is specified as 
 










By Shephard’s Lemma, the factor demanded for an input is equal to the derivative of the 






























By substituting for A specified before and taking the log for both sides, we have the 












+ 𝛽2𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽3𝑘𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡−𝑘
𝑗
𝑘=−1
+ 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑇𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡  
(7) 
where 𝛼𝑖 is the fixed individual effect, 𝛾𝑖𝑡  is an individual specific time trend, 𝑇𝑡 is the 
common time dummy which captures the common time shock, 𝑖𝑡 is the error term. Since 
CSR policies may have lead and lag effects as EPS as well, we extend the reduced model to 

















+ 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑇𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡  
                                                                                          (8)                                                                                      
Due to the relative short time length we have in the panel data, we limit the max lag 





hereafter.   
3.3.3 Data 
 The data of energy intensity of primary energy, R&D, and GDP is collected from World 
Bank. I also refer to 2016 Global R&D Funding Forecast (R&D Magazine, Winter 2016) for 





The CSR reporting regulation data is collected from Carrots&Sticks website.  
The environmental policy stringency index (EPS) data is also collected from OECD.Stat. 
For some countries, EPS data is missing for 2013 and 2014. I use the EPS value in 2012 as 
estimated value of EPS in 2013 and 2014 for these countries.  
The aggregate energy price is constructed by using total producer energy prices index by 
country from OECD.Stat, real energy prices by country including heavy fuel oil prices for 
industry, natural gas prices for industry, and steam coal prices for industry from Key World 
Energy Statistics (IEA, 2003, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014) and 
Zambia Data Portal hosted by Zambia Central Statistical Office, and the energy 
consumption amount by country from BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2017 
underpinning data (BP, 2017). First, for each country, I calculate the weighted sum of oil 
prices, gas prices and coal prices weighting by the consumption amount for a certain year. 
Second, I use total producer energy prices index to recover aggregate energy prices over 
2000-2014 in 2010 US $. The motivation of doing such recovery is out of the consideration 
that the producer energy prices index might be a more accurate reflection of the aggregate 
energy price faced by producers than a weighted sum of energy prices. For countries whose 
total producer energy prices index is not available, I use weighted sum of energy prices for 
all years. For countries whose real energy prices are not available, I use energy market 
prices from which a country mostly imports from. The energy market prices are also from 
BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2017 underpinning data (BP, 2017). In a rare case of 
China, the real energy prices are taken from China Energy Databook version 9.0 from 
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory Energy Analysis & Environmental Impacts 
Division China Energy Group.  
The output price 𝑃𝑄 is approximated by price level of real consumption of households and 
the government at current PPPs (in mil. 2011US$) from Penn World Table 9.0.  
The descriptive statistics are provided in Table 3.1. The descriptive graphs of energy 
intensity in logarithm of countries in the sample are provided in Figure 3.3. Most countries 









Table 3.1 Descriptive statistics of variables in the panel data set 
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max 
(E/Q) 5.07 1.60 2.39 10.36 
RDE 3.93e+12 8.12e+12 2.30e+10 4.46e+13 
AEPoP 413.66 210.02 81.36 1049.78 
CSR1 0.74 1.19 0 7 
CSR3 1.93 2.37 0 12 
EPS 2.24 0.83 0.52 4.13 
Note:  
1. All variables in the level forms. 
2. The aggregate energy price is a weighted average of prices of heavy fuel oil ($/tonne), natural gas for 
industry ($/10^7kcal GCV), and steam coal for industry ($/tonne) in 2010 US$. Thus, AEPoP is not a 
percentage. 
 






























































































































































































After matching the data, a panel data set of 25 most developed countries and main 
developing countries over 2000 to 2014 is formed. The list of 25 countries in the sample is 
provided in Table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2 The list of 25 countries in the sample 
Austria Finland India Poland Sweden 
Belgium France Ireland Portugal Switzerland 
China Germany Italy Slovakia Turkey 
Czech Republic Greece Japan South Korea United Kingdom 
Denmark Hungary Netherlands Spain U.S.A. 
 
Since we are using macro time series data, we conduct panel unit root tests first to check 
whether series are stationary or not before we estimate the model.  
 
3.3.4.1 Panel Unit Root Tests 
Theoretically, panel unit root tests are extensions of unit root tests on a single series to 
multiple series in panel data. However, there are important differences. Depending on what 
assumptions are made on the autoregressive coefficients, panel unit root tests can be 
classified into two categories. Consider a following AR(1) process for panel data: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌𝑖𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (9) 
 
where 𝑖 = 1, 2, … ,𝑁 denotes the cross-section units; 𝑡 = 1, 2, … , 𝑇 denotes time periods; 𝑋𝑖𝑡 are 
exogeneous variables in the model which may include fixed effects or individual trends; 𝜌𝑖 
are autoregressive coefficients and 𝜖𝑖𝑡 are assumed to be mutually independent 
idiosyncratic disturbances. If |𝜌𝑖| < 1, 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is considered to be weakly stationary. If |𝜌𝑖| = 1, 
then 𝑦𝑖𝑡 will contain a persistent trend which is non-stationary and is said to have a unit 
root.  
In the literature, there are two different assumptions on 𝜌𝑖. One assumption assumes 
that 𝜌𝑖 = 𝜌 for all 𝑖. In another word, it assumes that multiple series in the panel data are 





t-ratio based tests including Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) and Breitung (2000), and residual 
based test like Hadri (2000). The feature of these tests is that they pool the cross-section 
units data together and calculate one test statistic based on the pooled data. The other 
assumption assumes allows 𝜌𝑖 to vary across cross-section units. In another word, it allows 
that multiple series in the panel data are heterogenous and follow different autoregressive 
processes. Under this assumption, there are t-ratio based test like Im, Pesaran, and Shin 
(2003), and p-values based tests like Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi (2001). The feature 
of these tests is that they first calculate an individual test statistic for each cross-section 
unit separately and then use the average statistic or the distribution function of individual 
statistics to conduct the panel unit root test. 
In our case, since different countries are at different economic development stages and 
have different institutions and economic environment which may moderate the value of the 
autoregressive coefficient, it is more natural to assume that 𝜌𝑖 to vary across cross-section 
units. Therefore, we select Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) t-ratio based test, to conduct the 
panel unit root test. We first explore the descriptive graphs of each series to see whether 
there is an apparent trend. The graphs are listed in the Appendix B.1. There are apparent 
trends in energy intensity, R&D, CSR1, CSR3, and EPS for most countries in the panel. No 
apparent trend is found for AEPoP. The IPS (2003) unit root tests are done by using 
EViews 10. The results are reported in Table 3.3. The results indicate that we fail to reject 
the H0: All of the series are I(1), i.e. 𝜌𝑖 = 1⁡∀𝑖, for energy intensity, CSR1 and CSR3 without 
trend. Although H0 for EPS is rejected at significant level of 5%, by further checking the 
individual ADF test results for each country, only 4 countries (Finland, Hungary, South 
Korea, and Sweden) reject the hypothesis that 𝜌𝑖 = 1⁡at the significant level of 5%. In 
another word, all other 21 countries fail to reject the hypothesis that 𝜌𝑖 = 1 in individual 
ADF tests. Thus, we still take EPS without trend as I(1). For R&D, we also further checked 
the individual ADF test results for each country. The individual ADF test results show that 
only 3 countries (Germany, Hungary, and Spain) reject the hypothesis that 𝜌𝑖 = 1⁡at the 
significant level of 5%. Therefore, we take R&D without trend as I(1). Similarly, for 25 
series of AEPoP in the panel, we only find 3 countries (Germany, Italy, and Netherlands) 
reject the hypothesis that 𝜌𝑖 = 1⁡at the significant level of 5%. Thus, we take AEPoP 





In the situation with the trend, for energy intensity, the individual ADF test results 
show that one country (Belgium) rejects the hypothesis that 𝜌𝑖 = 1⁡at the significant level of 
5% and 4 countries (Belgium, Germany, Poland and UK) reject the hypothesis that 𝜌𝑖 = 1⁡at 
the significant level of 10%. For CSR3, the individual ADF test results show that two 
countries (Denmark and Italy) rejects the hypothesis that 𝜌𝑖 = 1⁡at the significant level of 
5%. For AEPoP with trend, 3 countries (Ireland, Netherlands, and South Korea) rejects the 
hypothesis that 𝜌𝑖 = 1⁡at the significant level of 5% in the individual ADF tests. Since the 
evidence to reject I(0) is quite weak, we still take energy intensity, CSR3 and AEPoP with 
trend as I(1).  
The first differences of all series without trend reject H0 at the significant level of 1%. 
Thus, all series are stationary in the first differences form.  
 
Table 3.3 IPS (2003) Panel unit root tests for 25 countries, 2000-2014. 
Variables IPS(2003)   
 H0: All of the series are I(1) 
 H1: At least one of the series is I(0) 
  Without Trend With Trend 
ln(E/Q) 5.872 (0-2) -2.383 (0-2)** 
ln(E/Q) -11.094 (0-1)*** -8.797 (0-1)*** 
lnRDE -2.919 (0-2)** 2.609 (0-2) 
lnRDE -7.659 (0-1)*** -8.794 (0-1)*** 
lnCSR1 3.295(0-2) 0.909(0-1) 
lnCSR1 9.023(0-1)*** 6.949(0-1)*** 
lnCSR3 2.012(0-2) -1.317(0-2) 
lnCSR3 10.546(0-2)*** 8.106(0-1)*** 
lnAEPoP -2.316 (0-2)* -1.378 (0-2) 
lnAEPoP -10.668 (0-2)*** -8.316 (0-1)*** 
lnEPS -1.984 (0-2)* -0.118 (0-2) 
lnEPS -12.440 (0-2)*** -10.880 (0-1)*** 
 
Notes:  
1. “***”, significant at 0.001; “**”, significant at 0.01; “*”, significant at 0.05; “” significant at 0.1.  
2. The automatic lag length selection based on SIC is specified in the parentheses. 
3. The panel unit root tests for lnCSR1 (with or without trend) and lnCSR1 (without trend) are based on 
14 cross-section units’ time series. 11 countries are dropped because CSR1 is zero or constant in all periods, or 
zero in the first 12-14 periods: Belgium, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Poland, Slovakia, South 
Korea, Switzerland, Turkey and U.S.A. The panel unit root test for lnCSR1 with trend is based on 15 cross-





Table 3.3 (cont.) 
4. The panel unit root tests for lnCSR3 (with or without trend) and lnCSR3 (without trend) are based on 
18 cross-section units’ time series. 7 countries are dropped because CSR3 is zero or constant in all periods, or 
zero in the first 12 periods: Belgium, Czech Republic, Hungary, Ireland, Poland, Slovakia, and Switzerland. The 
panel unit root test for lnCSR3 with trend is based on 19 cross-section units, including Ireland. 
 
3.3.4.2 Panel Cointegration Tests 
Since all of variables are I(1), there is a pitfall of spurious regression as pointed out in 
Granger and Newbold (1974) if we estimate level model directly. A common approach used 
is taking first differences of variables to adjust I(1) series into I(0) to estimate the model. 
However, we have only 15 periods data in our panel, which is short for time series 
analysis based on first differences. Another difficulty in using differenced data is when the 
explanatory variables do not vary much over time. In this situation, we miss too much 
information by using differenced data. After Engle and Granger (1987) gave a formal 
treatment of cointegration, cointegration models using variables in level form becomes more 
common. The idea is that: if 𝑦𝑡 is an I(1) series and 𝒙𝑡 is an I(1) vector in which all elements 
are I(1) series, and there exists a vector 𝛂, such that 𝑦𝑡 − 𝜶𝒙𝑡 is an I(0) process, then 𝑦𝑡 and 
𝒙𝑡 are said to be cointegrated with cointegration vector (1, 𝛂). In another word, the vector 
(1, 𝛂) depicts the long run equilibrium relationship between 𝑦𝑡 and 𝒙𝑡. And an advantage of 
using cointegration estimation procedure is that we do not need to specify dynamics until 
the vector error correction model (VECM) has been estimated (Engle and Granger, 1987, 
p.260).  
Following the procedure developed by Engle and Granger (1987), we begin with testing 
and estimating a panel cointegration model as follows: 






= 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑙𝑛RDE𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑖𝑙𝑛CSR𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑖𝑙𝑛EPS𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑖𝑙𝑛AEPoP𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (10)       
 
where 𝑖 = 1, 2, … ,𝑁 denotes the cross-section units; 𝑡 = 1, 2, … , 𝑇 denotes time periods; 𝛽1𝑖 to 
𝛽4𝑖 denotes the cointegrating coefficients that may vary across panels; 𝛼𝑖𝑡 is the country-
specific fixed effect; 𝛾𝑖 is the country-specific linear time trend; 𝜖𝑖𝑡 is the error term; 𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 
represents either 𝐶𝑆𝑅1𝑖𝑡 or 𝐶𝑆𝑅3𝑖𝑡. Due to the same reason above, we assume heterogeneous 











is cointegrated with the other four I(1) series 𝑙𝑛RDE𝑖𝑡, 𝑙𝑛CSR𝑖𝑡, 𝑙𝑛EPS𝑖𝑡, and 𝑙𝑛AEPoP𝑖𝑡, 
it is justified to estimate the cointegration model (10) by using level form variables. 
In general, to test the null hypothesis of no cointegration, Pedroni (1999, 2004) will first 
fit the model (11) by using OLS and obtain the estimated residual: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽i𝑿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖𝒁𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (11) 
 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is an I(1) process, 𝑿𝑖𝑡 is an I(1) vector, 𝒁𝑖𝑡 contains panel-specific means (fixed 
effect), panel-specific time trends or nothing. Then, the unit root test is conducted by fitting 
the DF regression model of estimated residuals ?̂?𝑖𝑡 for 𝜖𝑖𝑡 as follows: 
 
?̂?𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌𝑖?̂?𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 (12) 
 
where 𝜌𝑖 is the AR parameter and 𝑣𝑖𝑡 is the error term.  
Pedroni (1999, 2004) derives seven residual-based panel cointegration test statistics 
which allow panel-specific cointegration vectors as we specified above. Among them, four 
test statistics (within dimension approach) assume the same-AR for residuals: panel v-
statistic, panel 𝜌-statistic (panel modified PP t-statistic), panel PP t-statistic (panel non-
parametric t-statistic), panel ADF t-statistic. The other three test statistics (between 
dimension approach) assume panel-specific-AR for residuals: group 𝜌-statistic (group 
modified PP t-statistic), group PP t-statistic (panel non-parametric t-statistic), group ADF t-
statistic. The panel v-statistic is constructed as a ratio of variances. The numerator is the 
size of the residual variance from the cointegrating regression of 𝑦𝑖𝑡 on 𝑿𝑖𝑡. The 
denominator is the size of the conditional variance based on the projection of ∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 onto ∆𝑿𝑖𝑡. 
If there is no cointegration, the variance ratio should stabilize asymptotically. If there is 
cointegration, the variance ratio should diverge. The panel 𝜌-statistic is based on DF 
regression and test whether 𝜌𝑖 − 1 = 0. Both panel v-statistic and panel 𝜌-statistic do not 
control for serial correlation in residuals 𝑣𝑖𝑡. Both panel PP t-statistic and panel ADF t-
statistic control for the serial correlation in residuals 𝑣𝑖𝑡. The panel PP t-statistic uses 
Newey-west nonparametric adjustments while panel ADF t-statistic uses additional lags of 





However, a prerequisite to conduct Pedroni (1999, 2004) cointegration test is that the 
covariates are not cointegrated among themselves. Assume that there are m covariates in 
I(1) vector 𝒙𝑡. Let 𝒙𝑡(𝑛) denotes a vector of first n elements and 𝒙𝑡(𝑚 − 𝑛) denotes a vector 
of the rest (m-n) elements so that 𝒙𝑡 = (𝒙𝑡(𝑛), 𝒙𝑡(𝑚 − 𝑛)), where 1 < 𝑛 ≤ 𝑚-2. If n elements 
in 𝒙𝑡(𝑛) are cointegrated with a cointegrating vector 𝛂, then 𝛂𝒙𝑡(𝑛)  will be an I(0) process. 
It is always true that the sum of an I(0) and I(1) will be I(1). If 𝑦𝑡 is not cointegrated with 
these n elements in 𝒙𝑡(𝑛) but cointegrated with the rest elements in 𝒙𝑡(𝑚 − 𝑛), when we 
first fit the model (11) by OLS in the test, we may still be able to find a vector 𝜷 = (𝜶, 𝜸) so 
that 𝑦𝑡 −𝜷𝒙𝑡 is an I(0) process. In another word, we may wrongly conclude that 𝑦𝑡 and 𝒙𝑡 
are cointegrated even if they are not.  
Therefore, we need to conduct pairwise cointegration tests among covariates before we 
conduct the cointegration tests between the dependent variable and covariates. Since the 
cointegration test is not symmetric, the pairwise cointegration tests should go two-way. 
Thus, for each pair of covariates, there are two cointegration results. The results are 
reported in  
Table 3.4. The tests are done by using EViews 10. Since the panel v-statistic does not 
require modeling on ?̂?𝑖𝑡 and does not accommodate serial correlation and the panel 𝜌-
statistic does not accommodate serial correlation as well, we mainly rely on test 
Panel/Group PP statistic and Panel/Group ADF statistic to draw conclusions. The results 
indicate that cointegration exists for any pair of covariates.  
 
Table 3.4 The pairwise Padroni (1999, 2004) cointegration tests among covariates for energy intensity models 
  Dependent Variables (Without Trend) 
  lnRDE lnCSR1 lnCSR3 lnEPS lnAEPoP 
lnRDE - No (4) (3)**, (4)***, 
(6)***, (7)*** 
No 
lnCSR1 (7) - - (3)*, (4)*, (7) (2)**, (3)***, 
(4)***, (6)**, 
(7)*** 





lnEPS (4)*, (6)***, 
(7)*** 
No No - (3)*, (4)**, 
(6)**, (7)*** 








Table 3.4 (cont.) 
  Dependent Variables (With Trend) 
  lnRDE lnCSR1 lnCSR3 lnEPS lnAEPoP 
















lnCSR1 (1)***, (4), 
(7)* 
- - (4)**, (7)* (3)***, 
(4)***, (6)**, 
(7)*** 






























1. “***”, significant at 0.001; “**”, significant at 0.01; “*”, significant at 0.05; “” significant at 0.1.  
2. Variables in columns are dependent variables.  
3. Number (1) to (7) denotes seven different panel cointegration test statistics from Pedroni (1999, 
2004) tests without trend: 
(1). Panel v-Statistic  
(2). Panel rho-Statistic  
(3). Panel PP-Statistic  
(4). Panel ADF-Statistic 
(5). Group rho-Statistic  
(6). Group PP-Statistic  
(7). Group ADF-Statistic 
“No” means no statistic is significant. 
4. Since 9 countries’ CSR1 takes 0 for all the periods, the panel cointegration test involving CSR1 is 
based on 16 countries: Austria, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, UK, U.S.A. 
5. Since 6 countries’ CSR3 takes 0 for all the periods, the panel cointegration test involving CSR3 is 
based on 19 countries: Austria, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, India, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, UK, U.S.A. 







Based on above cointegration tests among covariates, we change our cointegration 
testing strategy to testing and estimating cointegration between energy intensity and CSR 
policies, EPS, R&D and AEPoP separately, with policy issues go first in the order.  
 
A. Energy intensity and CSR policies 
Our cointegration testing strategy for energy intensity and CSR policies is to conduct 
cointegration tests between energy intensity and one-year lead of CSR policies, same period 
CSR policies, one-year lag of CSR policies, two-year lag of CSR polices, and 3-year lag of 
CSR policies separately. The reason for us to do so is that including more than one CSR 
policies series will cause covariates to be cointegrated since the series of CSR polices is an 
I(1) process. Thus, we test different lead and lag of CSR policies separately to locate a 
stationary long run equilibrium relationship between energy intensity and any lead or lag 
of CSR policies.  
The testing results are reported in Appendix B.2 Table B- 1 and Table B- 2. The results 
show that five statistics among seven statistics: Panel v-Statistic, Panel/Group PP-Statistic, 
and Panel/Group ADF-Statistic reject the null hypothesis H0: no cointegration at significant 
level from 1% to 0.1%. Thus, all lead, same period and lag of CSR policies are justified to be 
included in a model involving energy intensity and CSR policies in level forms.  
Given the existence of cointegration, we use the fully modified OLS (FMOLS) developed 
by Pedroni (2000) for cointegrated panels which accounts for the heterogeneity in the fixed 
effects to estimate the long run equilibrium relation. FMOLS is originally suggested by 
Phillips and Hansen (1990). The motivation to develop FMOLS estimation procedure is that 
the widely believed properties of the joint dependence of most aggregate time series and 
non-stationarity invalidate the routine application of many standard statistical procedures 
(Phillips and Hansen, 1990). For example, in the dynamic cointegrated panels of aggregate 
time series, it is widely believed that there are endogenous feedback effects from regressors 
to the independent variables. To be more precisely, consider a data generating system as 
follows: 
 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽𝑋𝑡 + 𝛾𝐷𝑡 + 𝑢1𝑡 (13) 






where 𝑦𝑡 and 𝑋𝑡 are I(1) processes, 𝐷𝑡 is the deterministic trend regressor, 𝑢1𝑡 and 𝑢2𝑡 are 
the error terms. It is widely believed that cov(𝑢1𝑡, 𝑢2𝑡) ≠ 0. Thus, strict exogeneity 
assumption of regressors is not acceptable by most standards and the conventional OLS 
estimator for the cointegration vector is asymptotically biased (Pedroni, 2000). FMOLS 
employs a semi-parametric correction to eliminate the endogeneity problem caused by the 
long run correlation between the cointegrating equation and stochastic regressors 
innovations. It also makes a correction to eliminate the serial correlation. Pedroni (2000) 
shows that the FMOLS estimator is asymptotically unbiased and allows for standard Wald 
tests. Due to the same reason as we explained when conducting panel cointegration tests, 
we only include one CSR policy series each time in estimating the long run equilibrium 







= 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑙𝑛CSR𝑖𝑡−𝑘 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (15) 
 
where 𝑘 = −1, 0, 1, 2, 3. To allow for heterogeneity among countries, we use heterogenous 
first-stage long-run coefficients 𝛽𝑖 in FMOLS procedure. Among all FMOLS estimates, only 
3-year lag of environmental CSR policies has a statistically significant positive long run 
equilibrium relation with energy intensity. The complete FMOLS results can be referred to 
Appendix B.2 Table B- 3 and Table B- 4. The FMOLS results for 3-year lag of 
environmental CSR policies are presented in Table 3.5.  
The estimate indicates that with 1% increase the number of 3-year lag of environmental 
CSR (CSR3) policies, the energy intensity is estimated to increase by [0.00127%, 0.0694%] 
(90% C.I.). This might be due to the reason that all CSR reporting policies on pollution 
abatement and pollution control are classified into the category of environmental CSR 
policies. More environmental CSR policies on pollution control may have a significant effect 
on increasing the cost to producers to meet the requirements or expected standards in the 
short run. However, it is likely that the cost on pollution control or abatement may be 
balanced over a longer time period and the negative effect on firms’ energy efficiency may 






Table 3.5 Energy intensity and CSR policies long run equilibrium relation FMOLS estimates 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnCSR3(-3) 0.035348 0.020586 1.717115 0.0881 
T 11    
n 18    
N 198    
Adjusted R2 0.993028       
 
Notes:  
1. To allow for heterogeneity in response to CSR policies among countries, we use heterogenous first-stage 
long-run coefficients to estimate FMOLS model. 
2. Since 7 countries’ CSR3 takes 0 for all the periods, the FMOLS estimation using three-year lag of CSR3 
are based on 18 countries: Austria, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, India, Italy, 
Japan, Netherlands, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, UK, U.S.A. 
 
To verify the long run equilibrium relation that we identified for CSR3 and energy 
intensity, we further estimate a vector error correction model (VECM) for energy intensity 
and 3-year lag of CSR3 as suggested by Engle and Granger (1987). First, we obtained the 
estimated residuals from model (15). Second, using the lagged residuals from model (15) as 
the error correction term (ECT), a dynamic VECM is estimated by using seemingly 
unrelated regressions (SUR) for model (16a) and model (16b). The VECM results are 












+ 𝜃12Δ𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑆𝑅3𝑖(𝑡−3)−1 + 𝜆1𝜖𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑢1𝑖𝑡 (16𝑎) 
















Table 3.6 The VECM results for energy intensity and CSR3 
 ∆ln⁡(𝐸/𝑄)𝑡 ∆ln𝐶𝑆𝑅3𝑡−3 
ECT -1.136*** -0.127 
 (0.102) (0.511) 
∆ln⁡(𝐸/𝑄)𝑡−1 0.254** 0.062 
 (0.076) (0.381) 
∆ln𝐶𝑆𝑅3(𝑡−3)−1 -0.020 -0.047 
 (0.016) (0.082) 
C -0.015*** 0.054*** 
 (0.003) (0.013) 
Note:  
1. Due to the short time length in our panel data, we limit the lag length in VECM to be 1.  
2. The VECM is estimated using seemingly unrelated regression method. 
 
The coefficient of ECT in ∆ln⁡(𝐸/𝑄)𝑡 model is -1.136 at significant level of 0.1%, indicating 
that energy intensity will converge to its long run equilibrium relation with 3-year lag of 
CSR3 at a very fast speed. On the other hand, the coefficient of ECT in ∆ln𝐶𝑆𝑅3𝑡−3 model is 
not significant, indicating that there is no long run Granger causality from energy intensity 
to 3-year lag of CSR3. Besides, we find that the change of one-year lag of energy intensity 
has a significant positive impact on the change of current period energy intensity, 
indicating that there is a short run Granger causality from one-year lag of energy intensity 
to current period of energy intensity. 
 
B. Energy intensity and EPS 
Following the same testing and estimation strategy as we used for CSR policies, we first 
conduct panel cointegration tests between energy intensity and the lead, same period, 1-
year lag, 2-year lag, and 3-year lag of EPS. Similar to CSR policies, the results show that 
five statistics among seven statistics: Panel v-Statistic, Panel/Group PP-Statistic, and 
Panel/Group ADF-Statistic reject the null hypothesis H0: no cointegration at significant 
level from 5% to 0.1%. Thus, all lead, same period and lag of EPS are justified to be 
included in a model involving energy intensity and EPS in level forms. A long run 











= 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑙𝑛EPS𝑖𝑡−𝑘 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (17) 
where 𝑘 = −1, 0, 1, 2, 3. Again, we use FMOLS procedure to estimate model (17). Among all 
FMOLS estimates, both 2-year lag of EPS and 3-year lag of EPS have statistically 
significant negative long run equilibrium relations with energy intensity. The complete 
FMOLS results can be referred to in Appendix B.2 Table B- 4. The FMOLS results for 2-
year lag and 3-year lag of EPS are presented in Table 3.7. The estimate indicates that with 
1% increase of 2-year lag of EPS index, the energy intensity is estimated to drop by 
[0.00165%, 0.0523%] (95% C.I.). And with 1% increase of 3-year lag of EPS index, the 
energy intensity is estimated to drop by [0.0127%, 0.0686%] (95% C.I.). This finding is 
consistent with Albrizio et al (2014) which finds that changes in 2-year lag of EPS and 3-
year lag of EPS have significant positive effect on macro level productivity growth. This 
might be due to the reason that more stringent environmental policies measured by EPS 
may have an immediate effect on reducing the energy consumption, but not the energy 
efficiency. However, more stringent environmental policies may induce producers to make 
investments on emission reducing technology or energy efficiency improvement technology 
to meet standards or reduce the cost incurred by paying environmental taxes and 
purchasing emission credits. These technology progress may result in a drop of energy 
intensity with 2 to 3 years’ lag.  
Table 3.7 Energy intensity and EPS long run equilibrium relation FMOLS estimates 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnEPS (-2) -0.02697* 0.012857 -2.097729 0.0369 
T 12    
n 25    
N 300    
Adjusted R2 0.989291       
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnEPS(-3) -0.040657** 0.014185 -2.866309 0.0045 
T 11    
n 25    
N 275    
Adjusted R2 0.989299       
Note: To allow for heterogeneity in response to EPS index among countries, we use heterogenous first-stage 






To verify the dynamics we identified for EPS, we further estimate a vector error 
correction model (VECM) for energy intensity and 2-year lag of EPS as suggested by Engle 
and Granger (1987). First, we obtained the estimated residuals from model (17). Second, 
using the lagged residuals from model (17) as the error correction term (ECT), a dynamic 
VECM is estimated by using seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) for model (18a) and 












+ 𝜃12Δ𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖(𝑡−2)−1 + 𝜆1𝜖𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑢1𝑖𝑡 (18𝑎) 





+ 𝜃22Δ𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖(𝑡−2)−1 + 𝜆2𝜖𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑢2𝑖𝑡 (18𝑏) 
 
 
Table 3.8 The VECM results for energy intensity and EPS 
 ∆ln⁡(𝐸/𝑄)𝑡 ∆ln𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡−2 
ECT -0.894*** 0.203 
 (0.0679) (0.405) 
∆ln⁡(𝐸/𝑄)𝑡−1 0.271*** 0.0176 
 (0.0544) (0.325) 
∆ln𝐸𝑃𝑆(𝑡−2)−1 -0.0177 -0.0649 
 (0.0103) (0.0612) 
C -0.0143*** 0.0707*** 
 (0.00199) (0.0119) 
Note:  
1. Due to the short time length in our panel data, we limit the lag length in VECM to be 1.  
2. The VECM is estimated using seemingly unrelated regression method. 
 
The coefficient of ECT in ∆ln⁡(𝐸/𝑄)𝑡 model is -0.894 at significant level of 0.1%, indicating 
that energy intensity will converge to its long run equilibrium relation with 2-year lag of 
EPS at a fast speed. The ∆ln𝐸𝑃𝑆(𝑡−2)−1 is estimated to have a significant negative impact on 
∆ln⁡(𝐸/𝑄)𝑡 at 10% significant level, implying that ln𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡−3 has a significant negative impact 







C. Energy intensity and R&D 
Similarly, we use the same procedure to analyze the long run equilibrium relation 
between energy intensity and R&D. We start with testing and estimating cointegration 
between energy intensity and the same period R&D. The testing results are reported in 
Table 3.9. The results show that five statistics among seven statistics: Panel v-Statistic, 
Panel/Group PP-Statistic, and Panel/Group ADF-Statistic reject the null hypothesis H0: no 
cointegration at significant level of 0.1%. 
 
Table 3.9 The panel cointegration tests between energy intensity and R&D 
Panel Cointegration Test: use same period of R&D 
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs.  Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs.  
Within-dimension Between-dimension 
  Statistic   Statistic 
Panel v-Statistic  3.672846*** Group rho-Statistic  2.287087 
Panel rho-Statistic  0.626708 Group PP-Statistic -5.269243*** 
Panel PP-Statistic -3.713146*** Group ADF-Statistic -6.347495*** 
Panel ADF-Statistic -5.706593***     
 
Then we estimate FMOLS for a stationary relation between energy intensity and R&D 
specified in model (19). The FMOLS results are presented in Table 3.10. The results 
suggest that 1% increase in the same period R&D has a significant impact on reducing 
energy intensity by [0.000284%, 0.0581%] (90% C.I.). This result is consistent with a panel 
analysis for 2500 firms from 1997-1999 in China by Fisher-Vanden, Jefferson, Liu and Tao 
(2004) which finds that the 1% increases in firm’s R&D expenditure reduces energy 
intensity by around 0.05% to 0.1%. Since aggregate R&D expenditure also includes 
expenditure which is not directly with production, it suggests that our estimate is a 
reasonable estimate which is closer but smaller than the elasticity of firm R&D expenditure 














Table 3.10 The FMOLS results for energy intensity and R&D 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnRDE -0.031534* 0.014763 -2.136085 0.0335 
T 14    
n 25    
N 350    
Adjusted R2 0.988605       
Note: We use heterogenous first-stage long-run coefficients to estimate this FMOLS model.  
 
Given that we’ve located a long run equilibrium relation, we continue to estimate a 
VECM to further identify dynamics between R&D and energy intensity. The VECM is 
specified by model (20a) and (20b). The results of VECM is reported in Table 3.11. The ECT 
in model (20a) has a significant negative coefficient of -1.158 at the significant level of 1%, 
indicating that energy intensity will converge to the long-run equilibrium relationship with 
R&D at a relatively fast speed. The change of 1-year lag of R&D has a significant negative 
impact on energy intensity while the change of 2-year lag of R&D has a significant positive 
impact the change of energy intensity. A possible explanation to this result might be due to 
the complexity of R&D projects. Some R&D projects may be short-term and low 
implementation cost projects and can generate a return within one or two years. However, 
some R&D projects may be long-term and high implementation cost projects and may 
request a further facility investment to realize the technology upgradation, which may 
cause GDP to drop in 2-year lag. It is likely that the long term and high implementation 
cost R&D projects may have a significant negative impact on energy intensity over a longer 
period. However, due to the limitation of our data, we could not examine higher-order 
dynamics beyond 3-year lag. 
It is notable that the ECT is significant and positive in the estimated equation (20b) by 
VECM. This result indicates that there is no long run granger causality from energy 
intensity to R&D. However, when the gap between energy intensity and R&D becomes 
large in period t-1, the R&D must rise in period t to correct the disequilibrium error of the 
previous period. This result further confirms that there is only one cointegrating relation 
from R&D to energy intensity. The changes of 1-year lag R&D and 3-year lag R&D are 





due to two reasons: first, the short run force which drives the increase of R&D may persist 

















+ 𝜆1𝜖𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑢1𝑖𝑡 (20𝑎) 










+ 𝜆2𝜖𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑢2𝑖𝑡 (20𝑏) 
 
 
Table 3.11 The VECM results for energy intensity and R&D 
 ∆ln⁡(𝐸/𝑄)𝑡 ∆ln𝑅𝐷𝐸𝑡 
ECT -1.158*** 0.568* 
 (0.074) (0.263) 
∆ln⁡(𝐸/𝑄)𝑡−1 0.485*** -0.137 
 (0.056) (0.199) 
∆ln⁡(𝐸/𝑄)𝑡−2 0.350*** -0.144 
 (0.050) (0.179) 
∆ln⁡(𝐸/𝑄)𝑡−3 0.323*** -0.090 
 (0.047) (0.168) 
∆ln𝑅𝐷𝐸𝑡−1 -0.030 0.314*** 
 (0.016) (0.056) 
∆ln𝑅𝐷𝐸𝑡−2 0.074*** -0.001 
 (0.016) (0.058) 
∆ln𝑅𝐷𝐸𝑡−3 -0.023 0.211** 
 (0.016) (0.057) 
C 0.0008 0.011 
 (0.003) (0.010) 
Note: The VECM is estimated using seemingly unrelated regression method. 
 
 
D. Energy intensity and aggregate energy price (AEPoP) 
Lastly, we investigate the cointegrating relation between energy intensity and AEPoP. 
We follow the same panel cointegration testing and estimating procedure we used above. 





run while elastic in the long run, we extend to test and estimate cointegrating relation 
between energy intensity and AEPoP up to 8-year lag. The testing results are reported in 
Appendix B.2 Table B- 7. 
For nine 𝑙𝑛𝐴𝐸𝑃𝑜𝑃𝑖𝑡−𝑘 (𝑘 = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8) series, the testing results show that five 
statistics among seven statistics: Panel v-Statistic, Panel/Group PP-Statistic, and 
Panel/Group ADF-Statistic reject the null hypothesis H0: no cointegration at significant 
level 0.1%. Thus, all nine 𝑙𝑛𝐴𝐸𝑃𝑜𝑃𝑖𝑡−𝑘 (𝑘 = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8) series are justified to be 
included in a model involving energy intensity and AEPoP in level forms. A long run 







= 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑙𝑛AEPoP𝑖𝑡−𝑘 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (21) 
 
where 𝑘 = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,7⁡8. Again, we use FMOLS procedure to estimate each model. 
Among all FMOLS estimates, 2-year lag and 4-year lag of AEPoP have significant positive 
impacts on energy intensity while 6-year lag, 7-year lag and 8-year lag of AEPoP have 
significant negative impacts on energy intensity. The complete FMOLS results can be 
referred to in Appendix B.2 Table B- 8. The FMOLS results for 2-year lag, 4-year lag, 6-year 
lag, 7-year lag and 8-year lag of AEPoP are presented in Table 3.12.  
To explain these results, we need to look into the measurement of energy intensity level 
of primary energy we used in more details. According to World Bank, Sustainable Energy 
for All (SE4ALL) database, energy intensity of primary energy is defined by the total 
primary energy supply divided by GDP. The main sources of primary energy include: 
petroleum, natural gas, coal, renewable energy, and nuclear electric power. Primary energy 
supply is different from and higher than final energy consumption, depending on the energy 
generation efficiency, transformation efficiency, delivery efficiency and non-energy use. 
Therefore, there is also another energy intensity measurement called energy intensity level 
of final energy to measure the final energy usage efficiency. And there is an indicator called 
final to primary energy ratio (%) to capture the efficiency of using the primary energy. 
From the perspective of how much natural resources are used for a country’s production of 
total output, energy intensity level of primary energy is a better indicator and more 





Based on the understanding of this measurement issue explained above, the positive 
impact of 2-year lag and 4-year lag of AEPoP on primary energy intensity may reflect the 
positive energy price elasticity of primary energy supply. That is, higher aggregate energy 
price elicits higher primary energy supply in the short run, where there might be an 
overproduction problem. On the other side, the energy price elasticity of energy demand is 
relatively inelastic in the short run, while negative and elastic in the long run. This is 
because the energy usage pattern usually depends on the energy devices used by the end-
users, which are relatively stable in the short run but upgradable in the long run. 
Therefore, the significant negative impacts of 6-year lag, 7-year lag and 8-year lag of 
AEPoP on primary energy intensity may reflect the negative the energy price elasticity of 
energy demand. Overall, the accumulative absolute values of the price elasticity of energy 
demand are higher than the accumulative absolute values of price elasticity of primary 
energy supply. Therefore, in the long run, higher AEPoP may finally result in a decrease of 
primary energy intensity.  
Our finding is different from the panel analysis for 2500 firms from 1997-1999 in China 
by Fisher-Vanden, Jefferson, Liu and Tao (2004). In their study, they use firm level energy 
intensity, which can be viewed as the energy intensity of final energy by individual firm. 
They find that current year price of aggregate energy/ price of output has a significant 
negative impact on firm’s energy intensity of final energy use. The elasticity is estimated to 
by around -0.368. Our results show that the energy price elasticity of aggregate energy 
demand suggested by FMOLS estimates is around -0.086 using 6-year lag of AEPoP, 
around -0.075 using 7-year lag of AEPoP, and around -0.047 using 8-year lag of AEPoP, 
which are reasonable compared to Fisher-Vanden, Jefferson, Liu and Tao (2004) 
considering the macro level feature and the rough measurement of aggregate energy price. 
Compared with the policy intervention like EPS, the response from energy intensity to the 












Table 3.12 The Energy intensity and AEPoP long run equilibrium relation FMOLS estimates 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnAEPoP(-2) 0.019174 0.011618 1.650301 0.1001 
T 12       
n 25       
N 300       
Adjusted R2 0.989042       
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnAEPoP(-4) 0.030693* 0.01229 2.497459 0.0133 
T 10       
n 25       
N 250       
Adjusted R2 0.9893       
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnAEPoP(-6) -0.085724*** 0.015532 -5.519091 0.0000 
T 8       
n 25       
N 200       
Adjusted R2 0.991138       
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnAEPoP(-7) -0.074997*** 0.015124 -4.958725 0.0000 
T 7       
n 25       
N 175       
Adjusted R2 0.990088       
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnAEPoP(-8) -0.046691** 0.014080 -3.316193 0.0013 
T 6       
n 25       
N 150       
Adjusted R2 0.989987       
Note: We use heterogenous first-stage long-run coefficients to estimate this FMOLS model.  
 
Given the equilibrium relation we found for 2-year lag of AEPoP and energy intensity, 
we also estimate a panel vector error correction model (VECM) for AEPoP to perform the 
short-run and long-run Granger-causality tests. After a balance between the potential to 
examine dynamics as fully as possible and the relative short time length of our panel data, 
we use up to 4-period lag in the VECM to allow it to include 6-year lag of AEPoP. The 





The results show that the ECT in the model of ∆ln⁡(𝐸/𝑄)𝑡 is significant and negative, 
indicating that there is long-run Granger-causality from 2-year lag of AEPoP to energy 
intensity. However, the coefficient of ECT is -0.167 significant at 0.1% level, suggesting a 
relative slow speed in converging to the long-run equilibrium. We find that the change of 6-
year lag of AEPoP has a significant negative impact on energy intensity, which is consistent 
with what we found from FMOLS estimates. On the other side, the ECT in the model of 
∆ln𝐴𝐸𝑃𝑜𝑃𝑡−2 is also significant and negative. This result indicates that when the gap 
between energy intensity of primary energy supply and the 2-year lag of AEPoP becomes 
larger the 2-year lag of AEPoP will drop to reduce the gap, which verifies the cointegrating 
relation between the energy intensity and 2-year lag of AEPoP. 
 
Table 3.13 The VECM results for energy intensity and AEPoP 
 ∆ln⁡(𝐸/𝑄)𝑡 ∆ln𝐴𝐸𝑃𝑜𝑃𝑡−2 
ECT -0.167*** -0.572* 
 (0.0498) (0.270) 
∆ln⁡(𝐸/𝑄)𝑡−1 -0.0339 0.0661 
 (0.0716) (0.388) 
∆ln⁡(𝐸/𝑄)𝑡−2 -0.00409 0.485 
 (0.0718) (0.389) 
∆ln⁡(𝐸/𝑄)𝑡−3 0.104 0.135 
 (0.0687) (0.373) 
∆ln⁡(𝐸/𝑄)𝑡−4 -0.0864 0.586 
 (0.0707) (0.383) 
∆ln𝐴𝐸𝑃𝑜𝑃𝑡−3 -0.0166 -0.347*** 
 (0.0129) (0.0670) 
∆ln𝐴𝐸𝑃𝑜𝑃𝑡−4 0.0221 -0.0148 
 (0.0151) (0.0821) 
∆ln𝐴𝐸𝑃𝑜𝑃𝑡−5 0.00694 -0.0742 
 (0.0158) (0.0855) 
∆ln𝐴𝐸𝑃𝑜𝑃𝑡−6 -0.0460* -0.154 
 (0.0187) (0.101) 
C -0.0242*** 0.0522* 
 (0.00371) (0.0201) 






3.3.5 Robustness check 
To check the robustness of the cointegrating relations we identified using FMOLS 
models, we also use dynamic OLS (DOLS) to re-estimate each cointegrating relation we’ve 
identified.   
The DOLS is firstly advanced by Saikkonen (1992) and Stock and Watson (1993) and 
then extended to panel data setting by Kao and Chiang (2000), Mark and Sul (1999, 2003), 
and Pedroni (2001). It augments the panel cointegrating regression equation with cross-
section specific lags and leads of ∆𝑋𝑖𝑡 to eliminate the asymptotic endogenity and serial 
correlation. 
The estimation results are reported in Appendix B.3 Table B- 8 and Table B- 9. All 
estimates by DOLS are consistent with estimates by FMOLS. We implement two types of 
DOLS models: (1). DOLS based on SIC criterion to select the number of lead and lag 
included in the model; (2). DOLS with fixed 1 lead and 1 lag.  
The results from DOLS estimates based on SIC criterion indicate that several 
cointegrating relations become less significant, including 3-year lag of EPS, 2-year lag of 
AEPoP and 8-year lag of AEPoP. However, the results from DOLS with fixed 1 lead and 1 
lag indicate that all estimates are consistent with FMOLS estimates and even more 
significant, except for 4-year lag of AEPoP. Unfortunately, we are unable to obtain 
estimates for 7-year lag of AEPoP and 8-year lag of AEPoP using fixed l lead and 1 lag of 
DOLS due to the problem of not enough period included to estimate the DOLS model.   
 
3.4 CO2 Emissions 
3.4.1 Literature review on empirical analysis on CO2 emissions 
Currently, there are two approaches in studying greenhouse gas emissions.  
The first approach is the factor analysis and Index Decomposition Analysis (IDA) by 
decomposing CO2 emissions into several factors or indexes. A simply factor analysis can be 
given by Kaya identity (Yamaji, K., Matsuhashi, R., Nagata, Y., Kaya, Y., 1991). The Kaya 
















where P is the total population, G is GDP, E is total primary energy consumption, g=G/P is 
the per-capital GDP, e=E/G is the energy intensity of GDP, and f=F/E is the carbon 
intensity of energy. The merit of Kaya identity factor analysis is that it gives an exact 
decomposition of CO2 emissions without residual. Raupach M.R. et al (2007) used Kaya 
identity to analyze global and regional drivers of accelerating CO2 emissions. They found 
that global emissions growth since 2000 was driven by a cessation or reversal of earlier 
declining trends in the energy intensity of gross domestic product (GDP) (energy/GDP) and 
the carbon intensity of energy (emissions/energy), coupled with continuing increases in 
population and per-capita GDP. Similarly, IDA method first decomposes total CO2 
emissions (F) into n factors (𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛) to be F = 𝑥1𝑥2…𝑥𝑛 and then expresses the change in F 
as  





= 𝐷𝑋1𝐷𝑥2 …𝐷𝑥𝑛 (24)
 
 
Up to 2015, there are more than 500 archival journal articles (in English) on IDA (Ang, 
B.W., 2016). 
The second approach is to use econometric models to examine the effect of environmental 
policy or mechanism on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. For example, He, Huang, & Tarp 
(2014) used dynamic panel data model to evaluate the effectiveness of Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) on emission reduction. For another example, Kasim (2017) used 
Discontinuity Based Ordinary Least Squares (DB-OLS) to examine the effect of an 
environmental disclosure policy on air quality in New South Wales (NSW), Australia.  
3.4.2 Methodology 
To give an exact factor analysis of effects of CSR reporting regulation on CO2 emissions, 
I adopted Kaya identity factor analysis method following Raupach M.R. et al (2007).  
















where GHG emissions per capita (F/P) is decomposed into three factors: GDP per capita 
(G/P), energy intensity of GDP (E/G), and carbon intensity of energy (F/E). From this 
decomposition, it is easy to see that CSR reporting regulation may influence CO2 emissions 
per capita through two factors: energy intensity and carbon intensity of energy. Since we 
have analyzed the effect of CSR reporting regulation on energy intensity in Section 3.3, I 
will only focus on examining the effect of CSR reporting regulation on carbon intensity of 
energy. 
To further decompose F/E, we need to further examine the sources of CO2 emissions. It 
is estimated that the global CO2 emission flux from fossil fuel combustion and industrial 



















We can see that the main source of CO2 emission is the combustion of fossil fuel. To the 
contrary, the consumption of renewable energy, including wind energy, solar thermal 
energy, solar photovoltaic (PV), solar thermal-PV hybrids, geothermal energy, marine 
energy, and hydro energy, contributes very little GHG emissions. Thus, we can make 
following assumptions: 
𝐹𝑅 = 𝑎𝐸𝑅 (27) 
𝐹𝐹 = 𝑏𝐸𝐹 (28) 
where 𝐹𝑅 is the CO2 emissions from renewable energy consumption, 𝐸𝑅 is the amount of 
renewable energy consumption, a is a constant, 𝐹𝐹 is the CO2 emissions from fossil fuel 
combustion and nuclear energy generation, 𝐸𝐹 is the amount of fossil fuel consumption and 
nuclear energy consumption, b is also a constant. And it is reasonable to assume that 𝐸𝑅 +
𝐸𝐹 = 𝐸 and a<b. Further, assume that the CO2 emission which has been reduced by CO2 
emission reduction equipment is 𝜌𝐸𝑅𝐹, where 𝜌𝐸𝑅 is the percentage of F which has been 





𝐹𝑅 + 𝐹𝐹 − 𝜌𝐸𝑅𝐹
𝐸
 









































 is the renewable energy consumption rate (% total energy consumption). Since 
𝑎−𝑏
1+𝜌𝐸𝑅
< 0, F/E is decreasing in 
𝐸𝑅
𝐸
. Here, we can see that CSR reporting regulation may 
influence F/E through two possible ways. First, it may provide incentives to firms to switch 
to consume renewable energy so that the renewable energy consumption ratio will be 
increased. Second, it may increase 𝜌𝐸𝑅 by providing firms incentives to be equipped with 
CO2 reduction devices to reduce CO2 emissions. 
A possible empirical strategy to examine these two effects would be to estimate two 
empirical models. We can evaluate one empirical model on 
𝐸𝑅
𝐸




 as well as CSR regulation factors. Similarly, we can estimate an 
empirical model on 𝜌𝐸𝑅 as well.  
However, there is great difficulty in investigating causality relationship between 
renewable energy consumption rate and CSR reporting regulation. The main difficulty is 
that there are many factors which may influence the renewable energy penetration. J.P. 
Painuly (2001) proposed six categories of barriers which may influence the renewable 
energy penetration: energy market barriers, energy market distortion barriers, economic 
and financial barriers, institutional barriers, technical barriers, and social, cultural and 
behavior barriers. A well estimated empirical renewable energy consumption model would 
require adequate data on barriers mentioned in J.P. Painuly (2001). However, we do not 
have such detailed data for global countries. Instead, a few empirical studies on drivers 
behind renewable energy have been done by using panel cointegration technique 
(Sardorsky 2009a, 2009b; Apergis & Payne, 2010; Salim & Rafiq, 2012). Sardorsky (2009a, 
2009b) find that per capita renewable energy consumption is driven by real GDP per capita, 
CO2 per capita in G7 countries and is driven by real per capita income 18 emerging 
countries. Apergis & Payne (2010) find that there is a long-run equilibrium relationship 
between real GDP, renewable energy consumption, real gross fixed capital formation, and 





renewable energy consumption and economic growth in both the short-and long-run. Salim 
& Rafiq (2012) find that in the long-run the renewable energy consumption is significantly 
determined by income and pollutant emissions by using time series technique for each 
country from 1980 to 2006.  
For the empirical model on 𝜌𝐸𝑅 , since currently there is no data on the amount of CO2 
emission reduction 𝜌𝐸𝑅𝐹, the empirical model on  𝜌𝐸𝑅 is infeasible. However, the data on 𝜌𝐸𝑅 
possible determinants are available, including the number of patents on CO2 emission 
reduction which can be a proxy of the available CO2 emissions reduction technology, the 
data on CSR regulation, and EPS.  
Therefore, we can evaluate an empirical model on F/E which keeps 
𝐸𝑅
𝐸
 while replace 𝜌𝐸𝑅 





= 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑖
𝐸𝑅
𝐸 𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽2𝑖𝐶𝑂2𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑖𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑖𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡 (30) 
 
where 𝛼𝑖,𝑡 is the individual effect, 𝑡 is the time trend, 
𝐸𝑅
𝐸 𝑖,𝑡
is the renewable energy 
consumption rate (% of total energy consumption), 𝐶𝑂2𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1⁡ is the number of 1-year lag 
of CO2 emission reduction patents, 𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the number of CSR1 or CSR3 policies, and 
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the environmental policy stringency index, and 𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. To 



















To be clearer, we will use CO2/E for 
𝐹
𝐸
 and RE for 
𝐸𝑅
𝐸










The data sources on CSR, and EPS have been specified in Section 3.3.3.  
The data on total CO2 intensity of energy use and renewable energy consumption rate 
are collected from World Bank, which is collected from Carbon Dioxide Information 
Analysis Center (CDIAC), Environmental Sciences Division, Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory, Tennessee, United States. Particularly, CDIAC calculates annual 
anthropogenic emissions from data on fossil fuel consumption (from the United Nations 
Statistics Division's World Energy Data Set) and world cement manufacturing (from the 
U.S. Department of Interior's Geological Survey, USGS 2011). In combustion, different 
fossil fuels release different amounts of carbon dioxide for the same level of energy use: oil 
releases about 50 percent more carbon dioxide than natural gas, and coal releases about 
twice as much. Cement manufacturing releases about half a metric ton of carbon dioxide for 
each metric ton of cement produced (World Bank Data, CO2 Intensity, Statistical Concept 
and Methodology).  
The data on CO2 emission reduction patents is collected from OECD.Stat. Particularly, 
the number of CO2 emissions reduction patents is the sum of enabling technologies with a 
potential contribution to CO2 emissions mitigation, technologies relating to oil refining and 
petrochemical industry, reduction of CO2 emissions during production processes, 
technologies related to metal processing, reduction of CO2 emissions, capture, storage, 
sequestration or disposal of CO2, combustion technologies with mitigation potential (e.g. 
using fossil fuels, biomass, waste, etc.).  
Finally, we got a panel data set for the CO2 emissions model from 2000 to 2014. The 
descriptive statistics are provided in. The descriptive graphs of CO2 intensity of energy use 
in logarithm of countries in the sample are provided in  
Figure 3.4. Most countries exhibit a decreasing trend in CO2 intensity of energy use over 
the period 2000-2014, except for China, India, Japan and Turkey. The descriptive graphs of 
renewable energy consumption rate in the sample are provided in Figure 3.5. Most 
countries have an increasing trend of renewable energy consumption rate over the period, 
except for China, India, and Turkey. The descriptive graphs of registered lag CO2 reduction 







Table 3.14 Descriptive statistics of variables in the panel data set 
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max 
CO2/E 2.31 0.56 0.90 3.47 
RE 14.22 12.34 0.69 51.79 
Lag CO2Tech 31.76 74.92 0 527.36 
CSR1 0.74 1.19 0 7 
CSR3 1.93 2.37 0 12 
EPS 2.24 0.83 0.52 4.13 
Notes: All variables are in level forms.  
 



























































































































































































































































































































































































Since we are using macro level annual data, we conduct panel unit root tests and panel 
cointegration tests to address the concern of stationarity of the data and the cointegration 
among variables before we estimate the model. 
 
3.4.4.1 Panel Unit Root Tests 
We conduct IPS (2003) panel unit root tests for CO2/E, RE and lagged CO2Tech which 
allows autoregressive coefficient 𝜌𝑖 to vary across cross-section units. The panel unit root 
tests for CSR and EPS have been done in the previous section 3.3.4.1. The results are 
reported in Table 3.15. The IPS (2003) panel unit root test results for other series can be 
referred to Table 3.3. At the significant level of 0.1%, we reject the null hypothesis H0: All of 
the series are I(1) for series of CO2/E and RE either with or without trend. For lagged 





countries out of 25 countries reject H0: 𝜌𝑖 = 1⁡at the significant level of 5% (China, Hungary, 
Slovakia, and Turkey). For lagged CO2Tech with trend, by further inspecting the 
intermediate ADF test results, two countries out of 25 countries reject H0: 𝜌𝑖 = 1⁡at the 
significant level of 5% (Slovakia and Turkey). Thus, we still take lagged CO2Tech as I(1) 
with or without trend.  
Table 3.15 IPS (2003) panel unit root test 2000-2014 
Variables IPS(2003) 
 H0: All of the series are I(1) 
 H1: At least one of the series is I(0) 
  Without Trend With Trend 
lnCO2/E 6.41668(0-2) -0.64725(0-2) 
ln(CO2/E) -12.5194(0-2)*** -13.0889(0-1)*** 
lnRE 7.17112(0-2) -2.82134(0-2)** 
lnRE -11.0439(0-2)*** -8.34216(0-1)*** 
Lag lnCO2Tech 2.64928(0-1)** 2.78243(0-2)** 
Lag lnCO2Tech -14.6444(0-2)*** -9.99721(0-1)*** 
 
Notes:  
1. “***”, significant at 0.001; “**”, significant at 0.01; “*”, significant at 0.05; “” significant at 0.1.  
2. The automatic lag length selection based on SIC is specified in the parentheses. 
 
 
3.4.4.2 Panel Cointegration Tests 
We first conduct two-way pairwise Pedroni (1999, 2004) panel cointegration tests among 
potential dependent I(1) series RE, CSR1, CSR3, EPS, and lagged CO2Tech before we 
include all these I(1) series into the FMOLS model. The results of panel cointegration tests 
are reported in Appendix B.2 Table B- 9. The pairwise testing results that cointegration 
exists between any pair of covariates. Based on above cointegration tests among covariates, 
we change our cointegration testing strategy to testing and estimating cointegration 
between CO2/E and RE, CO2Tech, CSR policies, EPS separately.  
 
A. Carbon intensity of energy use (CO2/E) and renewable energy consumption rate (RE) 
We start with testing and estimating cointegration between carbon intensity of energy 
use and the same period renewable energy consumption rate. The testing results are 





Panel/Group PP-Statistic, and Panel/Group ADF-Statistic reject the null hypothesis H0: no 
cointegration at significant level of 0.1%. 
Then we estimate FMOLS for a stationary relation between CO2/E and RE specified in 
model (32). The FMOLS results are presented in Table 3.17. The results suggest that 1% 
increase in the same period RE has a significant impact on reducing same period CO2/E by 
[0.0804%, 0.138%] (90% C.I.).  
 
Table 3.16 The panel cointegration tests between CO2/E and RE 
Panel Cointegration Test: use same period of RE 
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs.  Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs.  
Within-dimension Between-dimension 
  Statistic   Statistic 
Panel v-Statistic -0.250825 Group rho-Statistic  2.064911 
Panel rho-Statistic  0.099887 Group PP-Statistic -8.150056*** 
Panel PP-Statistic -5.81147*** Group ADF-Statistic -8.038688*** 







= 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑙𝑛RE𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (32) 
 
 
Table 3.17 The FMOLS results for CO2/E and RE 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnRE -0.109409*** 0.014728 -7.428645 0.0000 
T 14    
n 25    
N 350    
Adjusted R2 0.992854       
 
Note:  
1. “***”: significant at 0.001. 
2. We use heterogenous first-stage long-run coefficients to estimate this FMOLS model.  
 
Given that we’ve located a long run equilibrium relation, we continue to estimate a 
VECM to further identify dynamics between energy intensity and RE. The results of VECM 
is reported in Table 3.18. The ECT in model for ∆ln⁡(𝐶𝑂2/𝐸)𝑡 has a significant negative 





long-run equilibrium relationship with RE at a fast speed. The change of 2-year lag of RE is 
found to have a significant positive impact on CO2/E. A possible explanation to this short-
run fluctuation pattern is likely due to the possible correlation between RE and the price of 
fossil fuels. When RE increases, the demand for fossil fuel will decrease so that the fossil 
fuel price may decrease, which may induce the fossil fuel consumption to rise a little bit in 
the short run. The ECT in the model for ∆ln𝑅𝐸𝑡 is negative but not significant, implying 
that there is no Granger-causality from 1-year lag of CO2/E to RE. Consistent with the 
short-run fluctuation pattern we find between 1-year lag of RE and CO2/E, we find that the 
change from 1-year lag of RE does not have a significant impact on ∆ln𝑅𝐸𝑡. However, both 
changes from 2-year lag of RE and 3-year lag of RE have a significant positive impact on 
∆ln𝑅𝐸𝑡. 
 
Table 3.18 The VECM results for CO2/E and RE 
 ∆ln⁡(𝐶𝑂2/𝐸)𝑡 ∆ln𝑅𝐸𝑡 
ECT -1.068** -0.143 
 (0.080) (0.288) 
∆ln⁡(𝐶𝑂2/𝐸)𝑡−1 0.432*** 0.231 
 (0.061) (0.218) 
∆ln⁡(𝐶𝑂2/𝐸)𝑡−2 0.082 0.268 
 (0.052) (0.188) 
∆ln⁡(𝐶𝑂2/𝐸)𝑡−3 0.193*** 0.052 
 (0.050) (0.180) 
∆ln𝑅𝐸𝑡−1 0.043* 0.098 
 (0.017) (0.061) 
∆ln𝑅𝐸𝑡−2 -0.007 0.275*** 
 (0.016) (0.057) 
∆ln𝑅𝐸𝑡−3 -0.007 0.310*** 
 (0.015) (0.054) 
C -0.005** 0.029*** 
 (0.002) (0.006) 








B. Carbon intensity of energy use (CO2/E) and CO2 emission reduction technology (CO2Tech) 
We then move on to test and estimate cointegration between carbon intensity of energy 
use and CO2 emission reduction technology. Since there might be a delay between CO2 
emission reduction technology innovation and the adoption of the technology, we continue 
searching for higher order lag of CO2Tech until we find a stationary long-run equilibrium 
relation between x-year lag of CO2Tech and CO2/E. The testing results are reported in 
Appendix B.2 Table B- 10. The results show that for from 1-year lag of CO2Tech to four-year 
lag of CO2Tech, five statistics among seven statistics: Panel v-statistic, Panel/Group PP-
Statistic, and Panel/Group ADF-Statistic reject the null hypothesis H0: no cointegration at 
significant level of 0.1%. 
Then we estimate equation (33) by FMOLS for 1-year lag of CO2Tech to 4-year lag of 
CO2Tech. The complete estimates results are reported in Appendix B.2. The results show 
that 4-year lag of CO2Tech has a significant negative impact on CO2/E. The FMOLS result 
is presented in Table 3.19. The results suggest that 1% increase in the 4-year lag of 
CO2Tech has a significant impact on reducing current period CO2/E by [0.000177%, 
0.010301%] (90% C.I.). This estimated effect is quite small which may imply that there is 
still much room to improve the effectiveness of CO2 emission reduction technology by 
encouraging the adoption of the new technology. Due to the short time length of our panel 
data, the VECM for CO2/E and 4-year lag of CO2Tech would have too limited periods, so we 







= 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑙𝑛CO2Tech𝑖𝑡−𝑘 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (33) 
where k=1, 2, 3, 4.  
 
Table 3.19 The FMOLS results for CO2/E and 4-year lag of CO2Tech 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnCO2Tech(-4) -0.005239 0.003065 -1.709319 0.0888 
T 11    
n 25    
N 275    
Adjusted R2 0.993056       
Note:  
1. “”: significant at 0.1. 






To further examine the dynamics, we estimate VECM for 4-year lag of CO2Tech. The 
results are reported in Table 3.20. The ECT in the model for ∆ln⁡(𝐶𝑂2/𝐸)𝑡 is -1.278 
significant at 0.1%, which indicates that there is long-run Granger causality from 4-year 
lag of CO2Tech to current period of CO2/E. The ECT is the model for ∆ln𝐶𝑂2𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑡−4 is not 
significant, indicating that there is no long-run Granger causality from CO2/E to 4-year lag 
of CO2Tech. For the short-run Granger causality, all one-year lag to 3-year lag of CO2/E 
have significantly positive impacts on the current period of CO2/E. However, the changes of 
5-year lag of CO2Tech and the 6-year lag of CO2Tech are significantly negative related. This 
might suggest that there are strong fluctuations in CO2Tech series in the short run.  
 
 
Table 3.20 The VECM results for CO2/E and CO2Tech 
 ∆ln⁡(𝐶𝑂2/𝐸)𝑡 ∆ln𝐶𝑂2𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑡−4 
ECT -1.278*** -1.198 
 (0.084) (2.128) 
∆ln⁡(𝐶𝑂2/𝐸)𝑡−1 0.568*** 2.485 
 (0.058) (1.465) 
∆ln⁡(𝐶𝑂2/𝐸)𝑡−2 0.188*** 0.062 
 (0.048) (1.228) 
∆ln⁡(𝐶𝑂2/𝐸)𝑡−3 0.205*** 0.160 
 (0.048) (1.210) 
∆ln𝐶𝑂2𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑡−5 0.004 -0.422*** 
 (0.003) (0.070) 
∆ln𝐶𝑂2𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑡−6 0.0004 -0.155* 
 (0.003) (0.073) 
∆ln𝐶𝑂2𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑡−7 -0.002 -0.037 
 (0.003) (0.068) 
C -0.0002 0.186 
 (0.002) (0.043) 
Note:  
1. The VECM is estimated using seemingly unrelated regression method.  







C. Carbon intensity of energy use (CO2/E) and CSR policies 
Since there might be a delay for the CSR policies to take effect, we extend to test and 
estimate cointegrating relation between CO2/E and CSR1 or CSR3 policies up to 6-year lag 
of CSR1 and CSR3 policies. The complete cointegration tests results are reported in 
Appendix B.2 Table B-12 and Table B-13.  
The results show that four to five among seven statistics: Panel v-statistic, Panel/Group 
PP-Statistic, and Panel/Group ADF-Statistic reject the null hypothesis H0: no cointegration 
at the significant level between 0.1% to 10%. Particularly, four statistics: Panel/Group PP-
Statistic, and Panel/Group ADF-Statistic reject the null hypothesis H0 at the significant 
level above 1%. Therefore, all CSR1 and CSR3 series we tested are justified for a model in 
level form.  
Then we estimate the equation (34) by FMOLS for both CSR1 and CSR3. The complete 
FMOLS estimation results are reported in Appendix B.2 Table B-14 and Table B-15. 
Unfortunately, we do not find any significant estimate for equation (31). This indicates that 
up to 6-year lag of CSR1 or CSR3 policies, we are unable to find any significant impact from 
CSR policies on CO2/E. In another word, CSR policies may not provide enough incentives to 
firms to switch from using fossil fuel to using renewable energy or increase the CO2 






= 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑙𝑛CSR𝑖𝑡−𝑘 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (34) 
where k=0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.  
 
D. Carbon intensity of energy use (CO2/E) and EPS policies 
Similarly, we conduct cointegration testing and estimation between CO2/E and EPS up 
to 6-year lag of EPS. The complete cointegration tests results are reported in Appendix 
Table B-16. The results show that four to five among seven statistics: Panel v-statistic, 
Panel/Group PP-Statistic, and Panel/Group ADF-Statistic reject the null hypothesis H0: no 
cointegration at the significant level between 0.1% to 5%. Particularly, four statistics: 
Panel/Group PP-Statistic, and Panel/Group ADF-Statistic reject the null hypothesis H0 at 
the significant level above 1%. Therefore, all EPS series we tested are justified for a model 
in level form.  
Then we estimate the equation (35) by FMOLS for CO2/E and EPS. The complete 





estimates, we find significant stationary equilibrium relations for same period EPS, 1-year 
lag of EPS and 6-year lag of EPS. The results on these significant relations are listed in 







= 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑙𝑛EPS𝑖𝑡−𝑘 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (35) 
where k=0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.  
 
Table 3.21 The FMOLS results for CO2/E and EPS 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnEPS 0.025068** 0.00796 3.149091 0.0018 
T 14    
n 25    
N 350    
Adjusted R2 0.991965       
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnEPS(-1) 0.018524* 0.00806 2.298193 0.0223 
T 13    
n 25    
N 325    
Adjusted R2 0.99258       
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnEPS(-6) -0.019575* 0.009577 -2.043821 0.0427 
T 8    
n 25    
N 200    
Adjusted R2 0.993774       
Note: We use heterogenous first-stage long-run coefficients to estimate FMOLS models.  
 
The cointegrating relation between the same period EPS, 1-year lag of EPS and CO2/E is 
not necessarily a casual relationship. Rather, it might reflect an opposite casual 
relationship: higher current CO2/E may cause policy makers to increase the same period 
EPS and next period EPS. To further examine the short-run and long-run Granger-
causality, we estimate VECM for same period EPS, 1-year lag of EPS and 6-year lag of EPS 





According to VECM results for CO2/E and same period EPS in Table 3.22, the ECT in 
model for ∆ln⁡(𝐶𝑂2/𝐸)𝑡 and ECT in model for ∆ln𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡 are both negative and significant, 
indicating that there is long-run Granger-causality from EPS to CO2/E and from CO2/E to 
EPS as well. For the short-run dynamics, there is no evidence of short-run dynamics from 
EPS (from 1-year lag to 3-year lag) to CO2/E but there are significant positive impacts from 
1-year lag and 3-year lag of CO2/E to EPS, which implies there is short-run Granger-
causality from CO2/E to EPS but no short-run Granger-causality from EPS to CO2/E.  
The VECM results for (CO2/E)t and EPSt-1 in Table 3.23 show that the ECT in model for 
∆ln⁡(𝐶𝑂2/𝐸)𝑡 is negative and significant, indicating that there is long-run Granger-causality 
from EPSt-1 to (CO2/E)t. However, the ECT in model for ∆ln𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡−1 is not significant, 
indicating that there is no long-run Granger-causality from (CO2/E)t to EPSt-1. Also, we do 
not observe short-run dynamics from (CO2/E)t to EPSt-1 as well. Based on these results, it is 
likely that the stationary long-run equilibrium relation between (CO2/E)t and EPSt-1 is not 
due to a casual relation but due to the persistent trend in CO2/E series. Since (CO2/E)t has a 
Granger-causality with EPSt and there is persistent autoregressive relation between 
(CO2/E)t and (CO2/E)t-1, the stationary long-run equilibrium relation between (CO2/E)t and 
EPSt-1 may simply a reflection of the long-run equilibrium relation between (CO2/E)t and 
EPSt.  
Lastly, the VECM results for (CO2/E)t and EPSt-6 in Table 3.24 show that the ECT in 
model for ∆ln⁡(𝐶𝑂2/𝐸)𝑡 is negative and significant, indicating that there is long-run 
Granger-causality from EPSt-6 to (CO2/E)t. However, the ECT in model for ∆ln𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡−6 is not 
significant, indicating that there is no long-run Granger-causality from (CO2/E)t to EPSt-6. 
In all, we conclude that (CO2/E)t has a Granger-causality to EPSt. On the other side, 
EPSt-6 has a significant negative impact on (CO2/E)t. With 1% increase in EPSt-6, (CO2/E)t is 

















Table 3.22 The VECM results for CO2/E and EPS 
 ∆ln⁡(𝐶𝑂2/𝐸)𝑡 ∆ln𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡 
ECT -1.088*** -1.741*** 
 (0.075) (0.395) 
∆ln⁡(𝐶𝑂2/𝐸)𝑡−1 0.461*** 0.850* 
 (0.057) (0.329) 
∆ln⁡(𝐶𝑂2/𝐸)𝑡−2 0.121* 0.126 
 (0.049) (0.294) 
∆ln⁡(𝐶𝑂2/𝐸)𝑡−3 0.231*** 0.774* 
 (0.047) (0.321) 
∆ln𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡−1 -0.005 -0.059 
 (0.008) (0.056) 
∆ln𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡−2 -0.005 -0.111* 
 (0.008) (0.054) 
∆ln𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡−3 -0.0006 0.011 
 (0.008) (0.054) 
C -0.001 0.069*** 
 (0.002) (0.012) 













Table 3.23 The VECM results for CO2/E and 1-year lag of EPS 
 ∆ln⁡(𝐶𝑂2/𝐸)𝑡 ∆ln𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡−1 
ECT -1.153*** 0.098 
 (0.080) (0.577) 
∆ln⁡(𝐶𝑂2/𝐸)𝑡−1 0.504*** 0.403 
 (0.059) (0.429) 
∆ln⁡(𝐶𝑂2/𝐸)𝑡−2 0.114* 0.255 
 (0.050) (0.362) 
∆ln⁡(𝐶𝑂2/𝐸)𝑡−3 0.222*** 0.195 
 (0.048) (0.348) 
∆ln𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡−2 -0.001 -0.071 
 (0.008) (0.060) 
∆ln𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡−3 -0.005 -0.137* 
 (0.008) (0.060) 
∆ln𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡−4 0.006 -0.002 
 (0.008) (0.059) 
C -0.002 0.073*** 
 (0.002) (0.014) 
Note: The VECM is estimated using seemingly unrelated regression method. 
 
Table 3.24 The VECM results for CO2/E and 6-year lag of EPS 
 ∆ln⁡(𝐶𝑂2/𝐸)𝑡 ∆ln𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡−6 
ECT -1.571*** -0.436 
 (0.102) (0.966) 
∆ln⁡(𝐶𝑂2/𝐸)𝑡−1 0.638*** 0.059 
 (0.062) (0.594) 
∆ln⁡(𝐶𝑂2/𝐸)𝑡−2 0.223*** 0.048 
 (0.055) (0.519) 
∆ln𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡−7 0.004 -0.100 
 (0.008) (0.077) 
∆ln𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡−8 0.015 -0.146 
 (0.008) (0.079) 
C -0.004 0.097*** 
 (0.002) (0.019) 






3.4.5. Robustness Check 
To check the robustness of the cointegrating relations we identified using FMOLS 
models, we also use dynamic OLS (DOLS) to re-estimate each cointegrating relation we’ve 
identified.   
The estimation results are reported in Appendix B.2 Table B-18 and Table B-19. All 
estimates by DOLS are consistent with estimates by FMOLS. We implement two types of 
DOLS models: (1). DOLS based on SIC criterion to select the number of lead and lag 
included in the model; (2). DOLS with fixed 1 lead and 1 lag.  
The results from DOLS estimates based on SIC criterion indicate that several 
cointegrating relations become insignificant, including 4-year lag of CO2Tech, one-year lag 
of EPS and 6-year lag of EPS, although the sign of each estimate is consistent with the sign 
of the estimate by FMOLS. This is probably due to the reason that FMOLS procedure 
allows more heterogeneity than DOLS by using heterogenous first-stage long-run 
coefficients to estimate FMOLS models. Only the estimate for RE by DOLS with fixed 1 
lead and 1 lag is consistent with FMOLS. Other estimates by DOLS with fixed 1 lead and 1 
lag are insignificant and the sign for the estimate of 6-year lag of EPS even reverses. The 
main reason for the reverse estimate might be due to less periods included in DOLS with 
fixed 1 lead and 1 lag for 6-year EPS (6 periods included) than FMOLS for 6-year EPS (8 
periods included).  
 
3.5 PM2.5 Pollution  
3.5.1 Literature review on PM2.5 pollution abatement 
Basically, there are two kinds of sources of PM2.5: primary sources and secondary 
sources. Primary sources include incomplete combustion, automobile emissions, industry 
processing, dust and cooking. Secondary sources include chemical reactions in the 
atmosphere (Salvador, S., Salvador, EI, 2012).  
Early studies on PM focused on fundamental researches on measuring the chemical 
composition and formation of PM. Chow and Waston (2002) reviewed the Chemical Mass 
Balance (CMB) analyses in 22 studies and found that fossil fuel combustion to be a large 
contributor to PM2.5 and PM10 concentrations, with most of the primary contributions 
originating from diesel-and gasoline-powered vehicle exhaust. Coal- and oil-fired power 
stations have also been shown to be large contributors if without effective pollution 





have verified the sources of PM2.5 in urban areas. The analysis by Lewis, Norris, Conner, & 
Henry (2003) using the multivariate receptor model Unmix based on a 3-yr PM2.5 ambient 
aerosol data set collected in Phoenix, AZ, beginning in 1995 found five source categories: 
gasoline engines (33±4%), diesel engines (16±2%), secondary SO42- (19±2%), crustal/soil 
(22±2%), and vegetative burning (10±2%). Lonati, Giugliano, Butelli, Romele, & Tardivo 
(2005) found in Milan (Italy) that the primary contribution of the traffic source, in terms of 
carbonaceous matter, is estimated in 6% and 11% of the total PM2.5 mass, respectively, in 
the cold and warm season. The secondary organic aerosols (SOA) from traffic source 
contribute 30% of the total PM2.5 mass. Pérez, Pey, Cusack, Reche, Querol, Alastuey, & 
Viana (2010) found in Barcelona that PM2.5 increased during traffic rush hours, reflecting 
exhaust, and non-exhaust traffic emissions, and then decreased by the effect of breezes and 
the reduction of traffic intensity. PM2.5–10 levels did not decrease during the day as a result 
of dust resuspension by traffic and wind. The number of particles showed a second peak, 
registered in the afternoon and parallel to O3 levels and solar radiation intensity, that may 
be attributed to photochemical nucleation of precursor gases. Also, there are a series of 
studies which analyze the chemical composition of PM in China (e.g. Cao et al 2003; Cheng 
et al 2000; Wang et al 2006; Xu et al, 2004). Some Chinese scholars used PM2.5 on-site 
measured samples to identify the chemical composition of PM2.5 and potential sources to 
reduce emissions in Beijing and other Chinese cities (e.g. Duan et al, 2006; He et al, 2001; 
Huang et al, 2006; Song et al, 2006; Zhao, et al, 2013). Yao et al (2009) provides a detailed 
review of studies on formation and control of PM in China. Based on summarizing four 
studies on the source apportionment of PM2.5 in Beijing, China, Yao et al. (2009) conclude 
that three dominant primary sources of urban PM2.5 are: coal combustion (15%-20%), 
vehicle exhaust (5%-10%) and biomass burning (5%-12%).  
Recently, based on previous fundamental researches on the formation and control of PM, 
to better assess PM’s related climate and health impacts, and to provide a solid reference 
for policy makers to regulate primary pollution sources, great efforts have been made to 
quantify primary emissions of PM from various sources on global (EDGAR; Janssens-
Maenhout,et al,, 2012; Huang Y., et al, 2014), regional (Klimont, Z., et al, 2002; Zhang,Q, et 
al, 2009), and country (U.S. EPA NEI; NAEI; MEIC; Reddy,, M. 2002; Zhang, Q., 2007; Lei, 
Y., 2011; Zhao, Y., 2011) scales. These studies or databases estimate PM emissions based 
on identifying pollution sources and activities, their corresponding emission factors (defined 





reduction effects of adopted PM control technology. Globally, according to the estimation by 
Huang Y., et al (2014) for year of 2007, biomass burning, including wildfires, residential 
fuels, and agriculture wastes, accounted for 67.6% of total global PM2.5 emissions. Power 
generation contributed 6.4% of global PM2.5 emissions. Motor vehicles accounted for 0.8%-
1.4% of global PM2.5 emissions. 
By using China’s emission inventory (MEIC) as input into an environmentally extended 
input-output framework and applying structural decomposition analysis, Guan D. et al. 
(2014) find that three main primary sources of PM2.5 emissions in China from 1997-2010 
are: industrial processes (45%), biofuel combustion (26%) and coal combustion (25%). From 
an industrial sector consumption perspective, Guan D. et al. (2014) find that two sectors: 
construction (37%) and metals and machinery (18%) are the largest emission sectors in 
China. From a final demand consumption perspective, Guan D. et al. (2014) find that 
contributions by three categories of final demands to PM2.5 emission are: capital formation 
(32%-39%), household (15%-20%) and exports (9%-18%).  
However, studies on PM2.5 pollution abatement are still rare currently. Prakash and 
Potoski (2014) studied the efficacy of adoption of ISO 14001 on reducing the emissions of 
PM10 by analyzing a panel of 159 countries from 1991 to 2005 using a panel AR(1) model in 
first difference estimated by GMM (Arellano & Bond, 1991). Prakash and Potoski (2014) 
find that lagged PM10 level has a significant positive impact on current year’s PM10 level. 
Besides, they find that both GDP and the lagged number of ISO 14001 certifications in the 
country have significant negative impacts on PM10 level. Another related study by Another 
related study by Kasim (2017) used Discontinuity Based Ordinary Least Squares (DB-OLS) 
to examine the effect of an environmental disclosure policy on air quality in New South 
Wales (NSW), Australia. Kasim (2017) found that the concentration levels were not 
significantly affected after the implementation of the policy. The limitation of this research 
is that it only examined the data between 2011 and 2013 and the DB-OLS method only 




The dependent variable is PM2.5 pollution level measured by annul mean population 
exposure to PM2.5. Due to the feature that PM2.5 pollution level is closely related with 





in the atmosphere, I follow Prakash and Potoski (2014) and use a dynamic panel AR(1) 
model to evaluate the impact of CSR reporting regulation on PM2.5 pollution level. For the 
selection of independent variables, by referring to the literature on the primary sources of 
PM2.5 and Prakash and Potoski (2014), I select independent variables from five dimensions: 
(a). Total fossil fuel combustion amount: 
To control for the total fossil fuel combustion amount, I select total CO2 emissions from 
fossil fuel combustion as a proxy for the total fossil fuel combustion amount. It is expected 
that higher fossil fuel combustion amount will result in higher PM2.5 pollution level.  
(b). The main primary source of PM2.5 emissions: 
Different fuel types have different PM emission levels. Among three categories of fuel 
types: solid fuel, liquid fuel and gaseous fuel, solid fuel has relatively higher emission 
factors than other two types of fuel (Huang Y., et al, 2014, Table S1). Therefore, given the 
same total fuel combustion amount, the PM emissions may vary a lot due to different 
shares of three fuel types combustion. To control for the main primary source of PM2.5, I 
include CO2 emissions from solid fuel combustion (% of total CO2 emissions) as an 
independent variable.  
(c). PM2.5 related abatement policies or standards: 
Under this dimension, I include three independent variables: the inventory of CSR 
polices, Environmental Policy Stringency Index (EPS), and the number of ISO 14001 
certificates in a country. It is worthy to mention that a firm may seek ISO 14001 
certificates as a meant to practice environmental CSR. Thus, the number of ISO 14001 
certificates may be correlated with the inventory of CSR policies. However, since ISO 14001 
is instituted by International Organization of Standardization, not by governments and 
CSR policies may have an impact on PM2.5 pollution through other channels like promoting 
green finance, we still view these two variables as two different mechanisms.   
A concern of using the number of ISO 14001 certificates is that the monitoring system of 
ISO 14001 is based on a five-year review. There is a moral hazard problem that once a firm 
obtains the ISO 14001 certificate, it may not keep making efforts to meet the standard. 
Thus, I consider using two different specifications of the number of ISO 14001 certificates 
in a country: a). the level form; b). the first difference form. The level form measures the 
inventory of total ISO 14001 certificates in a country. The first difference form measures 
the number of firms which newly obtained ISO 14001 certificates in a country.  





Given the same total fuel combustion amount, the PM emissions may vary greatly 
depending on what control technology is adopted. To control for the impact of PM2.5 
abatement technology, I use the lagged number of published applications for patents of 
emission abatement invention as a proxy of the PM2.5 abatement technology development, 
including emission abatement patents on SOx, NOx, PM emissions.  
(e). Other important influencing factors: 
Since annul mean population exposure to PM2.5 uses annual mean PM2.5 concentration 
estimates divided by total population, I further include total population of a country as a 
control variable.  
Our two model specifications are as follows: 
(a). 𝑃𝑀2.5𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖 + 𝜌𝑃𝑀2.5𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑂2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑑𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝐶𝑂2𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽4𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐼𝑆𝑂14001𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑃𝑀2.5𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑻𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 
(36) 
(b). 𝑃𝑀2.5𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖 + 𝜌𝑃𝑀2.5𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑂2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑑𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝐶𝑂2𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽4𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6∆𝐼𝑆𝑂14001𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑃𝑀2.5𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑻𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 
(37) 
where the subscript i denotes country and t denotes year. PM2.5i,t is the annul mean 
population exposure to PM2.5. TotalCO2i,t is the total CO2 emissions (kt) from fossil fuel 
combustion. Populationi,t is the total population. SolidFuelCO2i,t is the CO2 emissions (kt) 
from solid fuel combustion. CSRi,t represents the inventory of general sustainable CSR 
policies (CSR1) or the inventory of environmental CSR policies (CSR3). EPSi,t is the 
environmental policy stringency index. ISO14001i,t is the total number of ISO14001 
certificates in a country. PM2.5Techi,t-1 is the lagged number of published applications for 
patents of emission abatement invention. All these variables are in log forms. 𝛽𝑖 is the 
country specific fixed effect. 𝑻𝑡 is the time fixed effect for year 2000 to year 2014. 𝑖𝑡 is the 
error term.  
For a dynamic AR(1) model, since the lagged values of dependent variables are positively 
correlated with the unobservable unit specific fixed effects, it is well known that there is an 
incidental-parameter-induced bias for the Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) estimator 
as pointed out by Nickell (1981). 
In the literature, there are three categories of approaches developed as alternatives to 





instruments (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Anderson and Hsiao, 1981, 1982; Arellano and 
Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998), among which first-difference GMM estimator 
developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) is the most common approached in practical 
empirical work with dynamic panel regression. However, this method often suffers from 
problems of inefficiency and substantial bias, especially when there is weak instrument as 
pointed out by Han, Phillips, and Sul (2014). The second category of approaches are bias-
corrected LSDV estimators (LSDVC) which correct for the bias of LSDV estimators based 
on parametric assumptions (Kiviet, 1995, 1999; Bun and Kiviet, 2003; Hahn and 
Kuersteiner, 2002; Bruno, 2005). The Monte Carlo evidence from Kiviet (1995), Judson and 
Owen (1999), and Bun and Kiviet (2003) suggest that LSDVC estimator is more efficient 
than LSDV estimator, first-difference 2SLS estimator (Aderson and Hsiao, 1981, 1982), 
first-differenced GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991), and system GMM estimator 
(Blundell and Bond, 1998) at the aspects of bias and root mean squared error (RMSE) for 
small or moderately large samples. The third category of approaches is bias-free parametric 
estimation (Hsiao, Pesaran, and Tahmiscioglu, 2002; Kruiniger, 2008; Han and Phillips, 
2010; Han, Phillips, and Sul, 2014). Particularly, the recently developed bias-free 
parametric estimation method: panel fully aggregated estimator (PFAE) by Han, Phillips, 
and Sul (2014) is shown to have strong asymptotic and finite sample performance 
characteristics that dominate other procedures such as LSDVC estimators, GMM 
estimators, and system GMM estimators in evaluating dynamic panel models. The PFAE 
estimator uses a novel form of systematic differencing, called “X-differencing”, which 
eliminates unit specific fixed effects and make full use of all the information in the data.   
Therefore, I estimate equation (36) and (37) by using three estimation approaches: first-
difference GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991), LSDVC estimator, and PFAE 
estimator (Han, Phillips, and Sul, 2014). Due to the superior characteristic of PFAE 













The PM2.5 and PM2.5Tech data is collected from OECD.Stat. The total population data 
and CO2 emissions (kt) from solid fuel combustion data are collected from World Bank. The 
data of ISO 14001 certificates is collected from The ISO Survey of Management System 
Standard Certifications (1999-2016). The sources of other data are specified as before. After 
matching the data, we form a balanced panel data set of 25 countries from year 2000 to 
year 2014. The list of countries in the panel data set can be referred to Table 3.2.  
Descriptive statistics of the data are presented in Table 3.25. All variables are in log 
forms. The figures of PM2.5 for 25 countries in the panel are presented in Figure 3.6. From 
PM2.5 figures, we can see that there is a lot of variations from year to year and there seems 
no persistent trend for most countries. A panel unit root test for PM2.5 is provided in the 
next section 3.5.4 Results.  
 
Table 3.25 Descriptive Statistics for PM2.5 Panel Data Set 
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max 
PM2.5 18.00 10.63 5.60 55.42 
TotalCO2 219608.8 478793.4 8395.0 2818700 
Population 1.40E+08 3.33E+08 3805174 1.36E+09 
SolidFuelCO2 33.28 18.87 1.17 75.92 
CSR1 0.74 1.19 0 7 
CSR3 1.93 2.37 0 12 
EPS 2.24 0.83 0.52 4.13 
ISO 14001 4653.63 9463.26 20 80292 
PM2.5Tech 392.55 755.61 0 2847.63 
Note:  
1. All variables in the level forms. 
2. PM2.5 is measured by annual mean population exposure to PM2.5. TotalCO2 is measured by total 
CO2 emissions (kt). SolidFuelCO2 is measured by CO2 emissions from solid fuel combustion (% 























































































































































































































Since dynamic panel AR(1) model requires that the dependent variable has no unit root, 
I first take a IPS (2003) panel unit root test for PM2.5. The results are reported in Table 
3.26. The null hypothesis H0: All of the series are I(1) is rejected for both level form and 
first difference form of PM2.5 with or without trend at the significance level of 0.001. Thus, 
we conclude that there is no unit root in PM2.5 series.  
 
Table 3.26 IPS (2003) panel unit root test for PM2.5 series (2000-2014) 
Variables IPS (2003) 
 H0: All of the series are I(1) 
 H1: At least one of the series is I(0) 
  Without Trend With Trend 
lnPM2.5 -8.07558(0-2)*** -7.87034(0-2)*** 
ln(PM2.5) -15.0243(0-2)*** -12.2273(0-1)*** 
Notes:  
1. “***”, significant at 0.001; “**”, significant at 0.01; “*”, significant at 0.05; “” significant at 0.1.  
2. The automatic lag length selection based on SIC is specified in the parentheses. 
 
A. Baseline models 
Next, we proceed to estimate dynamic panel AR(1) model specified in equation (33) and 
equation (34). For a purpose of comparison, we use three estimation methods: first-
difference GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991), LSDVC estimator, and PFAE 
estimator (Han, Phillips, and Sul, 2014). However, due to the advantage of PFAE method, 
we draw conclusions based on PFAE estimates. The first-difference GMM estimators are 
estimated by Eviews 10. The LSDVC estimators are estimated by STATA 15 using the 
command xtlsdvc. The PFAE estimators are estimated by R version 3.4.3. The results are 
reported in Table 3.27 and Table 3.28.  
The PFAE estimate results suggest that the same period inventory of general 
sustainability CSR policies (CSR1) has a significant negative impact on PM2.5 annual mean 
population exposure. With 1% increase in the number of CSR1, PM2.5 is estimated to drop 
by [0.030%, 0.085%] (95% C.I.) (Table 3.27, PFAE model 2). However, we do not find any 
significant impact of the inventory of environmental CSR policies (CSR3) on PM2.5. One 
possible explanation to this result is that environmental CSR policies are more specific to 





materials, greenhouse gas emissions and so on. Some environmental CSR policies may not 
be directly related with air quality. However, general sustainability CSR policies usually 
have a broader scope on environmental issues. The EPS is estimated to have a significant 
negative impact on PM2.5. With 1% increase in EPS, PM2.5 is estimated to drop by 
[0.010%, 0.054%] (95% C.I.) (Table 3.27, PFAE model 2). An interesting result is obtained 
for ISO14001. It is estimated that the level form of ISO14001 has a significant positive 
impact on PM2.5 while the first difference of ISO14001 has a significant negative impact on 
PM2.5. The positive correlation might reflect an inverse causality that the increasing 
number of ISO14001 certificates is driven by PM2.5 pollution level. Higher PM2.5 pollution 
level may cause more public concern on air quality which may provide firms more 
incentives to seek ISO14001 certificates to stand out in the market. However, due to the 
moral hazard problem as we speculated before, only firms which newly obtain ISO14001 
certificates bring a significant negative impact on PM2.5. 
As far as for some other influencing factors, we find that lagged PM2.5 has a significant 
positive impact on current year PM2.5 by both PFAE and LSDVC estimations. This result 
confirms the specification of a dynamic panel AR(1) model. The TotalCO2 is estimated to 
have a significant positive impact on PM2.5 by PFAE estimation, consistent with our 
expectation. With 1% increase in TotalCO2, PM2.5 is estimated to increase by [0.008%, 
0.126%] (95% C.I.) (Table 3.27, PFAE model 2). The SolidFuelCO2 is found to have a 
significant positive impact on PM2.5 (Table 3.27 PFAE Model 2 and Table 3.28 PFAE 
Model 2). With 1% increase in SolidFuelCO2, PM2.5 is estimated to increase by [0.032%, 
0.216%] (95% C.I.) (Table 3.27, PFAE model 2). Comparing with the impact of TotalCO2 on 
PM2.5, SolidFuelCO2 has a larger impact on PM2.5. We do not find significant impact of 
Population on PM2.5. Although Population is expected to have negative impact on PM2.5 
since annual mean exposure to PM2.5 is weighted by Population, it may also have a positive 
impact on PM2.5 due to more production and consumption activities related with higher 
total population. Thus, the impact of Population on PM2.5 is uncertain, depending on which 
direction of effects dominates. The PM2.5Tech is found to have a significant positive impact 
on PM2.5. This result may suggest that currently the development of PM2.5 abatement 
technology is still driven by PM2.5 pollution level but has not exhibited significant impacts 






Table 3.27 Baseline models: dynamic panel AR(1) estimate results for PM2.5 model (using CSR1) 
Variables 
PM2.5 
First-Difference GMM LSDVC PFAE 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
PM2.5i,t-1 0.009 0.017 0.698*** 0.707*** 0.243*** 0.263*** 
 (0.123) (0.142) (0.055) (0.056) (0.021) (0.023) 
TotalCO2 -0.610 -0.388 -0.0002 -0.015 0.080** 0.067* 
 (1.200) (0.848) (0.113) (0.115) (0.026) (0.030) 
Population -0.474 11.371 0.370 0.472 -0.045 -0.0003 
 (16.462) (27.371) (0.878) (0.880) (0.082) (0.095) 
SolidFuelCO2 1.048 1.130 0.107 0.113 0.059 0.124** 
 (1.312) (1.687) (0.160) (0.160) (0.041) (0.047) 
CSR1 -0.162 -0.212 -0.034 -0.033 -0.068*** -0.057*** 
 (0.357) (0.445) (0.054) (0.055) (0.013) (0.014) 
EPS 0.070 0.071 -0.026 -0.021 -0.025* -0.032** 
 (0.171) (0.248) (0.040) (0.040) (0.010) (0.011) 
ISO14001 0.119  0.009  0.034***  
 (0.233)  (0.043)  (0.005)  
ISO14001  0.264  -0.056  -0.029** 
  (0.441)  (0.079)  (0.010) 
PM2.5Techi,t-1 -0.014 0.053 0.016 0.017 0.016*** 0.021*** 
 (0.050) (0.125) (.0133) (0.013) (0.005) (0.005) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
n 25 25 25 25 25 25 
T 13 13 14 13 15 14 
N 325 325 350 325 1950 1650 
















  p-value: < 2.2e-
16 
p-value: < 2.2e-16 
 
Notes:  
1. “***”, significant at 0.001; “**”, significant at 0.01; “*”, significant at 0.05; “” significant at 0.1.  
2. All variables are in logarithm forms. 
3. For first-difference GMM estimator, we use two lags of PM2.5 from 2 to 3 as instruments. Also, we use 
White period instrument weighting matrix and White period standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected).  




). The S.E. is obtained by using 50 times bootstrap process.  





Table 3.28 Baseline models: dynamic panel AR(1) main estimate results for PM2.5 model (using CSR3) 
Variables 
PM2.5 
First-Difference GMM LSDVC PFAE 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
PM2.5i,t-1 -0.018 -0.008 0.650*** 0.660*** 0.251*** 0.274*** 
 (0.134) (0.112) (0.057) (0.057) (0.021) (0.023) 
TotalCO2 0.285 -0.096 -0.011 -0.026 0.064* 0.050 
 (1.461) (0.698) (0.111) (0.112) (0.027) (0.030) 
Population -4.265 0.463 0.327 0.435 -0.064 -0.022 
 (15.402) (19.311) (0.883) (0.884) (0.084) (0.096) 
SolidFuelCO2 0.006 0.554 0.128 0.138 0.062 0.124** 
 (1.569) (1.337) (0.157) (0.156) (0.042) (0.048) 
CSR3 0.071 0.005 0.020 0.018 -0.009 0.004 
 (0.239) (0.235) (0.050) (0.049) (0.011) (0.013) 
EPS 0.139 0.115 -0.024 -0.018 -0.018 -0.027* 
 (0.171) (0.157) (0.039) (0.038) (0.010) (0.011) 
ISO14001 -0.058  0.015  0.033***  
 (0.308)  (0.043)  (0.005)  
ISO14001  0.089  -0.065  -0.028** 
  (0.330)  (0.076)  (0.010) 
PM2.5Techi,t-1 -0.013 0.010 0.015 0.016 0.017*** 0.022*** 
 (0.065) (0.101) (0.014) (0.013) (0.005) (0.005) 
Year 
Dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
n 25 25 25 25 25 25 
T 13 13 14 13 15 14 
N 325 325 350 325 1950 1650 
















  p-value: < 2.2e-16 p-value: < 2.2e-16 
Notes:  
1. “***”, significant at 0.001; “**”, significant at 0.01; “*”, significant at 0.05; “” significant at 0.1.  
2. All variables are in logarithm forms. 
3. For first-difference GMM estimator, we use two lags of PM2.5 from 2 to 3 as instruments. Also, we use 
White period instrument weighting matrix and White period standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected).  




). The S.E. is obtained by using 50 times bootstrap process.  






B. Models with lag structures 
Since there might be time lag for CSR policies and registered PM2.5 reduction technology 
patents to take effects on PM2.5 pollution level, we further estimate models with one to four 
years lag structures for CSR1, CSR3 and PM2.5Tech by using PFAE estimation method. 
For CSR1, we include the same period of CSR1 in all lag structure specifications since it is 
estimated to have a significant negative impact on PM2.5. For CSR3, we do not include the 
current period of CSR3 for all lag structure specifications since the estimates for CSR3 in 
the baseline model is not significant and inclined to be positive. For all models with lag 
structures, we use first difference of ISO14001 as a control variable rather than using 
ISO14001 since the first difference of ISO14001 is estimated to be a causal factor to reduce 
the PM2.5 pollution level while ISO14001 is not based on baseline models. The estimation 
results on models with lag structures are reported in Table 3.29 and Table 3.30.  
The results of models using CSR1 show that the current period CSR1 has a robust 
negative impact on PM2.5 among all lag structure specifications. And the estimates for the 
current period of CSR1 are between -0.11 to -0.08, significant at 1%. The 95% C.I.’s of 
elasticity of annual mean PM2.5 exposure with respect to the inventory of current period 
CSR1 is [0.036%, 0.166%] (Table 3.29 Model 4). Besides, we also find that 3-year lag of 
CSR1 has a significant negative impact on PM2.5. The 95% C.I.’s of elasticity of annual 
mean PM2.5 exposure with respect to the inventory of 3-year lag of CSR1 is [0.040%, 0.178%] 
(Table 3.29 Model 4). 
However, we also find that 2-year lag of CSR1 is estimated to have a significant positive 
impact on PM2.5. There might be two possible reasons for we to find a significant positive 
estimate of 2-year lag of CSR1 policies. First, CSR1 policies cover a broad scope of general 
sustainability, including CSR governance, environmental CSR and social CSR. In practice, 
implementing CSR1 may result in a short-run effect of increasing PM2.5 pollution. Second, it 
may be due to the need to balance the total negative impacts of CSR1 policies. In fact, the 
positive estimate for 2-year lag of CSR1 disappear in our robustness check, which we 
postpone presenting it in Section 3.5.4 Robustness Check. However, considering the total 
effects of CSR1 from the current period up to 4-year lag, the negative impacts of CSR1 on 





The results of models using CSR3 show that 3-year lag of CSR3 has a robust negative 
impact on PM2.5 pollution level. The estimates are between -0.113 to -0.038 among different 
lag structure specifications, significant at 0.1% to 5%.  
For PM2.5Tech, models using CSR1 suggest that 4-year lag of PM2.5Tech has a 
significant negative impact on PM2.5. The estimate is -0.012, significant at 10%. However, 
the estimate for 4-year lag of PM2.5Tech in models using CSR3 is not significant. This may 
suggest that the impacts of PM2.5Tech on reducing the PM2.5 pollution level is still limited.  
The estimates for other variables of interests in models with lag structures are 



























Table 3.29 PM2.5 models with lag structures using CSR1  
Variables 












PM2.5i,t-1 0.264*** 0.259*** 0.277*** 0.272*** 0.309*** 
 (0.023) (0.025) (0.028) (0.028) (0.030) 
TotalCO2 0.085** 0.123*** 0.110** 0.119** 0.063 
 (0.030) (0.035) (0.041) (0.041) (0.045) 
Population -0.022 -0.108 -0.222 -0.168 -0.029 
 (0.095) (0.110) (0.131) (0.130) (0.154) 
SolidFuelCO2 0.105* 0.063 0.109 0.118 0.166* 
 (0.048) (0.054) (0.062) (0.062) (0.069) 
CSR1 -0.087** -0.109*** -0.103** -0.101** -0.099** 
 (0.028) (0.030) (0.033) (0.033) (0.036) 
CSR1i,t-1 0.022 -0.026 -0.033 -0.036 -0.004 
 (0.028) (0.041) (0.044) (0.044) (0.048) 
CSR1i,t-2  0.034 0.129** 0.124** 0.085 
  (0.032) (0.045) (0.045) (0.048) 
CSR1i,t-3   -0.107** -0.109** -0.149** 
   (0.035) (0.035) (0.048) 
CSR1i,t-4     0.017 
     (0.039) 
EPS -0.036** -0.015 -0.024 -0.029* -0.012 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) 
ISO14001 -0.028** -0.035** -0.042** -0.045*** -0.018 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) 
PM2.5Techi,t-1 0.022***     
 (0.005)     
PM2.5Techi,t-2  0.005    
  (0.006)    
PM2.5Techi,t-3   0.021***   
   (0.006)   
PM2.5Techi,t-4     -0.012 
     (0.007) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
n 25 25 25 25 25 
T 14 13 12 12 11 
N 1650 1375 1125 1125 900 
Adjusted R2 0.4342 0.4581 0.471 0.4662 0.3273 
F-Statistic F(22,1628)=58.55,  
p-value: < 2.2e-16 
F(22,1353)=53.83,  
p-value: < 2.2e-16 
F(22,1103)=46.53,  
p-value: < 2.2e-16 
F(21,1104)=47.79,  
p-value: < 2.2e-16 
F(22,878)=20.91,  
p-value: < 2.2e-16 






Table 3.30 PM2.5 models with lag structures using CSR3 
Variables 












PM2.5i,t-1 0.274*** 0.275*** 0.282*** 0.278*** 0.310*** 
 (0.022) (0.025) (0.028) (0.028) (0.030) 
TotalCO2 0.044 0.061 0.058 0.066 0.019 
 (0.030) (0.034) (0.039) (0.040) (0.044) 
Population -0.029 -0.058 -0.158 -0.098 0.012 
 (0.095) (0.112) (0.132) (0.131) (0.154) 
SolidFuelCO2 0.122* 0.111* 0.164** 0.176** 0.234*** 
 (0.048) (0.054) (0.062) (0.063) (0.069) 
CSR3i,t-1 0.019     
 (0.014)     
CSR3i,t-2  -0.004    
  (0.015)    
CS33i,t-3   -0.038* -0.041* -0.113*** 
   (0.017) (0.017) (0.030) 
CS31i,t-4     0.034 
     (0.030) 
EPS -0.024* -0.007 -0.022 -0.027 -0.015 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) 
ISO14001 -0.027** -0.041*** -0.050*** -0.053*** -0.025 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) 
PM2.5Techi,t-1 0.023***     
 (0.005)     
PM2.5Techi,t-2  0.006    
  (0.006)    
PM2.5Techi,t-3   0.022***   
   (0.006)   
PM2.5Techi,t-4     -0.011 
     (0.007) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
n 25 25 25 25 25 
T 14 13 12 12 11 
N 1650 1375 1125 1125 900 
Adjusted R2 0.4281 0.4426 0.4569 0.4516 0.3134 
F-Statistic F(21,1629)=59.83,  
p-value: < 2.2e-16 
F(20,1355)=55.59,  
p-value: < 2.2e-16 
F(19,1106)=50.81,  
p-value: < 2.2e-16 
F(18,1107)=52.46,  
p-value: < 2.2e-16 
F(19,881)=22.63,  
p-value: < 2.2e-16 







3.5.5 Robustness Check 
Since some countries do not issue any general sustainability CSR policies or 
environmental CSR policies during the period over 2000 to 2014 we examined, there might 
be a problem of outliers in the dimension of CSR policies which may cause estimates for 
CSR policies to be misleading. To check the robustness of our estimates, particularly for 
CSR policies, we re-estimate models by using PFAE method on a smaller sample which 
exclude countries which the inventory of general sustainability CSR policies or 
environmental CSR policies is all zero for all years.  
For CSR1, we get a smaller sample which includes 17 countries: Austria, China, 
Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Turkey, UK, and U.S.A. In another word, 8 countries are dropped because CSR1 is 
zero in all years: Belgium, Czech Republic, Greece, Ireland, Poland, Slovakia, South Korea, 
Switzerland.  
For CSR3, we get a smaller sample which includes 21 countries. In another word, 4 
countries are dropped because CSR3 is zero in all years: Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, 
and Switzerland.  
The results of robustness check are presented in Appendix B.3. Robustness Check Table 
B- 22 and Table B-23. The results show that both current period of CSR1 and 3-year lag of 
CSR1 have significant negative impacts on PM2.5. Instead of 3-year lag of CSR3, 4-year lag 
of CSR3 has a significant negative impact on PM2.5. These results are basically consistent 
with what we have by using the full sample. Besides, estimates for other control variables 
are consistent with estimates on the full sample as well.  
 
3.6 Conclusions and Policy Implications 
In this chapter, we analyzed the effects of CSR policies on energy usage efficiency 
measured by energy intensity, total CO2 emissions characterized by carbon intensity of 
energy, and PM2.5 pollution level of a country based on a panel data set of 25 developed and 
developing countries from 2000-2014.  
Based on dynamic panel model estimation, we find that both the current period and 3-
yer lag of inventory of general sustainability CRS reporting regulation policies (CSR1) have 
significant impacts on reducing PM2.5 pollution levels. The 95% C.I.’s of elasticity of annual 
mean PM2.5 exposure with respect to the inventory of current period CSR1 is [0.036%, 





exposure with respect to the inventory of 3-year lag of CSR1 is [0.040%, 0.178%] (Table 3.29 
Model 4). The inventory of 3-year lag of environmental CSR reporting regulation policies 
(CSR3) is also estimated to have a negative impact on PM2.5 pollution levels. The 95% C.I.’s 
of elasticity of annual mean PM2.5 exposure with respect to the inventory of 3-year lag of 
CSR3 is [0.008%, 0.074%] (Table 3.30 Model 4). 
However, based on panel cointegration tests and cointegrating relations analysis, we do 
not find any significant impact of the inventory of CSR1 or environmental CSR reporting 
regulation instruments (CSR3) on carbon intensity of energy. Particularly, we find that 3-
year lag of the inventory of CSR3 has a significant positive impact on energy intensity. This 
might be due to the reason that all CSR reporting policies on pollution abatement and 
pollution control are classified into the category of environmental CSR policies. More 
environmental CSR policies on pollution control may have a significant effect on increasing 
the cost to producers to meet the requirements or expected standards in the short run. 
However, it is likely that the cost on pollution control or abatement may be balanced over a 
longer time period and the negative effect on firms’ energy efficiency may disappear in the 
long run.  
We also find that the environmental policy stringency index (EPS) has significant 
impacts on reducing energy intensity, carbon intensity of energy, and PM2.5 pollution levels. 
However, the impacts of EPS on energy intensity and carbon intensity differ depending on 
the length of lags. For energy intensity, we find that both 2-year lag and 3-year lag of EPS 
have significant impacts on reducing energy intensity. The estimate indicates that with 1% 
increase of 2-year lag of EPS, the energy intensity is estimated to drop by [0.00165%, 
0.0523%] (95% C.I.). And with 1% increase of 3-year lag of EPS, the energy intensity is 
estimated to drop by [0.0127%, 0.0686%] (95% C.I.). For carbon intensity of energy, we find 
that higher carbon intensity of energy result in higher EPS in the same period. However, 6-
year lag of EPS has a significant impact on reducing carbon intensity of energy. With 1% 
increase in EPSt-6, (CO2/E)t is reduced by [0.000649%, 0.0385%] (95% C.I.). For PM2.5 
pollution level, with 1% increase in EPS, PM2.5 is estimated to drop by [0.010%, 0.054%] 
(95% C.I.). 
Compared with the impacts of market based environmental policies and emission limit 
standards represented by EPS, CSR policies have relatively stronger and more significant 





and no significant impact on carbon intensity of energy. Overall, there is no evidence that 
CSR policies have any impact on reducing CO2 emissions of a country.  
Besides, we find some other relating factors to a country’s energy intensity, carbon 
intensity of energy and PM2.5 pollution level. For energy intensity, we find that the same 
period aggregate R&D expenditure has a significant impact on reducing energy intensity. 
The relative aggregate energy price (AEPoP) has quite complicated impacts on energy 
intensity. It is estimated that 2-year lag and 4-year lag of AEPoP have significant impacts 
on increasing the energy intensity while 6-year lag, 7-year lag and 8-year lag of AEPoP 
have significant impacts on reducing the energy intensity. The positive impacts of AEPoP 
on energy intensity might be due to a combination of positive energy price elasticity of 
primary energy supply in the short run and inelasticity of energy demand in the short run. 
The negative impacts of AEPoP on energy intensity may be due to the negative elasticity of 
energy demand in the long run. For carbon intensity of energy, the same period renewable 
energy consumption rate is found to have a significant impact on reducing the carbon 
intensity of energy. Also, 4-year lag of the number of CO2 emissions abatement technology 
is found to have a significant small impact on reducing the carbon intensity of energy. For 
PM2.5 pollution level, the total CO2 emissions and the CO2 emissions from solid fuel 
combustion are found to have significant impacts on increasing PM2.5 pollution level. An 
interesting result is obtained for the number of ISO14001 certificates (ISO14001). It is 
estimated that the level form of ISO14001 has a significant positive impact on PM2.5 while 
the first difference of ISO14001 has a significant negative impact on PM2.5. The positive 
correlation might reflect an inverse causality that the increasing number of ISO14001 
certificates is driven by PM2.5 pollution level. Higher PM2.5 pollution level may cause more 
public concern on air quality which may provide firms more incentives to seek ISO14001 
certificates to stand out in the market. Since the monitoring system of ISO 14001 
certificates is based on a five-year review, due to the moral hazard problem, it seems that 
only firms which newly obtain ISO14001 certificates bring a significant impact on reducing 
PM2.5 pollution level.  
Currently, our measurement of CSR reporting regulation instruments is only based on 
the number of inventory. A better measurement of CSR reporting regulation instruments, 
like the stringency of CSR reporting regulation is worthy to be developed in future to have a 
better evaluation results on CSR reporting regulation impacts, like environmental policy 





time periods we have in conducting panel time series analysis and panel cointegration 
analysis. Future studies on evaluation of CSR policies may need to further examine the 
robustness of our findings when more periods of CSR policies data are available. For future 
CSR reporting regulation, more effort on enhancing the stringency of instruments, like 
monitoring the CSR reports’ quality, is suggested to improve the effectiveness of CSR 
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Appendix A TECHNICAL APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 1 
Appendix A.1: The C.D.F. of Level and Differences Variables11 
 
 
                                                          
11 “MW” means the bordering countries’ weighted average. “EW” means top 5 exports destination 
countries’ weighted average. The solid line depicted C.D.F. function. The dotted line depicted the 

















































Appendix A.2: LARS-Lasso Estimates Coefficients Plots (left) and Cp Plots 
Equation 1: Total CSR Policies 
 
Equation 2: Mandatory CSR Policies 
 






Equation 4: General Sustainability CSR Policies 
 
Equation 5: CSR Governance Policies 
 




























Appendix A.3: Robustness Check 
Table A- 1 The SUR Estimates for Complete Models with Lagged Differences of Social Economic Factors 
Policies Change (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 









Long Differences in logs-Long 
Differences in logs & Level in logs               
Intercept -1.279 -1.723 -2.169 -1.445 -1.060 -1.106 -1.552 
 
(1.145) (1.172) (1.072) (1.127) (0.935) (1.149) (1.073) 
Differences in log Democracy 2006 
and log Democracy 2015 
0.438 -0.818 0.855 0.447 0.707 -0.324 0.177 
(1.185) (1.256) (1.118) (1.155) (0.945) (1.201) (1.098) 
Differences in log GDP 1995 and log 
GDP 2005 
-0.016 0.309 -0.249 -0.137 -0.240 0.076 -0.204 
(0.346) (0.370) (0.322) (0.342) (0.276) (0.363) (0.325) 
Differences in log Stock Market 
Capitalization (%GDP) 1995 and log 
Stock Market Capitalization 
(%GDP) 2005 
0.031 0.094 -0.025 0.036 0.021 0.023 0.059 
(0.110) (0.117) (0.103) (0.106) (0.088) (0.111) (0.101) 
Differences in log GHG emissions 
per capita 1995 and log GHG 
emissions per capita 2005 
0.615 0.343 0.577 0.593 0.664 0.548 0.757 
(0.524) (0.549) (0.501) (0.512) (0.419) (0.538) (0.505) 
Differences in log PM2.5 air 
pollution 1995 and log PM2.5 air 
pollution 2005 
1.480 0.106 1.293 0.671 0.460 1.312 0.733 
(0.868) (0.847) (0.809) (0.750) (0.634) (0.838) (0.735) 
Differences in log Weighted Average 
Top 5 Exports Destination 
Countries' CSR Policies 2000 and  
log Weighted Average Top 5 Exports 
Destination Countries' CSR Policies 
2015 
-0.074 0.371 -0.327 0.550 -0.245 0.261 0.529 
(0.378) (0.388) (0.298) (0.290) (0.331) (0.335) (0.313) 
Differences in log Weighted Average 
Bordering Countries' CSR Policies 
2000 and log Weighted Average 
Bordering Countries' CSR Policies 
2015 
-0.166 -0.027 -0.156 -0.151 0.050 -0.183 -0.183 
(0.119) (0.134) (0.111) (0.116) (0.096) (0.115) (0.105) 
Differences in log International 
Organizations' Accumulative 
Promotion Effort 2000 and log 
International Organizations' 
Accumulative Promotion Effort2015 
0.029 0.002 0.003 0.039 0.016 0.030 0.024 
(0.028) (0.029) (0.031) (0.027) (0.024) (0.029) (0.026) 
Log Democracy 2006 -0.008 0.299 0.639 -0.135 0.320 -0.310 -0.194 
 
(0.510) (0.526) (0.478) (0.497) (0.406) (0.513) (0.473) 
Log GDP 2000 0.236** 0.160 0.230** 0.174* 0.155* 0.199* 0.190** 
 
(0.077) (0.080) (0.071) (0.074) (0.060) (0.079) (0.069) 
Log Stock Market Capitalization 
(%GDP) 2000 
-0.104 0.035 -0.108 0.040 0.006 -0.099 0.048 
(0.114) (0.119) (0.112) (0.110) (0.091) (0.117) (0.105) 
Log GHG emissions per capita 2000 -0.076 -0.004 0.043 0.020 0.109 -0.099 -0.029 
(0.155) (0.166) (0.142) (0.150) (0.121) (0.163) (0.145) 
Log PM2.5 Air Pollution (mean 
annual exposure by micrograms per 
cubic meter) 2000 
-0.330 -0.169 -0.002 -0.178 -0.046 -0.323 -0.250 
(0.217) (0.227) (0.203) (0.214) (0.176) (0.220) (0.202) 
Log Weighted Average Top 5 
Exports Destination Countries' CSR 
Policies 2000 
-0.448 0.425 -0.960 0.870 0.972 -0.105 0.484 
(0.331) (0.309) (1.084) (0.672) (0.529) (0.300) (0.400) 
Log Weighted Average Bordering 
Countries' CSR Policies 2000 
-0.050 -0.201 0.679 -1.455 0.017 -0.109 -0.327 
(0.176) (0.282) (0.717) (1.972) (0.337) (0.316) (0.261) 
Log International Organizations' 
Accumulative Promotion Effort till 
year 2000 
-0.125 -0.088 -0.106 -0.116 -0.159 -0.008 -0.074 
(0.148) (0.151) (0.142) (0.146) (0.121) (0.151) (0.138) 
Adjusted R2 0.02358
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Table A- 2 The LARS-Lasso Refined Models Estimates with Lagged Social Economic Factors 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 









Long Differences in logs-Long 
Differences in logs & Level in logs               
Intercept -0.846 -1.246* -1.632** -1.524* -1.342* -1.049 -
1.706**  
(0.592) (0.560) (0.601) (0.577) (0.542) (0.606) (0.534) 
Differences in log Democracy 2006 
and log Democracy 2015 
   0.571   
   (0.834)   
Differences in log GDP 1995 and log 
GDP 2005 
  -0.136  -0.042  
  (0.250)  (0.219)  
Differences in log Stock Market 
Capitalization (%GDP) 1995 and log 
Stock Market Capitalization 
(%GDP) 2005 
  -0.088    
  (0.078)    
Differences in log GHG emissions 
per capita 1995 and log GHG 
emissions per capita 2005 
      
      
Differences in log PM2.5 air 
pollution 1995 and log PM2.5 air 
pollution 2005 
  0.934 0.866 0.889*  1.039* 
  (0.554) (0.523) (0.434)  (0.479) 
Differences in log Weighted Average 
Top 5 Exports Destination 
Countries' CSR Policies 2000 and  
log Weighted Average Top 5 Exports 
Destination Countries' CSR Policies 
2015 
   0.624*  0.505 0.429 
   (0.307)  (0.265) (0.290) 
Differences in log Weighted Average 
Bordering Countries' CSR Policies 
2000 and log Weighted Average 
Bordering Countries' CSR Policies 
2015 
      
      
Differences in log International 
Organizations' Accumulative 
Promotion Effort 2000 and log 
International Organizations' 
Accumulative Promotion Effort2015 
  0.042* 0.037 0.028  
  (0.019) (0.021) (0.017)  
Log GDP 2000 0.132* 0.160** 0.185*** 0.145** 0.165*** 0.114* 0.175**
*  
(0.053) (0.050) (0.052) (0.049) (0.046) (0.053) (0.046) 
Log Weighted Average Top 5 
Exports Destination Countries' CSR 
Policies 2000 
    1.644*  
    (0.694)  
N 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 
Adjusted R2 0.08872 0.1465 0.3371 0.1932 0.2646 0.1139 0.2622 
F-Statistics F(1,53)


































Appendix B TECHNICAL APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 3 
Appendix B.1 Descriptive Statistics 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix B.2 Panel Cointegration Tests and Estimates 
Table B- 1 Panel cointegration tests for energy intensity and CSR1 policies (with trend) 
Panel Cointegration Test: use one-year lead of CSR1 
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs.  Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs.  
Within-dimension Between-dimension 
  Statistic   Statistic 
Panel v-Statistic  2.974609** Group rho-Statistic  2.313507 
Panel rho-Statistic  0.868779 Group PP-Statistic -2.657261** 
Panel PP-Statistic -2.513309** Group ADF-Statistic -3.292768*** 
Panel ADF-Statistic -3.060117**         
Panel Cointegration Test: use same period of CSR1 
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs.  Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs.  
Within-dimension Between-dimension 
  Statistic   Statistic 
Panel v-Statistic  4.062515*** Group rho-Statistic  1.830867 
Panel rho-Statistic  0.244661 Group PP-Statistic -3.102207** 
Panel PP-Statistic -2.762518** Group ADF-Statistic -4.021154*** 
Panel ADF-Statistic -3.782186***     
Panel Cointegration Test: use one-year lag of CSR1 
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs.  Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs.  
Within-dimension Between-dimension 
  Statistic   Statistic 
Panel v-Statistic  5.935444*** Group rho-Statistic  1.810771 
Panel rho-Statistic  0.285611 Group PP-Statistic -5.177879*** 
Panel PP-Statistic -3.198723*** Group ADF-Statistic -4.430504*** 
Panel ADF-Statistic -4.55881***     
Panel Cointegration Test: use two-year lag of CSR1 
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs.  Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs.  
Within-dimension Between-dimension 
  Statistic   Statistic 
Panel v-Statistic  5.889270*** Group rho-Statistic  1.604681 
Panel rho-Statistic -0.234672 Group PP-Statistic -6.846891*** 
Panel PP-Statistic -4.507484*** Group ADF-Statistic -6.247334*** 
Panel ADF-Statistic -5.38117***         
Panel Cointegration Test: use three-year lag of CSR1 
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs.  Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs.  
Within-dimension Between-dimension 
  Statistic   Statistic 
Panel v-Statistic  8.857182*** Group rho-Statistic  2.449069 
Panel rho-Statistic  0.852470 Group PP-Statistic -6.388431*** 
Panel PP-Statistic -4.330775*** Group ADF-Statistic -6.282167*** 
Panel ADF-Statistic -5.298799***     
Notes:  
1. “***”, significant at 0.001; “**”, significant at 0.01; “*”, significant at 0.05; “” significant at 0.1.  
2. Since 9 countries’ CSR1 takes 0 for all the periods, the panel cointegration tests for models using 
one-year lead of CSR1 and same period of CSR1 are based on 16 countries: Austria, China, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Turkey, UK, U.S.A. The panel cointegration tests for models using one-year lag of CSR1 and two 
year-lag of CSR1 are based on 15 countries, not including Turkey. The panel cointegration tests for 






Table B-1 (cont.) 
3. The lag length is automatically selected based on SIC. 
 
Table B- 2 Panel cointegration tests for energy intensity and CSR3 policies (with trend) 
Panel Cointegration Test: use one-year lead of CSR3 
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs.  Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs.  
Within-dimension Between-dimension 
  Statistic   Statistic 
Panel v-Statistic  1.608986 Group rho-Statistic  2.582977 
Panel rho-Statistic  1.005758 Group PP-Statistic -3.661703*** 
Panel PP-Statistic -2.583866** Group ADF-Statistic -3.2294*** 
Panel ADF-Statistic -3.237234***         
Panel Cointegration Test: use same period of CSR3 
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs.  Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs.  
Within-dimension Between-dimension 
  Statistic   Statistic 
Panel v-Statistic  4.427094*** Group rho-Statistic  2.268928 
Panel rho-Statistic  0.545790 Group PP-Statistic -3.474029*** 
Panel PP-Statistic -2.544732** Group ADF-Statistic -3.580517*** 
Panel ADF-Statistic -3.597448***     
Panel Cointegration Test: use one-year lag of CSR3 
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs.  Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs.  
Within-dimension Between-dimension 
  Statistic   Statistic 
Panel v-Statistic  3.685176*** Group rho-Statistic  2.111573 
Panel rho-Statistic  0.456973 Group PP-Statistic -4.072687*** 
Panel PP-Statistic -2.985069** Group ADF-Statistic -4.937178*** 
Panel ADF-Statistic -4.497416***     
Panel Cointegration Test: use two-year lag of CSR3 
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs.  Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs.  
Within-dimension Between-dimension 
  Statistic   Statistic 
Panel v-Statistic  4.178806*** Group rho-Statistic  2.504777 
Panel rho-Statistic  0.797979 Group PP-Statistic -5.768402*** 
Panel PP-Statistic -3.23468*** Group ADF-Statistic -5.776242*** 
Panel ADF-Statistic -4.073316***         
Panel Cointegration Test: use three-year lag of CSR3 
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs.  Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs.  
Within-dimension Between-dimension 
  Statistic   Statistic 
Panel v-Statistic  6.795186*** Group rho-Statistic  2.598653 
Panel rho-Statistic  0.864326 Group PP-Statistic -6.357508*** 
Panel PP-Statistic -3.632161*** Group ADF-Statistic -4.914455*** 
Panel ADF-Statistic -4.025043***     
 
Notes:  
1. “***”, significant at 0.001; “**”, significant at 0.01; “*”, significant at 0.05; “” significant at 0.1.  
2. Since 6 countries’ CSR3 takes 0 for all the periods, the panel cointegration tests for models using 
one-year lead of CSR3, same period of CSR3, one-year lag of CSR3 and two-year lag of CSR3 are  
based on 19 countries: Austria, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, India, Ireland, 





Table B-2 (cont.) 
cointegration test for the model using three-year lag of CSR3 is based on 18 countries, not including 
Ireland. 
3. The lag length is automatically selected based on SIC. 
 
Table B- 3 Energy intensity and CSR1 policies long run equilibrium relation FMOLS estimates 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnCSR1 (1) -0.030875 0.025985 -1.188198 0.2365 
T 13    
n 16    
N 208    
Adjusted R2 0.991692       
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnCSR1 -0.021846 0.024648 -0.886338 0.3767 
T 14    
n 16    
N 224    
Adjusted R2 0.991299       
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnCSR1(-1) -0.004693 0.025001 -0.18771 0.8514 
T 13    
n 15    
N 195    
Adjusted R2 0.992095       
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnCSR1(-2) 0.00127 0.024729 0.051359 0.9591 
T 12    
n 15    
N 180    
Adjusted R2 0.993124       
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnCSR1(-3) 0.032432 0.023503 1.379919 0.1706 
T 11    
n 14    
N 154    
Adjusted R2 0.993068       
Notes:  
1. We use heterogenous first-stage long-run coefficients to estimate this FMOLS model. 
2. The countries included in each FMOLS estimation are consistent with countries included in the 
cointegration tests as we specified in the notes for Table B- 1 Panel cointegration tests for energy 





Table B- 4 Energy intensity and CSR3 policies long run equilibrium relation FMOLS estimates 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnCSR3 (1) -0.037349 0.02388 -1.564046 0.1194 
T 13    
n 19    
N 247    
Adjusted R2 0.991463       
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnCSR3 -0.028928 0.021884 -1.321882 0.1876 
T 14    
n 19    
N 266    
Adjusted R2 0.991334       
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnCSR3(-1) -0.030661 0.021834 -1.404287 0.1618 
T 13    
n 19    
N 247    
Adjusted R2 0.991999       
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnCSR3(-2) -0.00563 0.022509 -0.250143 0.8028 
T 12    
n 19    
N 228    
Adjusted R2 0.99282       
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnCSR3(-3) 0.035348 0.020586 1.717115 0.0881 
T 11    
n 18    
N 198    
Adjusted R2 0.993028       
 
Notes:  
1. We use heterogenous first-stage long-run coefficients to estimate this FMOLS model. 
2. The countries included in each FMOLS estimation are consistent with countries included in the 
cointegration tests as we specified in the notes for Table B- 2 Panel cointegration tests for energy 







Table B- 5 Panel cointegration tests for energy intensity and EPS policies (with trend) 
Panel Cointegration Test: use one-year lead of EPS 
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs.  Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs.  
Within-dimension Between-dimension 
  Statistic   Statistic 
Panel v-Statistic  6.446609*** Group rho-Statistic  2.867433 
Panel rho-Statistic  1.631049 Group PP-Statistic -3.900782*** 
Panel PP-Statistic -1.761665* Group ADF-Statistic -6.080796*** 
Panel ADF-Statistic -3.633295***         
Panel Cointegration Test: use same period of EPS 
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs.  Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs.  
Within-dimension Between-dimension 
  Statistic   Statistic 
Panel v-Statistic  8.989538*** Group rho-Statistic  2.428818 
Panel rho-Statistic  1.041678 Group PP-Statistic -4.403157*** 
Panel PP-Statistic -2.03732* Group ADF-Statistic -4.653356*** 
Panel ADF-Statistic -3.505023***     
  
Panel Cointegration Test: use one-year lag of EPS 
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs.  Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs.  
Within-dimension Between-dimension 
  Statistic   Statistic 
Panel v-Statistic  7.474453*** Group rho-Statistic  2.704355 
Panel rho-Statistic  1.093277 Group PP-Statistic -4.035446*** 
Panel PP-Statistic -2.497976** Group ADF-Statistic -4.270444*** 
Panel ADF-Statistic -3.815735***     
  
Panel Cointegration Test: use two-year lag of EPS 
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs.  Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs.  
Within-dimension Between-dimension 
  Statistic   Statistic 
Panel v-Statistic  6.847165*** Group rho-Statistic  2.225442 
Panel rho-Statistic  0.613001 Group PP-Statistic -5.741226*** 
Panel PP-Statistic -4.01732*** Group ADF-Statistic -7.002672*** 
Panel ADF-Statistic -5.373751***         
Panel Cointegration Test: use three-year lag of EPS 
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs.  Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs.  
Within-dimension Between-dimension 
  Statistic   Statistic 
Panel v-Statistic  4.625125*** Group rho-Statistic  2.980617 
Panel rho-Statistic  1.500316 Group PP-Statistic -5.1801*** 
Panel PP-Statistic -2.898729** Group ADF-Statistic -5.42999*** 
Panel ADF-Statistic -3.143832***     
 
Notes:  
1. “***”, significant at 0.001; “**”, significant at 0.01; “*”, significant at 0.05; “” significant at 0.1.  







Table B- 6 Energy intensity and EPS long run equilibrium relation FMOLS estimates 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnEPS (1) -0.020042 0.013871 -1.444831 0.1496 
T 13    
n 25    
N 325    
Adjusted R2 0.988347       
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnEPS -0.006191 0.012908 -0.479629 0.6318 
T 14    
n 25    
N 350    
Adjusted R2 0.988379       
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnEPS (-1) -0.009686 0.012954 -0.747744 0.4553 
T 13    
n 25    
N 325    
Adjusted R2 0.988592       
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnEPS (-2) -0.02697* 0.012857 -2.097729 0.0369 
T 12    
n 25    
N 300    
Adjusted R2 0.989291       
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnEPS(-3) -0.040657** 0.014185 -2.866309 0.0045 
T 11    
n 25    
N 275    
Adjusted R2 0.989299       










Table B- 7 The panel cointegration testing results for energy intensity and AEPoP (with trend) 
Panel Cointegration Test: use same period of AEPoP 
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs.  Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs.  
Within-dimension Between-dimension 
  Statistic   Statistic 
Panel v-Statistic  10.73327*** Group rho-Statistic  1.592599 
Panel rho-Statistic  0.015457 Group PP-Statistic -6.324653*** 
Panel PP-Statistic -4.797462*** Group ADF-Statistic -6.794755*** 
Panel ADF-Statistic -6.317559***         
Panel Cointegration Test: use one year lag of AEPoP 
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs.  Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs.  
Within-dimension Between-dimension 
  Statistic   Statistic 
Panel v-Statistic  11.23055*** Group rho-Statistic  2.107997 
Panel rho-Statistic  0.509552 Group PP-Statistic -5.17001*** 
Panel PP-Statistic -4.159237*** Group ADF-Statistic -5.867668*** 
Panel ADF-Statistic -5.788824***     
  
Panel Cointegration Test: use two-year lag of AEPoP 
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs.  Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs.  
Within-dimension Between-dimension 
  Statistic   Statistic 
Panel v-Statistic  9.974521*** Group rho-Statistic  2.251310 
Panel rho-Statistic  0.418702 Group PP-Statistic -4.6384*** 
Panel PP-Statistic -3.866462*** Group ADF-Statistic -6.348704*** 
Panel ADF-Statistic -5.413759***     
  
Panel Cointegration Test: use three-year lag of AEPoP 
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs.  Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs.  
Within-dimension Between-dimension 
  Statistic   Statistic 
Panel v-Statistic  9.159220*** Group rho-Statistic  2.719828 
Panel rho-Statistic  0.967753 Group PP-Statistic -6.608275*** 
Panel PP-Statistic -3.845463*** Group ADF-Statistic -6.506258*** 
Panel ADF-Statistic -5.364488***         
Panel Cointegration Test: use four-year lag of AEPoP 
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs.  Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs.  
Within-dimension Between-dimension 
  Statistic   Statistic 
Panel v-Statistic  10.54176*** Group rho-Statistic  2.488832 
Panel rho-Statistic  0.624900 Group PP-Statistic -8.178557*** 
Panel PP-Statistic -5.978334*** Group ADF-Statistic -9.506256*** 
Panel ADF-Statistic -7.760608***         
Panel Cointegration Test: use five-year lag of AEPoP 
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs.  Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs.  
Within-dimension Between-dimension 
  Statistic   Statistic 
Panel v-Statistic  5.981731*** Group rho-Statistic  3.740993 
Panel rho-Statistic  1.741810 Group PP-Statistic -6.136543*** 
Panel PP-Statistic -4.870503*** Group ADF-Statistic -7.920347*** 





Table B-7 (cont.) 
Panel Cointegration Test: use six-year lag of AEPoP 
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs.  Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs.  
Within-dimension Between-dimension 
  Statistic   Statistic 
Panel v-Statistic  7.402179*** Group rho-Statistic  3.516301 
Panel rho-Statistic  2.023614 Group PP-Statistic -8.59732*** 
Panel PP-Statistic -5.215692*** Group ADF-Statistic -6.140788*** 
Panel ADF-Statistic -4.880708***         
Panel Cointegration Test: use seven-year lag of AEPoP 
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs.  Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs.  
Within-dimension Between-dimension 
  Statistic   Statistic 
Panel v-Statistic  4.125089*** Group rho-Statistic  3.899850 
Panel rho-Statistic  2.192940 Group PP-Statistic -11.17164*** 
Panel PP-Statistic -7.681642*** Group ADF-Statistic -6.132826*** 
Panel ADF-Statistic -6.151335***         
Panel Cointegration Test: use eight-year lag of AEPoP 
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs.  Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs.  
Within-dimension Between-dimension 
  Statistic   Statistic 
Panel v-Statistic  2.275332* Group rho-Statistic  3.914040 
Panel rho-Statistic  2.278738 Group PP-Statistic -14.44573*** 
Panel PP-Statistic -10.58816*** Group ADF-Statistic -8.676835*** 
Panel ADF-Statistic -7.77241***     
Notes:  
1. “***”, significant at 0.001; “**”, significant at 0.01; “*”, significant at 0.05; “” significant at 0.1.  















Table B- 8 Energy intensity and AEPoP long run equilibrium relation FMOLS estimates 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnAEPoP(-2) 0.019174 0.011618 1.650301 0.1001 
T 12       
n 25       
N 300       
Adjusted R2 0.989042       
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnAEPoP(-3) 0.009195 0.012053 0.762916 0.4463 
T 11       
n 25       
N 275       
Adjusted R2 0.988933       
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnAEPoP(-4) 0.030693* 0.01229 2.497459 0.0133 
T 10       
n 25       
N 250       
Adjusted R2 0.9893       
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnAEPoP(-5) -0.006185 0.013031 -0.474661 0.6356 
T 9       
n 25       
N 225       
Adjusted R2 0.989844       
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnAEPoP(-6) -0.085724*** 0.015532 -5.519091 0.0000 
T 8       
n 25       
N 200       
Adjusted R2 0.991138       
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnAEPoP(-7) -0.074997*** 0.015124 -4.958725 0.0000 
T 7       
n 25       
N 175       








Table B-8 (cont.) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnAEPoP(-8) -0.046691** 0.014080 -3.316193 0.0013 
T 6       
n 25       
N 150       
Adjusted R2 0.989987       
Note: We use heterogenous first-stage long-run coefficients to estimate this FMOLS model. 
 
Table B- 9 The pairwise Padroni (1999, 2004) cointegration tests among covariates for CO2/E models 
  Dependent Variables (Without Trend) 
  lnRE lnCSR1 lnCSR3 lnEPS Lag lnCO2Tech 














lnCSR1 (3), (4)*, 
(7)* 
- - (4), (7) (2)***, (3)***, 
(4)***, (6)***, 
(7)*** 
lnCSR3 (7)* - - (3)*, (4)**, 
(6)*, (7)** 
(1), (2)***, (3)***, 
(4)***, (6)***, 
(7)*** 
lnEPS No No No - (1), (2)***, (3)***, 
(4)***, (5)*, 
(6)***, (7)*** 
LaglnCO2Tech No No No (3), (4)*, 
(6)*, (7)* 
- 
  Dependent Variables (With Trend) 
  lnRE lnCSR1 lnCSR3 lnEPS Lag lnCO2Tech 






















- - (1)*, (4)*, 
(7)* 







(4)**, (7)** (4)**, 
(6)**, 
(7)*** 













Table B-9 (cont.) 
Notes:  
1. “***”, significant at 0.001; “**”, significant at 0.01; “*”, significant at 0.05; “” significant at 0.1.  
2. Variables in columns are dependent variables.  
3. Number (1) to (7) denotes seven different panel cointegration test statistics from Pedroni (1999, 
2004) tests without trend: 
(1). Panel v-Statistic  
(2). Panel rho-Statistic  
(3). Panel PP-Statistic  
(4). Panel ADF-Statistic 
(5). Group rho-Statistic  
(6). Group PP-Statistic  
(7). Group ADF-Statistic 
“No” means no statistic is significant. 
4. Since 9 countries’ CSR1 takes 0 for all the periods, the panel cointegration test involving CSR1 is 
based on 16 countries: Austria, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, UK, U.S.A. 
5. Since 6 countries’ CSR3 takes 0 for all the periods, the panel cointegration test involving CSR3 is 
based on 19 countries: Austria, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, India, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, UK, U.S.A. 


















Table B- 10 The panel cointegration testing results for CO2/E and CO2Tech (with trend) 
Panel Cointegration Test: use one year lag of CO2Tech 
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs.  Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs.  
Within-dimension Between-dimension 
  Statistic   Statistic 
Panel v-Statistic  2.586579** Group rho-Statistic  2.422761 
Panel rho-Statistic  0.525320 Group PP-Statistic -4.108266*** 
Panel PP-Statistic -4.167397*** Group ADF-Statistic -3.547138*** 
Panel ADF-Statistic -5.003169***         
Panel Cointegration Test: use two-year lag of CO2Tech 
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs.  Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs.  
Within-dimension Between-dimension 
  Statistic   Statistic 
Panel v-Statistic  5.009312*** Group rho-Statistic  2.647949 
Panel rho-Statistic  0.086251 Group PP-Statistic -4.773169*** 
Panel PP-Statistic -6.774553*** Group ADF-Statistic -6.242038*** 
Panel ADF-Statistic -9.401614***     
Panel Cointegration Test: use three-year lag of CO2Tech 
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs.  Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs.  
Within-dimension Between-dimension 
  Statistic   Statistic 
Panel v-Statistic  5.109110*** Group rho-Statistic  2.393108 
Panel rho-Statistic  1.199136 Group PP-Statistic -6.90165*** 
Panel PP-Statistic -7.262554*** Group ADF-Statistic -7.6595*** 
Panel ADF-Statistic -8.846652***         
Panel Cointegration Test: use four-year lag of CO2Tech 
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs.  Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs.  
Within-dimension Between-dimension 
  Statistic   Statistic 
Panel v-Statistic  6.418540*** Group rho-Statistic  2.753252 
Panel rho-Statistic  1.105143 Group PP-Statistic -8.794144*** 
Panel PP-Statistic -6.717967*** Group ADF-Statistic -9.70462*** 
Panel ADF-Statistic -8.026721***     
Notes:  
1. “***”, significant at 0.001; “**”, significant at 0.01; “*”, significant at 0.05; “” significant at 0.1.  












Table B-11 CO2/E and CO2Tech long run equilibrium relation FMOLS estimates 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnCO2Tech(-1) 0.003241 0.003786 0.856134 0.3926 
T 14    
n 25    
N 350    
Adjusted R2 0.991853       
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnCO2Tech(-2) -0.000248 0.003407 -0.072696 0.9421 
T 13    
n 25    
N 325    
Adjusted R2 0.992501       
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnCO2Tech(-3) 0.00053 0.003 0.176753 0.8598 
T 12    
n 25    
N 300    
Adjusted R2 0.992845       
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnCO2Tech(-4) -0.005239 0.003065 -1.709319 0.0888 
T 11    
n 25    
N 275    
Adjusted R2 0.993056       















Table B-12 The panel cointegration testing results for CO2/E and CSR1 (with trend) 
Panel Cointegration Test: use same period of CSR1 
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs.  Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs.  
Within-dimension Between-dimension 
  Statistic   Statistic 
Panel v-Statistic -0.388898 Group rho-Statistic  1.741377 
Panel rho-Statistic  0.622599 Group PP-Statistic -2.847904** 
Panel PP-Statistic -3.685484*** Group ADF-Statistic -3.842243*** 
Panel ADF-Statistic -5.546037***         
Panel Cointegration Test: use one-year lag of CSR1 
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs.  Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs.  
Within-dimension Between-dimension 
  Statistic   Statistic 
Panel v-Statistic  3.177587*** Group rho-Statistic  1.275011 
Panel rho-Statistic -0.354305 Group PP-Statistic -6.197762*** 
Panel PP-Statistic -5.898195*** Group ADF-Statistic -5.558072*** 
Panel ADF-Statistic -6.653761***     
Panel Cointegration Test: use two-year lag of CSR1 
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs.  Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs.  
Within-dimension Between-dimension 
  Statistic   Statistic 
Panel v-Statistic  2.959053** Group rho-Statistic  2.592108 
Panel rho-Statistic  0.671825 Group PP-Statistic -4.424877*** 
Panel PP-Statistic -6.672601*** Group ADF-Statistic -6.262559*** 
Panel ADF-Statistic -8.222498***     
Panel Cointegration Test: use three-year lag of CSR1 
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs.  Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs.  
Within-dimension Between-dimension 
  Statistic   Statistic 
Panel v-Statistic  2.920843** Group rho-Statistic  2.454643 
Panel rho-Statistic  1.389123 Group PP-Statistic -4.439236*** 
Panel PP-Statistic -3.585191*** Group ADF-Statistic -5.012412*** 
Panel ADF-Statistic -6.064714***         
Panel Cointegration Test: use four-year lag of CSR1 
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs.  Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs.  
Within-dimension Between-dimension 
  Statistic   Statistic 
Panel v-Statistic  2.551827** Group rho-Statistic  2.458480 
Panel rho-Statistic  1.114759 Group PP-Statistic -7.011147*** 
Panel PP-Statistic -2.271707* Group ADF-Statistic -5.376725*** 
Panel ADF-Statistic -2.37134**     
Panel Cointegration Test: use five-year lag of CSR1 
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs.  Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs.  
Within-dimension Between-dimension 
  Statistic   Statistic 
Panel v-Statistic  3.567120*** Group rho-Statistic  1.962817 
Panel rho-Statistic  0.377709 Group PP-Statistic -7.626479*** 
Panel PP-Statistic -4.860246*** Group ADF-Statistic -5.610423*** 








Table B-12 (cont.) 
Panel Cointegration Test: use six-year lag of CSR1 
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs.  Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs.  
Within-dimension Between-dimension 
  Statistic   Statistic 
Panel v-Statistic  1.678626* Group rho-Statistic  2.358612 
Panel rho-Statistic  1.016819 Group PP-Statistic -7.703313*** 
Panel PP-Statistic -7.618776*** Group ADF-Statistic -4.117839*** 




Table B-13 The panel cointegration testing results for CO2/E and CSR3 (with trend) 
Panel Cointegration Test: use same period of CSR3 
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs.  Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs.  
Within-dimension Between-dimension 
  Statistic   Statistic 
Panel v-Statistic  1.745272* Group rho-Statistic  1.547751 
Panel rho-Statistic  0.232885 Group PP-Statistic -4.135152*** 
Panel PP-Statistic -3.964804*** Group ADF-Statistic -4.515242*** 
Panel ADF-Statistic -5.380415***         
Panel Cointegration Test: use one-year lag of CSR3 
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs.  Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs.  
Within-dimension Between-dimension 
  Statistic   Statistic 
Panel v-Statistic  1.799663* Group rho-Statistic  1.698843 
Panel rho-Statistic  0.186501 Group PP-Statistic -4.330007*** 
Panel PP-Statistic -3.990904*** Group ADF-Statistic -4.674053*** 
Panel ADF-Statistic -6.554406***     
Panel Cointegration Test: use two-year lag of CSR3 
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs.  Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs.  
Within-dimension Between-dimension 
  Statistic   Statistic 
Panel v-Statistic  2.256021* Group rho-Statistic  2.569215 
Panel rho-Statistic  1.097100 Group PP-Statistic -3.716855*** 
Panel PP-Statistic -4.197047*** Group ADF-Statistic -3.780778*** 
Panel ADF-Statistic -5.67456***     
Panel Cointegration Test: use three-year lag of CSR3 
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs.  Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs.  
Within-dimension Between-dimension 
  Statistic   Statistic 
Panel v-Statistic  4.343896*** Group rho-Statistic  2.716884 
Panel rho-Statistic  1.502332 Group PP-Statistic -5.261533*** 
Panel PP-Statistic -4.786884*** Group ADF-Statistic -5.536209*** 








Table B-13 (cont.) 
Panel Cointegration Test: use four-year lag of CSR3 
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs.  Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs.  
Within-dimension Between-dimension 
  Statistic   Statistic 
Panel v-Statistic  3.079023** Group rho-Statistic  2.696898 
Panel rho-Statistic  1.230887 Group PP-Statistic -9.114311*** 
Panel PP-Statistic -4.347854*** Group ADF-Statistic -7.233205*** 
Panel ADF-Statistic -4.707188***     
Panel Cointegration Test: use five-year lag of CSR3 
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs.  Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs.  
Within-dimension Between-dimension 
  Statistic   Statistic 
Panel v-Statistic  1.915002* Group rho-Statistic  3.226446 
Panel rho-Statistic  2.388576 Group PP-Statistic -6.388666*** 
Panel PP-Statistic -2.21253* Group ADF-Statistic -6.296698*** 
Panel ADF-Statistic -4.322728***     
Panel Cointegration Test: use six-year lag of CSR3 
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs.  Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs.  
Within-dimension Between-dimension 
  Statistic   Statistic 
Panel v-Statistic  0.401374 Group rho-Statistic  2.716389 
Panel rho-Statistic  2.505338 Group PP-Statistic -9.585247*** 
Panel PP-Statistic -3.812183*** Group ADF-Statistic -6.171795*** 

















Table B-14 CO2/E and CSR1 long run equilibrium relation FMOLS estimates 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnCSR1 -0.003186 0.021461 -0.148437 0.8822 
T 14    
n 16    
N 224    
Adjusted R2 0.991432       
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnCSR1(-1) 0.009251 0.020631 0.448381 0.6546 
T 13    
n 15    
N 195    
Adjusted R2 0.991995       
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnCSR1(-2) 0.004912 0.020784 0.236331 0.8136 
T 12    
n 15    
N 180    
Adjusted R2 0.99247       
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnCSR1(-3) 0.004946 0.025559 0.193492 0.8470 
T 11    
n 15    
N 165    
Adjusted R2 0.992764       
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnCSR1(-4) -0.015872 0.027089 -0.585921 0.5598 
T 10    
n 12    
N 120    
Adjusted R2 0.99537       
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnCSR1(-5) -0.004027 0.027232 -0.147882 0.8831 
T 9    
n 11    
N 99    








Table B-14 (cont.) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnCSR1(-6) -0.0261 0.034298 -0.760966 0.4551 
T 8    
n 10    
N 80    
Adjusted R2 0.994939       
 
Note: We use heterogenous first-stage long-run coefficients to estimate FMOLS models. 
 
 
Table B-15 CO2/E and CSR3 long run equilibrium relation FMOLS estimates 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnCSR3 -0.001472 0.018038 -0.081588 0.9351 
T 14    
n 19    
N 266    
Adjusted R2 0.992187       
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnCSR3(-1) -0.011179 0.018005 -0.620874 0.5354 
T 13    
n 19    
N 247    
Adjusted R2 0.992975       
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnCSR3(-2) -0.01377 0.017433 -0.789914 0.4306 
T 12    
n 19    
N 228    
Adjusted R2 0.993451       
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnCSR3(-3) -0.010029 0.015986 -0.627343 0.5314 
T 11    
n 18    
N 198    









Table B-15 (cont.) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnCSR3(-4) -0.014772 0.018002 -0.820558 0.4134 
T 10    
n 18    
N 180    
Adjusted R2 0.993775       
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnCSR3(-5) 0.000274 0.020986 0.013037 0.9896 
T 9    
n 18    
N 162    
Adjusted R2 0.994824       
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnCSR3(-6) -0.013267 0.021436 -0.61889 0.5378 
T 8    
n 16    
N 128    
Adjusted R2 0.994662       
 























Table B-16 The panel cointegration testing results for CO2/E and EPS (with trend) 
Panel Cointegration Test: use same period of EPS 
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs.  Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs.  
Within-dimension Between-dimension 
  Statistic   Statistic 
Panel v-Statistic  4.590410*** Group rho-Statistic  2.086772 
Panel rho-Statistic -0.37262 Group PP-Statistic -5.745038*** 
Panel PP-Statistic -6.577595*** Group ADF-Statistic -5.965562*** 
Panel ADF-Statistic -5.805029***         
Panel Cointegration Test: use one year lag of EPS 
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs.  Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs.  
Within-dimension Between-dimension 
  Statistic   Statistic 
Panel v-Statistic  3.946477*** Group rho-Statistic  2.420253 
Panel rho-Statistic -0.06584 Group PP-Statistic -7.008407*** 
Panel PP-Statistic -6.930241*** Group ADF-Statistic -7.846113*** 
Panel ADF-Statistic -8.389265***     
  
Panel Cointegration Test: use two-year lag of EPS 
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs.  Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs.  
Within-dimension Between-dimension 
  Statistic   Statistic 
Panel v-Statistic  2.633415** Group rho-Statistic  2.748787 
Panel rho-Statistic  1.406570 Group PP-Statistic -5.920642*** 
Panel PP-Statistic -4.160837*** Group ADF-Statistic -6.480718*** 
Panel ADF-Statistic -5.89515***     
  
Panel Cointegration Test: use three-year lag of EPS 
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs.  Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs.  
Within-dimension Between-dimension 
  Statistic   Statistic 
Panel v-Statistic  2.062611* Group rho-Statistic  2.651004 
Panel rho-Statistic  1.719291 Group PP-Statistic -6.00439*** 
Panel PP-Statistic -3.855563*** Group ADF-Statistic -7.679608*** 












Table B-17 CO2/E and EPS long run equilibrium relation FMOLS estimates 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnEPS 0.025068** 0.00796 3.149091 0.0018 
T 14    
n 25    
N 350    
Adjusted R2 0.991965       
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnEPS(-1) 0.018524* 0.00806 2.298193 0.0223 
T 13    
n 25    
N 325    
Adjusted R2 0.99258       
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnEPS(-2) 0.009247 0.00912 1.013906 0.3116 
T 12    
n 25    
N 300    
Adjusted R2 0.992851       
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnEPS(-3) 0.003451 0.010334 0.333971 0.7387 
T 11    
n 25    
N 275    
Adjusted R2 0.993009       
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnEPS(-4) 0.005965 0.01058 0.563865 0.5735 
T 10    
n 25    
N 250    
Adjusted R2 0.99324       
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnEPS(-5) -0.007212 0.01031 -0.69948 0.4852 
T 9    
n 25    
N 225    









Table B-17 (cont.) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnEPS(-6) -0.019575* 0.009577 -2.043821 0.0427 
T 8    
n 25    
N 200    
Adjusted R2 0.993774       

























Appendix B.3 Robustness Check 
A. Energy Intensity 
Table B-18 The DOLS estimates of cointegrating relations for energy intensity (SIC based) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnCSR3(-3) 0.042283 0.023498 1.799412 0.0741 
T 11    
n 18    
N 198    
Adjusted R2 0.993271       
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnEPS(-2) -0.047638** 0.016897 -2.819313 0.0052 
T 12    
n 25    
N 300    
Adjusted R2 0.988843       
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnEPS(-3) -0.029285 0.018246 -1.605015 0.1101 
T 11    
n 25    
N 275    
Adjusted R2 0.989186       
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnRDE -0.041888* 0.018119 -2.31189 0.0215 
T 14    
n 25    
N 350    
Adjusted R2 0.988636       
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnAEPoP(-2) 0.018321 0.015302 1.197274 0.2325 
T 12    
n 25    
N 300    
Adjusted R2 0.988953       







Table B-18 (cont.) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnAEPoP(-4) 0.025655* 0.012175 2.107186 0.0365 
T 10    
n 25    
N 250    
Adjusted R2 0.988727       
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnAEPoP(-6) -0.118259*** 0.017777 -6.652495 0.0000 
T 8    
n 25    
N 200    
Adjusted R2 0.991831       
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnAEPoP(-7) -0.084598*** 0.016624 -5.088756 0.0000 
T 7    
n 25    
N 175    
Adjusted R2 0.990757       
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnAEPoP(-8) -0.016106 0.019483 -0.826659 0.4111 
T 6    
n 25    
N 150    
Adjusted R2 0.988814       
 












Table B-19 The DOLS estimates of cointegrating relations for energy intensity (fixed 1 lead & 1 lag) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnCSR3(-3) 0.156871*** 0.038573 4.066848 0.0001 
T 9    
n 18    
N 162    
Adjusted R2 0.996377       
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnEPS(-2) -0.087179** 0.030998 -2.812441 0.0057 
T 10    
n 25    
N 250    
Adjusted R2 0.988612       
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnEPS(-3) -0.078840* 0.037836 -2.083757 0.0398 
T 9    
n 25    
N 225    
Adjusted R2 0.9883       
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnRDE -0.102290*** 0.029866 -3.425010 0.0008 
T 12    
n 25    
N 300    
Adjusted R2 0.987753       
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnAEPoP(-2) 0.101746** 0.030643 3.32036 0.0012 
T 10    
n 25    
N 250    
Adjusted R2 0.989455       









Table B-19 (cont.) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnAEPoP(-4) -0.008084 0.039932 -0.202446 0.8401 
T 8    
n 25    
N 200    
Adjusted R2 0.99108       
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnAEPoP(-6) -0.282495*** 0.059883 -4.717410 0.0001 
T 6    
n 25    
N 150    



























B. CO2 Emissions 
Table B-20 The DOLS estimates of cointegrating relations for energy intensity (SIC based) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnRE -0.119418*** 0.021161 -5.643302 0.0000 
T 14    
n 15    
N 350    
Adjusted R2 0.994316       
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnCO2Tech(-4) -0.005155 0.005176 -0.99603 0.3204 
T 11    
n 25    
N 275    
Adjusted R2 0.994813       
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnEPS 0.020407 0.011071 1.843322 0.0664 
T 14    
n 25    
N 350    
Adjusted R2 0.99336       
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnEPS(-1) 0.01072 0.011302 0.948453 0.3438 
T 13    
n 25    
N 325    
Adjusted R2 0.994303       
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnEPS(-6) -0.011196 0.015827 -0.707415 0.4806 
T 8    
n 25    
N 200    
Adjusted R2 0.996247       









Table B-21 The DOLS estimates of cointegrating relations for energy intensity (fixed 1 lead & 1 lag) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnRE -0.108216*** 0.031947 -3.387321 0.0009 
T 12    
n 25    
N 300    
Adjusted R2 0.99682       
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnCO2Tech(-4) -0.001279 0.00888 -0.144049 0.8858 
T 9    
n 25    
N 225    
Adjusted R2 0.996757       
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnEPS 0.033009 0.017423 1.894615 0.0598 
T 12    
n 25    
N 300    
Adjusted R2 0.995492       
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnEPS(-1) 0.02782 0.017776 1.565043 0.1197 
T 11    
n 25    
N 275    
Adjusted R2 0.996151       
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
lnEPS(-6) 0.092202 0.050616 1.821601 0.081 
T 6    
n 25    
N 150    












Table B- 22 Robustness check main estimate results for PM2.5 model (using CSR1) 
Variables 








PM2.5i,t-1 0.270*** 0.269*** 0.297*** 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.037) 
TotalCO2 0.127* 0.109* 0.080 
 (0.050) (0.049) (0.056) 
Population -0.007 0.213 -0.026 
 (0.184) (0.168) (0.208) 
SoliFuelCO2 0.147 0.193* 0.234** 
 (0.079) (0.078) (0.088) 
CSR1 -0.096** -0.093** -0.082* 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.037) 
CSR1i,t-1 -0.025 -0.021 0.008 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.047) 
CSR1i,t-2 0.114** 0.106* 0.069 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.046) 
CSR1i,t-3 -0.099** -0.101** -0.143** 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.047) 
CSR1i,t-4   0.026 
   (0.038) 
EPS -0.056** -0.066*** -0.049* 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.020) 
ISO14001 -0.039* -0.046** -0.026 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) 
PM2.5Techi,t-1    
    
PM2.5Techi,t-2    
    
PM2.5Techi,t-3 0.025**   
 (0.009)   
PM2.5Techi,t-4   -0.007 
   (0.010) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
n 25 25 25 
T 12 12 11 
N 765 765 900 
Adjusted R2 0.5116 0.5068 0.372 
F-Statistic F(22,743)=37.42,  
p-value: < 2.2e-16 
F(21,744)=38.44,  
p-value: < 2.2e-16 
F(22,590)=17.48,  





Table B-23 Robustness check main estimate results for PM2.5 model (using CSR3) 
Variables 












PM2.5i,t-1 0.288*** 0.286*** 0.286*** 0.289*** 0.324*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.028) (0.032) (0.033) 
TotalCO2 0.051 0.044 0.041 0.033 -0.039 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.037) (0.042) (0.047) 
Population -0.021 -0.025 0.061 0.012 0.234 
 (0.108) (0.108) (0.128) (0.150) (0.171) 
SoliFuelCO2 0.123* 0.118* 0.143* 0.221** 0.294*** 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.058) (0.067) (0.074) 
CSR3 0.016     
 (0.016)     
CSR3i,t-1  0.040** -0.002   
  (0.015) (0.027)   
CSR3i,t-2   0.019   
   (0.026)   
CS33i,t-3    -0.018  
    (0.018)  
CS31i,t-4     -0.034 
     (0.020) 
EPS -0.038** -0.035** -0.027 -0.047** -0.034 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.017) (0.018) 
ISO14001 -0.037*** -0.035** -0.043*** -0.048** -0.020 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016) 
PM2.5Techi,t-1 0.022*** 0.023***    
 (0.006) (0.006)    
PM2.5Techi,t-2   0.006   
   (0.007)   
PM2.5Techi,t-3    0.015  
    (0.007)  
PM2.5Techi,t-4     -0.002 
     (0.008) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
n 21 21 21 21 21 
T 15 14 13 12 11 
N 1386 1375 1155 945 756 
Adjusted R2 0.4425 0.4449 0.4546 0.4659 0.3165 
F-Statistic F(21,1365)=53.39,  
p-value: < 2.2e-16 
F(20,1365)=53.91,  
p-value: < 2.2e-16 
F(21,1134)=46.84,  
p-value: < 2.2e-16 
F(19,926)=44.39,  
p-value: < 2.2e-16 
F(18,738)=20.45,  
p-value: < 2.2e-16 
 
